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Introductory Words
Within the last 51 months, I have had the opportunity to work with a number of
inspiring researchers. This is reflected in this cumulative dissertation, which com-
prises five mainly independent research projects. Apart from the single-authored
research project in the first chapter, six different coauthors have each contributed
to exactly one of the four joint research projects presented in Chapters 2 to 5.
This heterogeneity in coauthorship is one reason why I was able to address very
diverse topics in this dissertation. The common ground of all five chapters is the
application of econometric methods in a microeconomic context.
Econometric methods are most commonly applied either using historical or ex-
perimental data. In order to test a certain theory, experimental data are created
in a target-oriented way in a (perfectly) controlled environment, whereas historical
data uses information from the past. My dissertation makes use of both data alter-
natives. The first part of my dissertation (Chapters 1 to 3) is based on historical
data, mainly from the German Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für
Arbeit, in short BA), to investigate wage dynamics in the German labor market
over the last four decades. For the second part of my dissertation, experimen-
tal data have been collected in the field (Chapter 4) as well as in the laboratory
(Chapter 5) to investigate individual donation behavior.
Studying wage dynamics has been a key element of labor economics for a long
time. One major finding is the widening of the wage distribution in most developed
countries that started in the 1970s in several countries, see e.g. Autor et al. 2008,
Acemoglu 2003, and Levy and Murnane 1992. In Germany, rising wage inequality
was mainly driven by the disproportional wage increases in the upper-tail of the
1
wage distribution in the 1970s before the lower-tail wage inequality started to
increase since the 1990s as well (see e.g. Dustmann et al. 2009, Fitzenberger 1999).
However, as long as individuals are able to move up the earnings distribution, a
high degree of cross-sectional wage inequality is likely to exaggerate the extent
of wage inequality over a working life. Thus, for any analysis of the evolution of
lifetime wage inequality it is important to also take individual wage mobility over
time into account. Wage mobility is defined as the change of an individual’s relative
position in the wage distribution between two periods. To this end, I make use of
the regional file of the employment subsample of the Research Institute of the BA
(SIAB), which contains a 2% random sample of all social security records between
1975 and 2008 that cover approximately 80% of the overall German workforce.
Chapter 1 gives a descriptive overview of the evolution of wage inequality and
wage mobility, separately for men and women, in West and East Germany over
the last four decades. The results show that the increase in wage inequality was
accompanied by a decrease in wage mobility for both sexes in West and East
Germany. Women face a higher level of wage inequality and a lower level of wage
mobility than men in West and East Germany throughout the entire observation
period. The mobility decline was sharper in East Germany so that the level of
wage mobility has fallen below that of West Germany. The long time span of the
data additionally allows for an analysis of long-term mobility, which is of particular
interest as it gives insights on the chances of moving up the wage distribution over
an individual’s life cycle. Covering up to 24 years of a West German working life, I
find that long-term wage mobility was higher for male than for female workers in all
years. However, the wage mobility gender gap has been slowly closing over time
as long-term wage mobility has slightly increased for women whereas it slightly
2
decreased for men.
From a welfare perspective, a low degree of wage mobility in the low-wage sector
is of particular concern as it tends to marginalize low-wage workers in the long
run. Therefore, Chapter 2 takes a specific look at the evolution of wage mobility
in the West German low-wage sector between 1984 and 2004.1 Wage mobility
is here defined as switching between the two labor market states “low pay” and
“high pay” with the threshold being 2/3 of the median wage, which is the standard
threshold in the literature (e.g. OECD 1998, Stewart and Staffield 1999, European
Commission 2004). In this essay, which is coauthored by Nicole Gürtzgen, we are
particularly interested in explaining the observed decline in wage mobility in the
low-wage sector, which has grown from 13% in 1996 to 18% in 2008. Next to
compositional shifts in the low-wage relative to the high-wage sector, the decline
in wage mobility may be explained by an increase in genuine (or “true”) state
dependence. The latter occurs if low-wage employment today causes low-wage
employment in the future for reasons of, e.g., stigmatization or human capital
depreciation.
In order to isolate the evolution of genuine state dependence, we model low-pay
transitions by estimating a series of multivariate probit models. We address the
initial conditions problem in our estimation approach by explicitly accounting for
selection into low-wage employment. Moreover, we control for the fact that the
likelihood of remaining in the sample might differ between low-paid and high-paid
individuals. Our findings for men and women point to an upward trend of genuine
state dependence among low-paid workers, especially since the beginning of the
1As the SIAB data set has been made available only recently, the analysis in Chapter 2 uses
the previous data version (IABS), which contains the years 1975 to 2004.
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1990s. Using decomposition techniques by Oaxaca (1978) and Blinder (1978),
we show that between 35 and 54% of the increase in genuine state dependence
during the 1990s is accounted for by changes in the characteristics of the low-wage
workforce over time.
One way to prevent the low-wage sector from increasing and to reduce the
number of individuals at risk of low-pay persistence is to introduce minimum wages.
While in several developed countries there exists a nation-wide minimum wage, the
introduction of minimum wages is still a highly debated political issue in Germany.
The main argument against it is that a minimum wage might lead to job losses
following the standard theory of a competitive labor market, where prices cannot
be set by employers, see, e.g., Brown (1999). Evidence from, e.g., the UK and
the US shows that in many cases negative employment effects are hard to detect
as long as the minimum wage is not set extraordinarily high, see Neumark and
Wascher (2008) for an overview article.
Up to now, only few specific industries in Germany have a minimum wage.
The minimum wage level differs across sectors and partially also within sectors.
One of the first sectors in Germany to introduce a minimum wage in 1997 was the
roofing sector as a consequence of the law on the posting of workers (Arbeitnehmer-
Entsendegesetz). Together with Melanie Arntz and Terry Gregory, I have evaluated
the employment effects of the minimum wage introduction and the subsequent
minimum wage increases in this sector. For this purpose, we were able to exploit
two administrative linked employer-employee panel data sets: i) data that are
collected by the central pay office of the roofing sector (Lohnausgleichskasse für das
Dachdeckerhandwerk) and ii) data that are collected by the BA for all employees
who are subject to social insurance contributions. This enabled us to contribute
4
to the sparse literature on employment spillovers of minimum wages on workers
who earn above the minimum wage level, see Chapter 3.
The roofing sector was the first sector to introduce the same minimum wage
level for East and West German workers in 2003. This gave rise to an interna-
tionally unprecedented hard bite of a minimum wage. By 2010, half of the East
German roofers earned the minimum wage so that by now there is no longer a
low-wage sector - as defined above - in the East German roofing sector. Using
a difference-in-differences approach, we investigate the chances of remaining em-
ployed in the roofing sector for workers with and without a binding minimum
wage. We focus on the plumbing sector as a suitable benchmark sector since it is
not subject to a minimum wage. By estimating the counterfactual wage plumbers
would receive in the roofing sector given their characteristics, we are able to iden-
tify employment effects along the entire wage distribution. The results indicate
that the chances for roofers to remain employed in the sector have deteriorated in
East Germany along the entire wage distribution. Such employment spillovers to
workers for whom the minimum wage is not binding may result from scale effects
and/or capital-labour substitution. However, given the specific conditions of the
roofing sector, a transferability of the results to other sectors has to be viewed
with caution.
The second part of my dissertation also makes use of microeconometric meth-
ods, but considers the field of behavioral rather than labor economics. The key
objective of the emerging research in behavioral economics is to harmonize eco-
nomic theories and models with human behavior observed in reality. One of the
key assumptions in economics is thereby questioned by behavioral economists:
that an individual behaves like homo oeconomicus and, thus, acts rationally and
5
egoistically to maximize his or her utility, which is often assumed to be measured
in monetary terms. One phenomenon that makes this view particularly question-
able are donations. Although donations stand in contrast to the behavior of homo
oeconomicus, we do observe them in the real world. Over the past years, (behav-
ioral) economists have put a lot of effort into finding out why individuals donate
and what their decision to donate money (or time) is influenced by, see List (2011)
and Bekkers and Wiepking (2011) for literature overviews. Explanations why in-
dividuals might donate can be found in the theories of altruism (Andreoni, 1989),
the feeling to do something good (Andreoni 1990), reciprocity (Sugden 1984) or
prestige (Harbaugh 1998), to name a few.
Researchers have lately begun to investigate under which circumstances indi-
viduals increase their donations. One motive that attracts individuals to donate
higher amounts is the motive of identification as people care more about identi-
fiable victims than about statistical victims (Small and Loewenstein 2003). Se-
bastian Kube and I contribute to this literature in Chapter 4 by exploring the
effect of providing donors with the opportunity to choose the target country for
their donation. To this end, we have cooperated with a large German charitable
organization, which sent out more than 57,000 letters to their members as part
of a donation campaign. Using this setting for a large natural field experiment,
we find that our treatment manipulation affects neither the average donation size
nor the response rate. Only a small fraction of donors (3.5%) actually chooses
their object of benevolence. However, those donors give more than those who did
not specify a recipient. Based on previous donations, we can provide indicative
evidence that this might be a causal rather than a mere selection effect. This work
has been accepted for publication in a Special Issue on Field Experiments in the
6
Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
Rather than focusing on the amount that is donated to a particular charitable
organization, the essay coauthored by Sarah Borgloh and Astrid Dannenberg in
Chapter 5 goes one step back and analyzes the decision to donate at all. In par-
ticular, we are interested in studying the effect of information about the size of a
charitable organization on individuals’ donations to that organization. The pre-
diction is not clear-cut as there are two contrary strands of theory. The approach
of signaling (Vesterlund, 2003), for example, predicts that donations increase with
others’ contributions while they may decrease following the impact philanthropy
model of Duncan (2004) as the relative impact of one’s donation might be reduced
with rising revenues of the charitable organization.
In order to answer our research question, we have conducted a framed field
experiment in the lab with a non-student subject pool, in which subjects had the
opportunity to donate to various charitable causes. The results show that if sub-
jects are to choose between large organizations with high annual revenues and
small organizations with low annual revenues, they prefer the small organizations.
Thus, our results support the predictions that follow from the model of impact
philanthropy. Moreover, we provide insights about which socio-demographic char-
acteristics affect individual contributions and show that the individual willingness
to donate increases with the subjects’ age, income, and education.
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Chapter 1
Gender Differences in German
Wage Mobility∗
1.1 Introduction
According to Saez (2012), the top one percent of the earnings distribution in the US
earned 10% of all income in 1980, but this share increased to 23% in 2007. This rise
in wage inequality has lately fostered public attention (and tension) throughout
the developed world. An additional prevailing concern is that those who are rich
stay rich and those who are poor stay poor, i.e. wage mobility is perceived to be
low.
Although the actual public debate prefers to concentrate on this extreme case
of wage inequality at the very top of the earnings distribution, several studies
have documented for a number of countries that wage inequality has been rising
during the last decades also at lower percentiles (e.g. Autor et al. 2008, Acemoglu
2003, Levy and Murnane 1992).2 While the upper-tail inequality, measured as
90/50 percentile ratio, for example in the US, has been increasing steadily since
the 1980s, the lower-tail inequality (50/10 percentile ratio) rose sharply during the
1∗I thank Nicole Gürtzgen for fruitful discussions and helpful comments. Financial support
from the German Science Foundation (DFG) is gratefully acknowledged (Grant-No. FR 715/9-1).
2In the US and in the UK, wage inequality began to rise in the 1970s whereas the continental
European countries experienced the start of the increase in wage inequality about one decade
later.
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1980s and flattened thereafter, see e.g. Goldin and Katz (2009).
One reason for the growing upper-tail wage inequality is due to the change in
relative supply of skills that was not able to keep up with the change in relative
demand that occurred due to rapid skill-biased technological change (Katz and
Murphy 1992, Goldin and Katz 2008, Acemoglu and Autor 2012). The erosion
of labor market institutions including labor unions as well as rising international
trade, immigration, and outsourcing is often viewed to have contributed to ris-
ing wage inequality in the lower tail of the wage distribution, see e.g. Burtless
(1995), Acemoglu (2003) and Goldin and Katz (2009). The job polarization in the
highest- and lowest-wage occupations that is modeled by Autor et al. (2003) and
documented, e.g., by Goos and Manning (2007) for the UK may serve as a further
explanation for the diverging trends in upper-tail and lower-tail inequality. As a
consequence of the technological progress - and in particular the implementation of
computer technology - machines substitute medium-paid routine tasks conducted
by, e.g., craft manual workers and bookkeepers, see Spitz-Oener (2006) for evidence
on Germany.3 Furthermore, Card et al. (2012) find that rising wage inequality has
been fostered by rising heterogeneity between workers, rising variability in the
wage premiums at different establishments, and increasing assortativeness in the
matching of workers to plants.
A full picture of the changing wage structure is, however, only adequately drawn
if not only changes in wage inequality, but also changes in wage mobility are taken
into account. If, for example, perfect mobility of wages were observed, low-wage
earners in one period would have the same probability as high-wage earners to
3Antonczyk et al. (2009), however, find that the task-based approach can not explain the
recent increase in wage inequality among male employees in Germany.
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earn a high wage in the next period. In this case, rising wage inequality might
be acceptable as a low-wage position would not be of permanent nature. In the
other extreme case of perfect immobility of wages, all individuals would be bound
to their wage position over time. Thus, a more unequal wage distribution would
deteriorate the chances of low-wage workers to move up the wage ladder over the
life cycle. In general, wage mobility can thus reduce cross-sectional wage inequality
as was shown by, e.g., Gottschalk (1997) for the US and Hofer and Weber (2002)
for several European countries. However, international studies suggest that for a
large number of countries the rising wage inequality was accompanied by declining
wage mobility, which gives rise to rising persistence in low-wage employment, see
e.g. Buchinsky and Hunt (1999) for the US and Dickens (2000) for the UK.4
The wage structure has also been changing in Germany over time, which is par-
ticularly interesting for two reasons: first, the German wage structure has long been
considered relatively stable at the lower tail of the earnings distribution (Prasad
2004). This was likely due to labor market institutions, such as unions, and was
consistent with the hypothesis of skill-biased technological change especially in
the upper part of the wage distribution (Fitzenberger, 1999). Since the mid 1990s,
the lower-tail wage inequality has distinctly risen (Dustmann et al. 2009, Fuchs-
Schündeln et al. 2010, Gernandt and Pfeiffer 2007) to which labor supply shocks,
such as the slowdown of skill-upgrading, and strong deunionization are likely to
have contributed (Antonczyk et al. 2010, Dustmann et al. 2009). Second, Ger-
nandt (2009) shows in one of the very few studies on wage mobility in Germany
that earnings mobility declined over the last decades using household panel data
4Burkhauser et al. (1997) denote that a comparable development of US and German earnings
mobility is achieved during the 1980s despite major differences in labor market institutions and
a greater increase of inequality in the US.
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from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). This finding is confirmed by
Riphahn and Schnitzlein (2011), which is to the best of my knowledge the only
study that analyzes both the evolution of wage inequality and wage mobility us-
ing German administrative data. Their evidence is based on the change in wage
mobility for the overall working population in West and East Germany.
The aim of this chapter is to investigate whether certain sub-groups of the
population are especially prone to being immobile in their wages in the short and
in the long run. I particularly concentrate on gender differences in West and East
Germany when analyzing different wage inequality and wage mobility measures.
For this purpose, I use administrative data from a 2% subsample of the German
Employment Statistics Register (SIAB data). In contrast to survey data like the
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), the SIAB offer much more individual
observations and span (for West Germany) a longer time period from 1975 to 2008.
Moreover, less attrition and less measurement errors can be expected as the sample
is based on reports from employers in compliance with the notifying procedure for
the German social security system.
That differences in wage mobility levels may exist between men and women
might stem from various developments. On the one hand, the rising share of well-
educated women might have contributed to rising wage mobility across women.
On the other hand, there is evidence that men profit from higher wage increases
when changing jobs (Gottschalk 2001, Weber 2002). Moreover, as will be shown in
Chapter 2, women are more likely to stick to a low-paid job, which is of particular
concern as the share of women in the low-wage sector is much greater than the
share of men. Thus, women’s wage mobility is lower than men’s at the low-
wage threshold of 2/3 of the median wage. This result, however, gives only an
12
imprecise picture of the development of wage mobility since it does not allow for
any conclusion on the development of the rest of the wage distribution.
In international studies, the development of wage mobility by gender has been
investigated along the entire wage distribution for various countries. Hofer and
Weber (2002), for example, find that, except for Austria and the UK, women are
more mobile in their wages than men in a number of OECD countries. The study
also includes Germany, but uses the GSOEP for the analysis. The result for the
UK is confirmed by Dickens (2000). Moving up the wage distribution being the
main determinant of wage mobility, Kopczuk et al. (2010) find for the US that
men have a much higher level of long-term upward mobility than women, but this
upward mobility gender gap has been closing over time.5
The outline of this chapter is as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the data set I
use for my analysis and gives an overview on the inequality and mobility measures.
The results on the evolution of wage inequality and short-term and long-term wage
mobility are displayed in Section 1.3. Section 1.4 concludes.
1.2 Data and Measures
1.2.1 The SIAB data
The data set that I use for my analysis is taken from the regional file of the IAB
employment subsample 1975-2008 (SIAB); for detailed information see Dorner
et al. (2011). This administrative data set contains a 2% random sample of all
5Regarding different developments of wage mobility for different individual groups, Raferzeder
and Winter-Ebmer (2007), among others, suggest that young and well educated workers, workers
who work for big companies and workers working in the service sector have higher probabilities
of upward mobility, ceteris paribus.
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social security records from 1975 to 2008 for West Germany and from 1992 to
2008 for East Germany. It includes employment records subject to social security
contributions as well as unemployment records with transfer receipt. The data
contain the employment history of 1.6 million individuals and provide individual
information on daily wages, workers’ employment histories and a number of indi-
vidual characteristics, such as age, education, nationality and occupational status.
Approximately 80% of the German workforce are covered, but self-employed work-
ers, civil servants, and individuals currently doing their military service are not
included in the data set.
Although the SIAB covers a large time span and is subject to much less panel
attrition compared to household surveys like the GSOEP, the data set has some
disadvantages as well. First, as I only observe whether an individual works full-time
or part-time (defined as working less than 30 hours per week), the data lack explicit
information on the actual number of hours worked. For this reason, I restrict
the sample to full-time workers. Second, the wage information is censored since
retirement insurance contributions are only paid up to a fixed social contribution
taxation threshold. Appendix 1C gives an exercise on why it might be advisable
to use only the uncensored observations for my analysis rather than imputing
wages for censored observations as suggested by Gartner (2005). Third, the wage
information contains one-time payments, such as bonus payments, only since 1984.
As Steiner and Wagner (1998) point out, ignoring this structural break between
1983 and 1984 leads to an increase in wage inequality. Hence, the method based on
Fitzenberger (1999) is used to correct for this. For the analysis, I further restrict
the sample to individuals aged between 20 and 55 years. Moreover, only those
employment spells are used which overlap June 30th, thereby ensuring that each
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individual is not observed more than once per year.6
1.2.2 Wage inequality measures
To shed light on the development of the earnings inequality in Germany over time,
different measures of wage inequality can be used. Given that the wage information
is censored in the SIAB, the comparison of particular wage percentiles over time
helps to overcome this limitation. Following Dustmann et al. (2009), I will use
the 15th and 50th (50th and 85th) percentile for highlighting the development at
the lower (upper) part of the earnings distribution. Moreover, the evolution of the
spread between the 85th and the 15th percentile of the annual wage distribution
is a first crude measure of overall wage inequality over time.
In order to use more information of the wage distribution, I also apply wage
inequality measures that take into account the entire wage distribution (up to
the censoring limit). The widely used Gini coefficient, for example, which fulfills
desirable properties like mean independence, population size independence, and
symmetry displays the level of wage inequality on a scale from 0 (no inequality
meaning everyone earns the same income) to 1 (perfect inequality meaning the
richest person earns all the income). More formally, it measures the average dif-
ference between all possible pairs of incomes in the population, expressed as a
6If a worker worked for more than one employer in a year, a weighted average is computed
where the weights represent the shares worked for each employer. To improve the education
variable, I use the imputation rules derived by Fitzenberger et al. (2006). Due to the introduction
of the Euro in 1999, all wages before 1999 are transformed from Deutschmark into Euros at a
rate of 1 e= 1.95583 Deutschmark. Since the wage variable delivers unrealistic daily wages at
the lower end of the wage distribution, all observations with earnings of less than 16 e per day
(in prices of 1995) are excluded.
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proportion of total income (see also Cowell 2011):
Gini = 12N2y¯
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
| yi − yj |, (1.1)
where yi (yj) is the income of individual i (j), y¯ is the average income of the
population and N is the number of individuals in the population.
A third class of inequality measures stems from the family of generalized en-
tropy inequality measures. In contrast to the Gini coefficient, which is particularly
sensitive to the middle of the distribution, the Theil index is particularly sensitive
to the top of the earnings distribution and is defined as follows:
Theil = 1
N
N∑
i=1
yi
y¯
log
(
yi
y¯
)
. (1.2)
The measure of mean log deviation (MLD), also known as Theil’s L measure,
is particularly sensitive to the lower part of the earnings distribution:
MLD = 1
N
N∑
i=1
log
(
y¯
yi
)
(1.3)
As before, yi denotes the income of individual i, y¯ is the average income, and
N is the number of individuals. In contrast to the Gini coefficient, the Theil index
as well as the MLD measure allow for additive decomposition between different
groups. This is particular interesting in my case as I investigate wage inequality
patterns across different subgroups of the population. If Y is the total income of
the population, Yj the income of the subgroup, N the total population and Nj the
population of the subgroup, the decomposition of the Theil index is as follows:
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Theil =
N∑
i=1
yi
Ny¯
log
(
yiN
y¯N
)
=
N∑
i=1
yi
Y
log
(
yiN
Y
)
=
∑
j
Yj
Y
Theilj +
∑
j
Yj
Y
log
(
Yj/Y
Nj/N
)
(1.4)
The first term in equation (1.4) displays the within-group inequality while the
second term represents the between-group inequality. Similarly, the decomposition
for the MLD measure is given by:
MLD =
N∑
i=1
1
N
log
(
Y
YiN
)
=
∑
j
Nj
N
MLDj +
∑
j
Nj
N
log
(
Nj/N
Yj/Y
)
. (1.5)
Hence, the use of these measures allows to draw conclusions on inter- as well
as intragroup inequality of the overall wage inequality observed.
1.2.3 Wage mobility measures
The wage inequality measures give insights into how the shape of the wage distri-
bution has changed over time. However, movements within the wage distribution
cannot be detected by these measures. A series of papers demand to consider wage
mobility when dealing with changes in the wage distribution (e.g. Buchinsky and
Hunt (1999), Dickens (2000), Cardoso (2006)).
A widely used mobility measure is the rank correlation coefficient, which mea-
sures the degree of similarity of, e.g., individual wages between two periods, thus
enabling mobility analyses in the short and in the long run. The higher the rank
correlation is, the lower will be wage mobility between the two periods. In order
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to specify whether different parts of the wage distribution differ with respect to
the level of wage mobility, I furthermore look at quintile transition matrices. This
allows to investigate whether and how many quintiles individuals have moved be-
tween two periods. Since such transition matrix approaches fail to capture the
movement within each quintile so that mobility is likely to be underestimated, I
additionally make use of the measure by Dickens (2000). This mobility measure is
based on the degree of change in ranking from one year to the next and is derived
in the following way:
MD =
2∑Ni=1 | F (wi,t+1)− F (wi,t) |
N
, (1.6)
where F (wi,t) and F (wi,t+1) are the cumulative distribution functions for earn-
ings in year t and t + 1, respectively, and N is the number of individuals. As
the measure is twice the average absolute change in percentile ranking between
year t and year t+ 1, it takes the minimum value 0 when there is no mobility, i.e.
when each individual remains in the same percentile. Assuming independence of
earnings in the two years would result in a value of 2/3 while the maximum value
of 1 would correspond to the situation where the earnings in the two years are
perfectly negatively correlated.
Moreover, in order to formalize the relationship between wage mobility and
wage inequality, i.e. to measure the extent to which wage mobility reduces short-
run wage inequality in the longer run, the Shorrocks index is applied (Shorrocks,
1978). If we consider a population of i = 1, ..., N individuals observed in t consec-
utive periods and yi,t is the (short-term) earning of individual i in period t, then
y¯i =
∑
t yi,t denotes the average (long-term) earnings of an individual i across T
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periods. If Z = (y1, ..., yN) is a vector of individual earnings and an inequality
measure G() is defined that is a convex function of earnings relative to the mean,
Shorrocks (1978) shows that it must hold that
G
(
Z¯
)
≤
T∑
t=1
G (Zt) /T, (1.7)
where Zt is a vector of earnings in period t and Z¯ is a vector of average indi-
vidual earnings across T periods. The Shorrocks index MS is then defined as
MS = 1−
G
(
Z¯
)
∑T
t=1G (Zt) /T
. (1.8)
The index thus compares the average of t period-specific inequality measures
with inequality averaged over t periods. If the latter is smaller than the for-
mer, intertemporal mobility reduces short-run inequality. The smaller the ratio
in equation (1.8) is, the greater will be the mobility, and the closer to 1 will be
the Shorrocks Index. If both components are of the same size, no mobility is ob-
served and the Shorrocks Index takes the value 0. As inequality measure G(), I
will present the results using the Gini index to estimate the Shorrocks index and
using a horizon of T = 5 years.
Furthermore, the long time dimension of the data set allows an analysis of
long-term mobility in West Germany. This is of particular interest as it gives
insights on the chances of moving up the wage ladder over an individual’s life
cycle. Therefore, I calculate the rank correlation of individual average earnings of
a five-year period centered around period t and a five-year period centered around
t + k, where k = 10, 15, 20 years, thus covering up to 24 years of an individual
working life.
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1.3 Results
1.3.1 Development of wage inequality
Before studying the developments of wage mobility, it is worth to describe the
overall development of wage inequality over time. Figure 1.1 plots the evolution
of real wage growth at three different percentiles of the wage distribution (15th,
50th and 85th percentile) separately for men (Panel A) and women (Panel B).7
The upper graphs (Panel 1) display the real wage growth for West Germany from
1975 to 1992 with 1975 as the base year. The middle and lower graphs show the
real wage growth for West (Panel 2) and East Germany (Panel 3) from 1992 to
2008 with 1992 being the base year.
As can be seen from Panel 1A, male individuals at the 85th percentile experi-
enced a distinct rise in real wages between 1975 and 1992 compared to individuals
at the 15th and 50th percentile, whose real wages developed similarly over the
observation period. For female workers, the real wages for all three wage groups
increased similarly as for the men’s 85th percentile (see Panel 1B). Since the begin-
ning of the 1990s, the pattern of real wage growth has evolved quite differently for
the lower, middle and upper part of the wage distribution for both sexes. While
the growth of real wages continued for men and women at the 85th percentile
before it attenuated at the beginning of the 2000s, the median male and female
worker had about zero real wage growth between 1993 and 2008 in West Germany
(Panel 2). During the same period, especially the male individuals at the 15th
percentile experienced dramatic real wage losses that amounted to almost 20%
7The wages have been deflated by the German Consumer Price Index from the Federal Sta-
tistical Office.
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while female’s wages decreased by around 10% between 1992 and 2008.
Figure 1.1: Real wage growth by gender and region, 1975 = 0, 1975 - 1992 and
1992 - 2008
(A) (B)
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A similar decrease in real wages of around 10% was observed for both men
and women at the 15th percentile in East Germany (Panel 3). While the median
workers’ real wage growth stagnated for both men and women similarly as in
West Germany, the wage growth of individuals at the 85th percentile in the East
was much less pronounced between 1992 and 2008 than for their West German
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counterparts. All in all, Figure 1.1 confirms the findings of Dustmann et al. (2009)
and Riphahn and Schnitzlein (2011).
While Figure 1.1 depicts relative values of the development of wages, Figure
1.B1 displays the development of real gross daily wages by gender and region
over time.8 The absolute difference in daily wages between West German male
and female workers amounted to around 20e per calendar day for individuals at
the 15th and 50th percentile in 2008. At the 85th percentile, male workers earned
160e per calendar day, which is about 40emore than their female counterparts. In
East Germany, the absolute difference in the average real gross daily wage between
men and women is much smaller. It is highest for individuals in the lower part
of the wage distribution, where male workers at the 15th percentile earned about
40e per calendar day in 2008, around 5e more than their female counterparts.
As the different developments of wages at different percentiles in Figure 1.1
already suggest, wage inequality has been rising over the last decades. This is
illustrated by the ratio of the 85th and 15th percentile in Figure 1.2, shown sep-
arately for East and West Germany and men and women. While West German
men at the 85th percentile earned about 1.8 times the amount of male workers at
the 15th percentile in 1975, the 85/15 percentile ratio increased slightly year by
year until the mid 1990s to a ratio of 2.1 before it markedly grew to 2.7 in 2008.
Due to the fact that wages are more evenly distributed along the wage distribution
for men than for women, women’s wage inequality has always been higher than
men’s throughout the entire observation period. For women, the 85/15 percentile
ratio was 2.2 in 1975 and remained constant until the mid 1990s before it rose to
8Whenever a letter (A for tables, B for figures) is listed within a figure or table name, the
corresponding figure or table can be found in the Appendix section at the end of the corresponding
chapter.
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2.8 in 2008. Hence, by now men’s wage inequality has almost converged to the
level of women’s inequality in West Germany. A similar pattern holds for East
Germany, where wages are also more unequal for women than for men, a finding
consistent with Franz and Steiner (2000). For both sexes, there has been a distinct
increase in wage inequality since the start of the observation period in 1992. For
men (women), the 85/15 percentile ratio increased from about 1.8 (2.0) in 1992 to
2.5 (3.0) in 2008. Hence, in contrast to West Germany, the difference of the 85/15
percentile ratio between men and women has become slightly larger over time.
Figure 1.2: Evolution of the 85/15 percentile ratio, 1975 - 2008, by gender and
region
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In order to shed light on the development of lower and upper-tail wage inequal-
ity, Figure 1.3 illustrates the evolution of the 85/50 and 50/15 percentile ratio by
gender and region. Figure 1.3 reveals a pattern which is consistent for both re-
gions and is in line with the results of, e.g., Kohn and Antonczyk (2011): while
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the upper-tail wage inequality surmounts the lower-tail inequality for men, the
opposite is true for women. Thus, the fact that women’s wage inequality is greater
than that for men, as seen in Figure 1.2, results from the high level of women’s
lower-tail wage inequality.
Figure 1.3: Evolution of upper- and lower-tail inequality by gender, 1975 - 2008,
West Germany (top) and East Germany (bottom)
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This observation is especially true for East Germany, where the level of upper-
tail wage inequality has evolved very similarly for men and women over time, see
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the bottom part of Figure 1.3. The upper part of Figure 1.3 further demonstrates
for West Germany that the slight increase in the male’s 85/15 percentile ratio until
the mid 1990s, as observed in Figure 1.2, is driven by upper-tail wage inequality as
the 50/15 percentile ratio started to increase only at the beginning of the 1990s.
This is in line with the findings of, e.g., Fitzenberger (1999) and Dustmann et
al. (2009).
As the percentile ratios do not account for the full wage information of the
wage distribution, it can only be seen as a first crude wage inequality measure.
One measure which takes the whole wage distribution into account is the Gini
coefficient. However, the results would be biased if one ignored the fact that the
data set is censored at the social contribution threshold. Therefore, one can either
decide to rely only on the uncensored observations and to disregard the wage
information at the highest percentiles of the wage distribution. An alternative
is to use the method by Gartner (2005) and to impute wages of individuals who
earn at the social contribution threshold or above, which is the case for up to 14%
(6%) of all male observations in West (East) Germany in each year, see Table
1.A1. Even when using the imputed wages, one still needs to be cautious with the
interpretation of the Gini coefficient as the share of imputed observations is not
constant over time. Appendix 1C gives an empirical exercise on the advantages and
disadvantages of using either alternative. It turns out that the the development of
wage inequality is rather insensitive with respect to the use of imputed wages for
censored observations. As the analysis of wage mobility seems to be more sensitive
with respect to using imputed wages - see Appendix 1C for more details - I rely
only on observations with uncensored wages throughout my analysis. This has to
be kept in mind when analyzing the results as, e.g., the wage inequality results
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will be rather underestimated.
Figure 1.4: Evolution of the Gini coefficient by gender and region, 1975 - 2008
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Figure 1.4 plots the development of the Gini coefficient by gender and region
over time. The development of wage inequality using the Gini coefficient is compa-
rable to the development of the 85/15 percentile ratio. The Gini coefficient, which
was 0.20 for women and 0.13 for men in 1975, increased only slightly until the mid
1990s for both sexes before a distinct rise was observed for both men and women.
In 2008, the Gini coefficient was 0.25 for women and 0.21 for men indicating that
men’s wage inequality has approached the level of inequality of women over time.9
The development in wage inequality can be confirmed when the mean log deviation
9The level of the Gini coefficient is comparable to Riphahn and Schnitzlein (2011) who use
the same data set, but do not look at differences across gender. When the entire wage distri-
bution is used, the wage inequality values are larger. According to the OECD (2010), the Gini
coefficient increased by 0.04 percentage points for Germany since the mid 1980s to 0.28 in 2007.
In international comparison, the Gini coefficient for Germany is rather low as the Gini coefficient
across more than 100 countries ranges between 0.26 in Denmark being the most equal country
in terms of wages and 0.71 in Namibia (United Nations, 2004).
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or other generalized entropy measures like the Theil index are used for measur-
ing wage inequality, see Figure 1.B2, which examplarily shows the development of
wage inequality using the mean log deviation as wage inequality measure.10 This
emphasizes that the observed wage inequality is not particularly sensitive to either
the lower, middle, or upper tail of the wage distribution.
One advantage of using, e.g., the mean log deviation rather than the Gini co-
efficient as wage inequality measure is that inequality can be decomposed into
a within and a between-inequality component. Within-inequality reflects in my
case the inequality that exists within the same subgroup of men and women, re-
spectively. Between-inequality catches all inequality that arises from differences
across subgroups, i.e. men and women. Thus, if all men earned the same wage
and women earned a different wage that were the same for all women, then wage
inequality would be covered only by between-inequality. In the other extreme, had
men and women the same distribution of earnings, all inequality would be due to
within-inequality. As Shorrocks and Wan (2005) point out, the between-group
component is usually small relative to the within-group component, especially
when using earnings data. This is in fact what I find. While the within-group in-
equality amounted to 79% of the total wage inequality in 1975, this share gradually
increased to explaining around 93% of the total inequality in 2008. The share in
East Germany has been even higher throughout the observation period suggesting
that the major part of wage inequality is driven by wage differences within one
subgroup rather than by differences across subgroups.11
10Further figures illustrating the evolution of wage inequality using other generalized entropy
measures are provided by the author upon request.
11Using the GSOEP, Becker and Hauser (1994) find a share of within-inequality that is very
close to my numbers when using the social status as subgroups for the decomposition of the
German wage inequality between 1983 and 1990.
27
To sum up, I have documented a clear upward shift in wage inequality in
West and East Germany for both men and women, especially since the mid 1990s.
Women have always faced a higher wage inequality than men. While the difference
in wage inequality between men and women has been slightly decreasing in the
West, it has been slightly increasing in East Germany. In both regions, the upper-
tail wage inequality has surmounted the lower-tail inequality for men whereas the
opposite was true for women. As set out earlier, it is not only important to look
at changes in wage inequality over time, but also to take into account how likely it
is for workers to move up the wage ladder. A high degree of cross-sectional wage
inequality is likely to exaggerate the extent of inequality over a working life as long
as individuals are able to move up the earnings distribution. In the next section,
I will therefore take a closer look at the development of short-term and long-term
wage mobility in West and East Germany.
1.3.2 Development of wage mobility
1.3.2.1 Short-term mobility patterns
In order to measure wage mobility, the wage distribution is typically split up into
different parts of the same size (e.g. percentiles, deciles, or in my case quintiles).
In a next step, a matrix is built which reports the movement of individuals across
quintiles from one period to another (e.g. t− 1 and t). Figure 1.5 plots the evolu-
tion of one-year quintile transitions by gender for West (top) and East Germany
(bottom). While the “stayers” represent those individuals who have stayed in the
same quintile, a “mover” is a person who has moved to a neighbor quintile be-
tween t − 1 and t. “Jumpers” are those individuals who have moved in the wage
distribution by more than one quintile within one year.
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Figure 1.5: Evolution of one-year quintile transitions by gender and region, 1976
- 2008
The upper part of Figure 1.5 illustrates that the level of quintile transitions was
very similar for West German men and women throughout the entire observation
period. While the share of those individuals who stayed in the same quintile
increased steadily from around 72% in 1976 to 82% in 2008, the share of individuals
who moved by one quintile decreased from 25 to 18% at the same time. The share
of individuals who moved by more than one quintile within one year was always
below 5% and become even smaller over time.
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A similar trend towards less movement within the wage distribution can also
be observed in East Germany, where the level of mobility was higher for men
than for women throughout the observation period, see the lower part of Figure
1.5. The decreasing trend in wage mobility was especially pronounced during
the 1990s when the share of individuals that remained in the same wage quintile
one year later increased from 62% (70%) in 1992 to 78% (83%) in 2000 for men
(women). In order to shed more light on which part of the wage distribution
was particularly prone to wage immobility, Table 1.A2 displays the percentage of
quintile stayers for each quintile separately for male and female workers for the
years 1993 and 2008. The table shows the typical result, as documented, e.g., by
Dickens (2000) or Cardoso (2006), that individuals at the top and at the bottom of
the wage distribution face less wage mobility than those individuals in the middle
of the wage distribution. Moreover, it can be observed that these middle quintiles
experienced a more pronounced decrease in wage mobility over time compared to
the individuals at the top or the bottom of the wage distribution, especially in
East Germany. While the share of stayers in the third quintile increased from 50%
in 1993 to 75% in 2008 in East Germany, the share of stayers in the first quintile
increased from 70% in 1993 to 80% in 2008.
When looking at wage quintiles, wage mobility can only be observed across
but not within quintiles. Therefore, I also make use of the Dickens measure which
averages the absolute change in percentile ranking between two periods (t and t+1).
The higher these absolute changes are, the higher will be the extent of the Dickens
measure and, thus, wage mobility. Figure 1.6 illustrates the development of wage
mobility by gender and region using this measure. The figure reveals that men have
been more mobile in their wages than women throughout the entire observation
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period in both West and East Germany. One reason for this finding might be
that men profit from higher wage increases when changing jobs (Gottschalk 2001,
Weber 2002). Over time, wage mobility has been decreasing in both regions and
for both sexes. The slight decrease in wage mobility in West Germany during
the 1970s was followed by an increase during the 1980s for both men and women.
Since 1990, wage mobility steadily declined for both men and women until the
wage mobility pattern became stationary in 2004.
Figure 1.6: Evolution of the Dickens measure of mobility, by gender and region,
1975 - 2007
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In East Germany, there was a dramatic decline in wage mobility just after reuni-
fication, which is likely to be a consequence of the slowing down of the assimilation
of East wages to the wage level of West Germany in the mid 1990s (Steiner and
Wagner 1997). While wage mobility was higher than in West Germany in 1992,
the Dickens measure had decreased by 50% twelve years later in 2004. Riphahn
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and Schnitzlein (2011) show that next to structural shifts and unexplained fac-
tors a substantial part of around 40% of the mobility decline in East Germany
is associated with changes in observable worker characteristics, particularly those
describing job stability and employment characteristics. As a consequence, the
level of wage mobility has converged to (and for women fallen below) the level
of West Germany. Also with respect to gender, a convergence in wage mobility
can be observed. While the absolute difference in the Dickens measure between
men and women differed by more than 0.02 index points in 1975 in West Germany
and by more than 0.04 index points in 1992 in East Germany, wage mobility was
about the same in West Germany by 2007, whereas in East Germany men are still
slightly more mobile than women.
What we have seen so far is that rising wage inequality was accompanied by
decreasing wage mobility in West and East Germany for both men and women.
This is a phenomenon also observed in other developed countries, see e.g. Dickens
(2000) for the UK and Buchinsky and Hunt (1999) for the US. In order to verify
to what extent rising wage inequality is reduced by existing (although decreasing)
wage mobility, the Shorrocks index is calculated in a next step. As shown in
equation (1.8), the index compares a longer-term wage inequality with the weighted
sum of single-year wage inequalities. The higher the index is, the higher is the
degree to which wage mobility reduces wage inequality in the short run. Figure
1.7 shows the Shorrocks index separately for gender and region using the Gini
coefficient as wage inequality measure for a time horizon of T = 5 years.12
12A comparable pattern is observed when using the mean log deviation or the Theil index as
wage inequality measure. The corresponding figures are provided by the author upon request.
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Figure 1.7: Evolution of the Shorrocks index, by gender and region, 1975 - 2004
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Throughout the entire observation period, the Shorrocks index was higher for
men than for women. This is true for West and East Germany. However, the
gender difference with respect to the Shorrocks index became smaller over time
and had almost disappeared by 2004 for both sexes and in both parts of the
country. While in East Germany the decrease in the Shorrocks index evolved
more rapidly than in West Germany and monotonously over time, the evolution
of the Shorrocks index in West Germany was characterized by ups and downs.13
The index fell between 1975 to 1981, between 1988 to 1994 and between 1998 to
2003. In between, the Shorrocks index experienced increases which, however, were
less pronounced than the decreases in the preceding periods implying an overall
downward trend of the Shorrocks index over time. All in all, the evolution of the
Shorrocks index reflects the earlier reported observed changes in wage mobility
and inequality patterns: as wage inequality increases were accompanied by wage
13A similar pattern is observed in Riphahn and Schnitzlein (2011), who, however, do not look
at differences across gender.
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mobility decreases, wage mobility has been reducing wage inequality less and less
over time.
One explanation for the wavelike pattern in the West German Shorrocks index
(and also in the Dickens measure) may be changing business cycle effects over
time. In times of economic prosperity, wages grow more rapidly than during re-
cessions, see, e.g., Devereux and Hart (2006), Shin and Shin (2008). This wage
procyclicality is stronger for low-wage (and highest-wage earners) compared to
median earners as low-wage workers may credibly threaten to quit to unemploy-
ment when productivity increases (Robin 2011). Therefore, wage mobility might
be positively correlated with the well-being of the economy. In other words, wage
mobility might reduce the short-run wage inequality to a higher degree when the
unemployment rate, which may serve as a proxy for business cycle effects, is low.
Although the underlying correlation coefficients do not provide causal evidence,
the negative relationship between the unemployment rate and the Shorrocks in-
dex is highly significant for men (ρ = −0.809, p = 0.000) as well as for women
(ρ = −0.464, p = 0.007).14
1.3.2.2 Long-term mobility patterns
The long time span of the data additionally allows for an analysis of long-term
mobility, which to the best of my knowledge has not been done so far for Germany.
Such an analysis is of particular interest as it gives insights on the chances of
14If the GDP is used as proxy for business cycle effects, the positive correlation between
the GDP and the Shorrocks index is highly significant for women (ρ = 0.514, p = 0.002) and
significant for men (ρ = 0.339, p = 0.054). Applying the Dickens measure, as illustrated in Figure
1.6, rather than the Shorrocks index yields similar results: the positive relationship with respect
to the GDP is significant for both men (ρ = 0.419, p = 0.021) and women (ρ = 0.522, p = 0.003),
whereas the negative correlation coefficient regarding the unemployment rate is only significant
for men (ρ = −0.677, p = 0.000, women: ρ = −0.159, p = 0.400).
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moving up the wage ladder over an individual’s life cycle. Although the time
length of the data is too short to describe mobility across a whole working life,
as was done by Kopczuk et al. (2010) for the US with data that goes back until
1937, it is sufficiently long in West Germany to overcome concerns of transitory
changes in earnings impacting wage mobility in the short run. For this, the rank
of individual average earnings of a five-year period centered around period t is
compared to the rank of individual average earnings of a five-year period centered
around period t+ k, where k = 10, 15, 20 years.15 This allows for covering a time
period of up to 24 years and, thus, more than half of a full working life. Periods
with zero earnings are included in the analysis as long as the average earnings in
a five-year time span lie above the minimum threshold of 4,800 e (in 2008 prices),
which is the threshold for being a marginal worker in Germany. To avoid many
five-year periods with zero earnings from individuals entering or exiting the labor
market early, only those individuals are included in the analysis who are aged
between 22 and 38 years in year t.16
Figure 1.8 displays for West German men and women the rank correlation in
year t between five-year average earnings centered around t and five-year average
earnings centered around year t + k, where k = 10, 15, 20. Not surprisingly, the
degree of mobility is the lower, the longer the considered time horizon.17 As the
rank correlation of individual earnings in year t and t + k is smaller for men
15Yearly average earnings are indexed to 2008 prices.
16If only those individuals are considered who worked in all periods, i.e., for example, in periods
t-2 to t+2 and t-18 to t+22, the evolution of long-term mobility evolves similarly, albeit at a
higher level of mobility. Thus, zero earnings do not seem to have a large impact on the trend of
long-term mobility.
17The long-term mobility level is slightly lower than that observed in Kopczuk et al. (2010)
for the US. However, they use an eleven-year rather than a five-year time span, which might be
expected to lead to an overall higher rank correlation.
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than for women, long-term mobility was higher for male than for female workers
in all years. The long-term mobility gender gap has, however, been closing over
time. While the men’s rank correlation slightly increased over time for all three
time horizons, the women’s rank correlation experienced a slight decline. Thus,
the long-term mobility of women slightly increased over time, whereas it slightly
decreased for men, a result that is line with the evidence for the US (Kopczuk et
al. 2010). This finding is consistent with the observation that the gender wage gap
has been decreasing in Germany in the last decades (Fitzenberger and Wunderlich
2002, Black and Spitz-Oener 2010).
Figure 1.8: Rank correlation displaying long-term mobility for three different time
horizons, by gender, 1977 - 1996
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One reason for this closing long-term mobility gap might be the increase in the
share of women at higher percentiles of the wage distribution. Figure 1.9 displays
the share of females among those individuals earning at the 15th, the 50th, the
85th percentile and among the overall working population in the sample. The
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figure illustrates that the share of females among the overall working population
remained constant at around 33% over time. However, although men are still more
likely to be in the upper part of the wage distribution than women, the median
wage earners and those individuals earning at the 85th percentile were much more
likely to be women in 2008 compared to 1975. The opposite is true for workers at
the 15th percentile. Hence, this development suggests that the chances to move up
in the earnings distribution have been relatively improving for women compared
to men in the last decades.
Figure 1.9: Share of females among the total working population, the 15th, the
50th, and the 85th percentile, 1975 - 2008
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1.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have analyzed the evolution of wage inequality and wage mobility
separately for men and women in West and East Germany over the last four
decades. Using a large German administrative data set which covers the years
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1975 to 2008, I find that until the 1990s rising wage inequality was mainly observed
in the upper tail of the men’s wage distribution. Since the mid 1990s, rising wage
inequality not only extended to the lower part of the men’s wage distribution,
but also started to occur for women in the upper and lower part of the wage
distribution. In East Germany, lower and upper-tail wage inequality rose since the
start of the observation period in 1992 for both men and women. Overall, women
faced a higher level of wage inequality than men in West and East Germany. While
the wage inequality gender gap has been slightly decreasing in West, it has been
slightly increasing in East Germany.
A high degree of cross-sectional wage inequality is, however, likely to exagger-
ate the extent of inequality over a working life as long as individuals are able to
move up the earnings distribution. Therefore, I have focussed on the evolution
of short and long-term wage mobility in this chapter. Short-term wage mobility,
which has been higher for male than for female workers in West and East Ger-
many throughout the observation period, decreased over time. The decrease was
particularly pronounced in East Germany. In West Germany, ups and downs in
wage mobility levels were observed over time. One reason for this may be business
cycle effects as a strongly negative relationship has been found between the level
of wage mobility and the unemployment rate for both men and women. As rising
wage inequality is accompanied by decreasing wage mobility, a trend which is also
observed, e.g., in the US (Buchinsky and Hunt 1999) and the UK (Dickens 2000),
the impact of wage mobility on reducing wage inequality has become smaller.
The long time span of the data additionally allows for investigating long-term
wage mobility, which gives insights on the chances of moving up the wage ladder
over an individual’s life cycle. The results for West Germany show that long-term
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wage mobility was higher for male than for female workers in all years. However,
the wage mobility gender gap has been slowly closing over time as long-term wage
mobility has slightly increased for women whereas it slightly decreased for men.
One reason for this contrary development across gender might be women’s relative
earnings improvement as the share of females in the middle and upper part of the
wage distribution has distinctly increased over time.
As this study has given a descriptive analysis of the developments in wage
mobility and inequality, future research is necessary to identify possible causal
effects of what drives the differences in the wage mobility pattern across gender and
regions. Moreover, more explanatory variables than those covered by this study
may influence the development of wage inequality and mobility, as is suggested
by, e.g., Gernandt (2009) and Raferzeder and Winter-Ebmer (2007). Finally, it is
important to keep in mind that the results only account for all observations up
to the social contribution threshold. This is especially relevant for men in West
Germany, for which up to 14% of the observations per year are censored. Using
imputed wages for the censored observation does not appear to be an accurate
solution for the censoring problem as the imputed wages artificially drive the wage
mobility pattern.
Nevertheless, the simultaneous observation of increasing wage inequality and
decreasing wage mobility clearly calls for a closer consideration of workers earning
a low wage as this development gives rise to a larger persistence of low-wage
employment. However, the determinants underlying the evolution of low-wage
mobility are hardly documented in the literature so far. In particular, a decline
in wage mobility in the low-wage sector may result from compositional shifts of
the low-wage relative to the high-wage sector. Alternatively, increasing genuine
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state dependence, i.e. low-wage employment today causing low-wage employment
in the future for reasons of, e.g., stigmatization or human capital depreciation,
might be an explanation for a decline in low-wage mobility. In the next chapter,
I will therefore take a closer look at the determinants underlying the evolution of
low-wage mobility.
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Appendix 1
1.A - Tables
Table 1.A1: Total observations and share of females in %, by year and region, and
share of censored observations in % by year, region, and gender
West Germany East Germany
share share cens. obs N share share cens. obs Nfemales men women females men women
1975 33.1 10.9 1.2 358,335
1976 32.9 9.7 1.0 355,573
1977 33.0 9.3 1.0 358,787
1978 33.2 8.5 0.8 358,887
1979 33.3 8.1 0.8 369,373
1980 33.5 9.1 0.9 375,384
1981 33.3 10.1 1.1 376,242
1982 33.4 9.8 1.1 369,728
1983 33.1 9.2 1.0 359,831
1984 33.2 10.4 1.4 361,562
1985 33.1 11.0 1.5 358,840
1986 33.5 10.3 1.4 368,045
1987 33.6 11.8 1.8 370,807
1988 33.7 11.0 1.6 373,694
1989 33.9 11.4 1.8 382,760
1990 34.0 12.4 2.1 400,488
1991 34.0 12.4 2.2 411,835
1992 34.5 13.7 2.6 421,287 43.7 3.8 1.2 99,348
1993 34.6 11.1 2.0 409,127 42.6 4.5 1.6 94,138
1994 34.5 11.4 2.1 396,685 41.7 4.4 1.5 92,346
1995 34.4 10.8 2.1 391,759 41.4 4.4 1.5 91,997
1996 34.3 10.3 1.9 382,912 41.3 4.0 1.2 89,246
1997 34.1 10.8 2.1 376,553 40.9 3.4 1.0 84,666
1998 33.9 10.2 2.1 376,218 41.3 4.6 1.8 82,281
1999 34.2 11.9 2.6 378,397 41.4 4.0 1.6 81,223
2000 34.3 11.5 2.7 384,167 41.4 5.1 2.3 78,395
2001 34.4 11.7 3.0 383,544 41.7 5.7 2.8 75,157
2002 34.6 13.5 3.6 374,043 41.9 6.0 3.3 71,773
2003 34.3 9.5 2.2 363,572 41.6 4.3 1.7 69,401
2004 34.1 10.1 2.4 353,955 41.2 4.2 1.8 66,450
2005 34.0 10.3 2.6 346,295 40.9 4.3 1.8 63,362
2006 33.8 10.1 2.5 348,296 40.5 4.4 1.8 63,059
2007 33.9 10.8 2.9 355,064 40.2 4.4 1.7 63,744
2008 34.0 11.8 3.2 359,704 40.0 4.9 2.3 64,164
Total 33.9 10.8 1.9 12,711,749 41.5 4.5 1.8 1,330,750
41
Table 1.A2: Share of individuals staying in the same quintile as in previous year
in %, by quintile, sex and region, 1993 and 2008
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 N
West Germany
Men 1993 80.7 69.2 68.7 75.7 91.4 248,818
Men 2008 82.7 76.9 77.0 82.1 94.1 217,347
Women 1993 83.2 70.9 70.1 75.7 90.6 125,018
Women 2008 83.6 76.1 76.3 80.9 92.8 105,767
East Germany
Men 1993 69.5 51.6 49.9 58.9 82.6 48,352
Men 2008 80.3 72.5 73.7 80.7 93.4 34,219
Women 1993 78.4 61.4 61.6 67.1 84.2 34,757
Women 2008 83.7 77.8 79.0 82.3 92.4 22,429
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1.B - Figures
Figure 1.B1: Evolution of real gross daily wages, in 2008 prices, 1975 - 2008, by
gender, West Germany
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Figure 1.B2: Evolution of the mean log deviation by gender and region, 1975 -
2008
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1.C - How to deal with censored observations
For up to 14% (4%) of West German men’s (women’s) observations per year, the
correct wage is not reported since the wages are censored at the social contri-
bution threshold. Therefore, two different scenarios may be applied to overcome
this censoring problem. One might either i) use all the wage information up to
the censoring limit and disregard the development of wages at or above the so-
cial contribution threshold or ii) impute wages for censored observations using
the imputation technique proposed by Gartner (2005). Both alternatives have
drawbacks: while the former alternative cannot draw a picture on the entire wage
distribution, the latter alternative partly relies on wages that cannot be observed
in the data.
In order to get an impression to what extent the Gini coefficient, as a measure
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for wage inequality, is affected by using either alternative, the upper part of Figure
1.B3 plots the development of the West German Gini coefficient by gender using
i) only the observations up to the censoring limit and ii) using all observations
including the censored observations for which the wages are imputed.18 Figure
1.B3 reveals that a higher level of the Gini coefficient is observed when wages
for the censored observations are imputed. This is not surprising as the entire
wage distribution is considered in this case. As the share of censored observations
has slightly increased over time for men and women - compare Table 1.A1 -, the
difference between the two sample alternatives has become slightly larger over
time for both men and women. However, I mainly observe a level effect of the
Gini coefficient when the imputed observations are used, which is greater for men
as their share of censored wages is higher than for women. Thus, the use of the
imputed wages seems rather insensitive to the development of wage inequality over
time.
With respect to the development of wage mobility, however, the choice of the
sample matters to a much higher degree. The lower part of Figure 1.B3 shows for
West Germany how the rank correlation of individual wages between year t−1 and
year t has evolved with and without imputed wages.19 The rank correlation, which
by definition lies between 0 and 1, is the higher, the higher an individual sticks to
his wage position, i.e. the lower the wage mobility is. The figure illustrates that the
18The imputation is conducted separately for men and women, East and West Germany and
year. The regression model contains as explanatory variables age, age squared, tenure, tenure
squared, degree of education, and occupation.
19If only the wage information up to the censoring limit is used, it is important to keep in
mind that those individuals who move up to the censoring limit between year t−1 and year t are
not captured. However, the share of such movers among all workers earning below the censoring
limit is on average less than two (one) percent for men (women). Hence, the downward bias of
the mobility pattern due to this selection should be very small.
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rank correlation is not only smaller when imputed wages are used in the analysis for
both men and women, but that it has also developed differently over time compared
to the sample with uncensored observations. While the rank correlation increased
over time for those individuals earning below the social contribution threshold,
the rank correlation remained at the same level over the entire observation period
when wages were imputed for the censored observations for both sexes. It is,
thus, the mobility of those individuals for which the wages have been imputed and
whose share has slightly increased over the years that accounts for most of the
wage mobility.
Thus, whereas the observations with imputed wages contributed to a fairly
constant shift in wage inequality over time, the analysis of wage mobility seems to
be more sensitive with respect to using imputed wages. Figure 1.B4 shows that
this result is also observed in East Germany, although to a weaker extent as the
share of censored observations is smaller than in West Germany. One reason for
the sensitivity in wage mobility could be that an imputed wage is attached to
some degree of uncertainty. In other words, it is likely that an imputed wage in
one period differs from an imputed wage in the consecutive period for the same
individual which could artificially increase one’s wage mobility. Therefore, using
imputed wages needs to be treated with caution especially when the development
of wage mobility is analyzed. In order to avoid such inaccuracies, I therefore only
focus on those observations that are below the censoring limit.
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Figure 1.B3: Evolution of the Gini coefficient (top) and the rank correlation (bot-
tom) by gender, without censored observations and with imputed wages for cen-
sored observations, 1975 - 2008, West Germany
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Figure 1.B4: Evolution of the Gini coefficient (top) and the rank correlation (bot-
tom) by gender, without censored observations and with imputed wages for cen-
sored observations, 1975 - 2008, East Germany
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Chapter 2
What Explains the Decline inWage
Mobility in the German Low-Wage
Sector?∗
2.1 Introduction
A large body of academic work has documented a sharp increase in earnings
inequality particularly in the Anglo-Saxon countries over the last three decades
(e.g. Acemoglu 2003, Gosling et al. 2000, Levy and Murnane 1992). However, as
long as individuals are able to move up the earnings distribution, a high degree
of cross-sectional earnings inequality is likely to exaggerate the extent of inequal-
ity over a working life. Thus, any analysis of the evolution of lifetime inequality
requires investigating the evolution of both inequality and mobility. For example,
a rise in wage mobility could mitigate an increase in cross-sectional earnings in-
equality because, in that case, a position at the bottom of the distribution would
be of more temporary nature. Conversely, if a rise in earnings inequality were
accompanied by a decline in mobility, inequality over a working lifetime would
19∗This contribution is joint work with Nicole Gürtzgen. It is published as ZEW Discussion
Paper No. 12-041 (Aretz and Gürtzgen 2012). We thank Melanie Arntz and Anja Heinze for
providing us with programming routines as well as Verena Niepel, Steffen Reinhold, and Arne
Uhlendorff for fruitful discussions and helpful comments. Financial support from the German
Science Foundation (DFG) is gratefully acknowledged (Grant-No. FR 715/9-1).
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increase due to more persistent positions in the earnings distribution.
Even though there is a large literature that addresses both the evolution of
inequality and mobility over time (e.g. Cardoso 2006, Dickens 2000, Gottschalk
1997, Kopczuk et al. 2010), little is known about the determinants underlying the
evolution of wage mobility. This is particularly relevant as a number of authors has
documented a widening in the distribution of labor earnings that is accompanied
by a decline in mobility, giving rise to a larger persistence of low-wage employment
(see Buchinsky and Hunt (1999) for the U.S. , Cardoso (2006) for Portugal and
Dickens (2000) for the U.K. ). From a welfare perspective, a high degree of low-pay
persistence is of particular concern as it tends to marginalize low-wage workers in
the long run. As a result, the determinants of low-pay persistence are of con-
siderable interest to policy-makers. For instance, a decline in low-wage mobility
that is accounted for by an increase in the fraction of those without educational
attainment would call for appropriate policy interventions aiming at improving
these characteristics. In contrast, if a decline in low-wage mobility was caused by
increasing state dependence due to stigmatization effects, policy measures aim-
ing at improving observable attributes of low-wage workers would be less likely to
succeed.
The purpose of this chapter is therefore to fill this gap and to investigate the
determinants of the evolution of wage mobility. Using German administrative data,
we focus on the West German low-wage sector, which is particularly interesting for
several reasons. First, while the German wage structure has long been considered
relatively stable at lower percentiles (Prasad 2004), the past two decades have
seen a clear tendency towards more earnings inequality at the bottom end of the
earnings distribution (Dustmann et al. 2009, Kohn 2006). As a consequence, the
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low-wage sector has increasingly grown in importance. Second, there is evidence
that wage mobility has been declining over the last decades (see Gernandt 2009
and Riphahn and Schnitzlein 2011). However, as mentioned above, this does not
necessarily imply a larger degree of persistence in terms of “true” or “genuine” state
dependence of low-wage employment, which may occur if low-wage employment
today causes low-wage employment in the future for reasons of stigmatization or
human capital depreciation.20 Alternatively, a larger degree of persistence may
also be the result of a more unfavorable composition of the low-wage relative to
the high-wage sector. The large extent of selection into low-wage employment has
been documented by a number of studies dealing with the determinants of wage
mobility. A key finding that emerges from this literature is that the extent of
genuine state dependence is often considerably reduced once observable attributes
and selection into low-wage employment are accounted for (see Cappellari 2002,
2007, Stewart and Swaffield 1999). The overall aim of our analysis is therefore to
explore to what extent the observed decline in German low-wage mobility reflects
a rise in “true” state dependence by distinguishing the evolution of genuine state
dependence from relative composition effects.
The data we use to address these questions stem from the IAB Employment
Subsample 1975-2004 (IABS), the preceding data set of the SIAB. Similar to the
SIAB, this administrative data set is a 2% subsample of the German Employment
Statistics Register, which is based on reports from employers in compliance with
the notifying procedure for the German social security system. The Employment
20Using German household data from the GSOEP, Uhlendorff (2006) finds evidence for true
state dependence of low-pay jobs. In contrast to Uhlendorff (2006), who looks at pooled transi-
tions over the observation period 1998 to 2003, we focus on the evolution of true state dependence
over time.
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Statistics Register offers information on individual wage records and a number of
individual characteristics for the whole population of employees who are covered by
the German social security system. The IABS provides a useful basis for exploring
the evolution of the determinants of wage mobility for several reasons. First, the
data allow us to retrieve a great deal of reliable information on workers’ previous
employment histories, which will be used to model the selection of individuals into
the low-wage sector. Second, due to the administrative nature of the IABS, the
problem of panel attrition is considerably reduced as the data track individuals
over time as long as they are either employed or, alternatively, unemployed with
transfer payments. Even though our data feature less panel attrition than survey
data, we still face the problem of non-random earnings retention as individuals
may become voluntarily or involuntarily unemployed and may fall out of the earn-
ings distribution. Because this dropout is likely to be non-random, we follow the
approach of Cappellari and Jenkins (2006) and Cappellari (2007) by estimating
a series of trivariate probit models, which not only account for the selection into
low-wage employment, but additionally model non-random earnings retention. To
do so, we will take advantage of the precise information on workers’ employment
histories in order to find appropriate exclusion restrictions that govern both, the
process of earnings retention and the initial conditions process.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 provides a
description of the data and some descriptive results. Section 2.3 presents the
empirical analysis. While Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 spell out the estimation strategy
and define the measure of state dependence, Section 2.3.3 presents the empirical
results. Section 2.4 concludes.
52
2.2 Descriptive Empirical Analysis
2.2.1 Data and variable description
The data for our analysis are taken from the regional file of the IAB employment
subsample 1975-2004 (IABS). This administrative data set, which is described in
more detail by Drews (2008), contains a 2% random sample of all social security
records spanning the time period 1975 to 2004. It includes employment records
subject to social security contributions as well as unemployment records with trans-
fer receipt. The data is representative of all workers subject to the German social
security system and covers approximately 80% of the German workforce. Self-
employed workers, civil servants and individuals currently doing their military
service are not included in the data set. We restrict our analysis to West Germany
as East Germany experienced profound political and structural changes during our
observation period. We further restrict our sample to individuals aged 20 to 55
years and confine our analysis to the years 1984 to 2004 due to a structural break
concerning the wage information which took place in 1984. The IABS provides
individual information on (daily) wage records, workers’ employment histories and
a number of individual characteristics such as age, education, nationality and oc-
cupational status. Since the data set is comprised out of spell data, the data allow
us to retrieve a large number of variables used to proxy the stability of workers’
employment histories. In particular, the data allow us to measure tenure at the
current employer, the number of previous un- and non-employment spells, the num-
ber of previous employers, the number of employment interruptions at the current
employer as well as the cumulative duration of previous un- and non-employment
spells. A full description as well as descriptive statistics of the variables used in
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our analysis can be found in Tables 2.A1 and 2.A2, respectively.
Although the IABS provides a great deal of information on workers’ employ-
ment histories, the data set has similar disadvantages as the SIAB. First, the data
set provides information on daily wages. While we observe an individual’s full-
time or part-time status (defined as working less than 30 hours per week), the
data lack explicit information on the number of hours worked. For this reason, we
restrict our sample to full-time workers. Second, the data do not allow a distinction
between involuntarily unemployed individuals without transfer receipt and indi-
viduals who left the labor force or who became self-employed or civil servants. To
distinguish more precisely between voluntary and involuntary unemployment, we
follow the assumptions proposed by Lee and Wilke (2009) about when the state
of unemployment is reached. Further information on the definition of un- and
non-employment spells as well as on adjustments of the wage and the education
information can be found in Table 2.A1.
2.2.2 Definition of low-pay status
To study the evolution of wages in the low-wage sector, we define the low-pay
status as earning less than two thirds of the median (full-time) wage. This defini-
tion has been used in several other studies (e.g. OECD 1998, Stewart and Swaffield
1999 and European Commission 2004). In order to calculate the low-pay threshold
for each year, we consider only spells which include the set date June 30th.21 For
each year of our observation period, we start from the population of full-time em-
ployed workers for whom we define the low-pay status and the respective pay and
21Note, however, that we exploit the full spell structure of the data to construct information
on individuals’ employment histories. Weighting the wage information by the length of the spell
did not alter the results substantially.
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employment status five years later. This gives rise to 16 relevant transition periods
(1984/1989, 1985/1990, . . . , 1999/2004). The low or high-pay status is only de-
fined for those who stay full-time employed five years later. We therefore construct
a dummy measuring full-time earnings retention, which takes on the value zero if
an individual falls out of the full-time earnings distribution (i.e. become part-time
employed, apprentices, involuntarily unemployed or non-employed). Table 2.A3
gives an overview on the yearly median gross daily wages and the corresponding
yearly low-wage threshold (in gross daily and approximated gross hourly wages).
2.2.3 The evolution and pattern of low-pay transitions
In line with the definition of Section 2.2.2, Figure 2.1 displays the fraction of low-
paid individuals among all full-time employees for the years 1984 to 2002. The
figure shows that the extent of the low-wage sector was quite stable in Germany
until the mid 1990s with a slightly decreasing trend until 1996. After that, the
low-wage sector experienced a clear upward trend: in 2002, the rate of low-wage
earners was 14.9%, 14% higher than in 1996.22 As shown in Figure 2.2, the overall
increase was fully made-up by male workers. Among them, the share of low-paid
workers, which was in the range of 5 to 6% between 1984 and 1996, increased to
8% in 2002. In contrast, the share of low-paid women dropped from 33% in 1985
to 28% in 2002. Obviously, however, female workers still exhibit a much higher
probability of being low paid than male workers. Compared with workers from the
high-wage sector, low-paid individuals are on average four years younger, less well
22This development confirms earlier results by Rhein et al. (2005), who find a very similar
evolution of low-wage employment using the same data set for the years between 1990 and 2001.
Bosch and Kalina (2007), also using the same data set, yield similar results, though at a slightly
higher low-wage level.
55
educated and are more likely to be of foreign nationality (see Table 2.A2). Also, as
one would expect, total previous un- and non-employment duration periods have
on average been longer for individuals in the low-wage sector, whereas their job
tenure is on average shorter than that for individuals working in the high-wage
sector.
Figure 2.1: Share of low-wage earners in the total population, 1984 - 2002
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In order to describe the overall pattern of the evolution of low-wage persis-
tence, we calculate a measure of aggregate state dependence (ASD) for each year.
This measure is defined as the difference between the probability of staying in
the low-wage sector and the probability of descending into the low-wage sector
five years later, i.e. ASD = Pr (Lt = 1|Lt−5 = 1)− Pr (Lt = 1|Lt−5 = 0). Note
that this measure does not account for the heterogeneity across formerly low and
high-paid workers. Later in our analysis, we will therefore attempt to distinguish
this measure from the degree of genuine state dependence (GSD). This is the
measure of “true” persistence we are ultimately interested in and will be defined
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as the individual difference in the predicted transition probabilities conditional on
being initially low and high paid, respectively, therefore providing a measure of
differences in price effects of observables across the two groups (see Section 2.3.2).23
Figure 2.2: Share of low-wage earners in the total population by sex, 1984 - 2002
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Figure 2.3 illustrates the evolution of ASD between 1984 and 1999 for males
and females. As the probability of descending into the low-wage sector is typically
close to zero, the extent of ASD is mainly determined by the persistence probabil-
ity. In 1984, for example, the overall persistence probability was 50%, i.e. one out
of two individuals who earned a low wage and still worked five years later kept his
or her low-pay status. The probability of moving from high to low pay, however,
was very small in 1984, with only every 20th woman and approximately every
100th man descending into the low-wage sector. Figure 2.3 reveals that the level
of ASD is about 20 percentage points higher for women than for men. This means
that men are considerably less likely to stick to a low-wage job. The development
23One of the two predicted transition probabilities will be counterfactual as individuals were
initially either high or low paid.
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of ASD was quite similar for both sexes, though. Women experienced a larger
decrease in ASD in the mid 1980s than men, with both sexes reaching their lowest
value in the year 1987 with an ASD of 26% for males and an ASD of 49% for
females. Since 1987, ASD has been rising continuously with only a slight atten-
uation period during the mid 1990s. In 1999, the male ASD amounted to 45%,
whereas women faced an ASD of 65%. Thus, (West) Germany has experienced a
distinct shift towards a higher degree of low-wage persistence in the last 15 years
of the 20th century.
Figure 2.3: Aggregate state dependence by sex, 1984 - 1999
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What determines the extent of ASD? Turning to the association between
low-pay persistence and observable attributes, Figure 2.4 provides the evolution
of ASD by different age groups. The figure illustrates that there are remarkable
differences across groups, with younger workers exhibiting considerable less ASD
than older ones. While the difference between the probabilities of remaining low
paid and descending into low pay was 29% for workers under the age of 25 in
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1984, workers older than 50 years faced a much higher ASD (78%). By 1999, this
difference had only slightly decreased. However, the share of old workers in the
low-wage sector is by far smaller than the share of young workers below 26 years
(see Figure 2.B1). Averaged over the whole observation period, only 3% (27%) of
male (female) workers above 50 years earned a low wage, whereas 18% (41%) of
the young workers below 26 years were low paid. In other words, younger workers
have a higher probability of earning a low wage, but are, at the same time, more
likely to move up the wage ladder. Once, however, older workers face a low-wage
job, it is much harder for them to escape the low-wage sector. Note that this is
consistent with the concave shape of age-earnings profiles typically reported in the
literature (see e.g. Murphy and Welch, 1990).24 With respect to an individual’s
tenure, the interpretation works similar.25 The shorter the tenure at the current
job is, the higher is the likelihood of being low paid (Figure 2.B3) and - on the
other hand - the lower will be the extent of ASD (see Figure 2.B2).
The level of education is also clearly related to the degree of state dependence:
the better an individual is educated, the lower is his or her ASD. Figure 2.B4
reveals for both sexes that while the ASD for the high and low-skilled increased
only very slightly over our observation period, medium-skilled workers experienced
a much larger increase in their ASD.26 Interestingly, the ASD level of medium-
skilled workers has converged to the ASD level of the low-skilled - a development
which can be observed for men as well as for women. Put differently, medium-
skilled workers, once earning a low wage, seemed to face about the same risk of
24For Germany, recent evidence on age-earnings profiles is provided by Bönke et al. (2011).
25All corresponding figures on mentioned variables other than age can be found in Appendix
2B.
26The spikes in the ASD of high-skilled low-paid males can be explained by the small number
of observations (<100 per year).
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being caught in the low-wage sector as their low-skilled counterparts in 1999. As
Figure 2.B5 points out, however, the share of medium-skilled men (women) is
with 5% (28%) substantially lower than the share of low-skilled individuals in the
low-wage sector (13% for men, 38% for women).
Figure 2.4: Aggregate state dependence by age group, 1984 - 1999
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There are further observable characteristics that are associated with different
levels of ASD. With respect to nationality, for example, Figure 2.B6 reveals that
foreign individuals have long faced a larger risk of sticking to a low-wage job.
By the end of the observation period in 1999, however, the ASD for workers of
German nationality had converged to the level of their foreign counterparts for
both males and females. Such a convergence can not be found when comparing
the development of ASD of blue- and white-collar workers (see Figure 2.B7). Over
the whole observation period, the ASD of blue-collar workers has remained about
10 percentage points higher than the ASD of white-collar workers. This pattern
holds for male as well as for female workers.
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Why did the overall aggregate state dependence increase over time? Besides
factors like business cycle effects or other macroeconomic developments, one pos-
sible explanation could be a change in the relative composition of the low and
high-wage sector that caused the extent of ASD to rise. To investigate such pos-
sible composition effects, it is instructive to depict the evolution of some selected
observable attributes in the low-wage sector relative to the respective development
in the high-wage sector. As can be seen from Figure 2.5 separately for men (top
part) and women (bottom part), the share of young workers below the age of 26
among the low-paid decreased markedly during the last decades. While the pro-
portion of young female workers in the low-wage sector dropped from 40% to 19%
over the observation period, the decrease was even larger for male workers below
the age of 26. For the latter, the corresponding share fell from 52% in 1984 to 24%
in 2002. This is a much more pronounced decline compared to the development in
the high-wage population where the share of young male (female) workers dropped
by 7 (14) percentage points between 1984 and 2002, see Figure 2.B8.
Not only the demographic change drives this development. The decision to
acquire higher education was taken more often in 2000 (34%) than in 1985 (20%)
so that a smaller share of workers was available for the labor market below the
age of 26 (Federal Statistical Office, 2011).27 As a consequence, the sharp decline
in the share of young workers among the low-paid, who - as seen in Figure 2.4 -
face a lower ASD than the older workforce may have contributed to the overall
observed increase in ASD over time.
27Following the definition of the OECD publication “Education at a Glance”, the numbers of
the Statistical Office are calculated by dividing the absolute number of first-year students by the
population of individuals in the typical age range. The number for the year 2000 includes the
states of East Germany.
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Figure 2.5: Evolution of the age composition in the low-wage sector, 1984 - 2002
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The development of other observed characteristics, however, works against an
increase in ASD over the observation period. The sex composition in the low-wage
sector, for example, has shifted distinctly towards more men being low paid. While
the share of males in the high-paid population remained roughly constant within
the range of 71 to 74%, the share of male workers among the low-paid has steadily
risen from 21% in 1984 to 36% in 2002, see Figure 2.B9. Since male workers, on
average, face a lower ASD than female workers (compare Figure 2.3 above), this
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change in the sex composition of the low-wage sector has favored a reduction of
the overall ASD over time.28
One explanation for the improving situation of women might relate to the
decline in the share of low-skilled workers in the female workforce between 1984 and
2002, as can be seen from Figure 2.B10. However, compared to the development
in the high-wage sector where the fraction of the low-skilled decreased from 24 to
10%, low-paid females experienced a weaker decline in the fraction of low-skilled
workers (from 29 to 21%). Male low-paid workers exhibit an even less favorable
evolution in their skill composition: while in the high-wage sector the fraction of
male low-skilled workers declined from 17 to 10%, the corresponding share in the
low-wage sector even rose by six percentage points (from 27 to 33%, see Figure
2.B11). Moreover, the low-wage sector experienced a less pronounced increase in
the share of high-skilled workers than the high-wage sector, where the fraction of
high-skilled doubled between 1984 and 2002. Overall, the less favorable evolution
of the skill composition among low paid workers should have contributed to a rise
in ASD. However, as medium-skilled workers have steadily approached the ASD
level of their low-skilled counterparts over time (compare Figure 2.B4), this price
effect is likely to have mitigated the effect of the skill composition on ASD over
time.
There are further developments that support a compositional explanation of
the rise in ASD over time. As a consequence of the ongoing technological change
and the associated structural shift from production to service industries, the share
of blue-collar workers (as compared to white-collar workers) declined by about ten
28However, in what follows, we will analyze the evolution of state dependence for men and
women separately.
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percentage points in the high-wage population for both sexes between 1984 and
2002 (see Figure 2.B12). While a reduction in the share of blue-collar workers
is also observed for low-paid women during the observation period, the opposite
is true for male workers in the low-wage sector. Despite the overall decreasing
importance of blue-collar jobs, the fraction of blue-collar workers among the low-
paid increased between 1984 and 2002. As blue-collar workers are more likely to
remain low paid (the ASD is - as shown in Figure 2.B7 - ten percentage points
higher than for white-collar workers), the male-specific shift towards more low-paid
blue-collar jobs is likely to have contributed to the rise in ASD.
With respect to nationality patterns, Figure 2.B13 illustrates that particularly
the low-wage sector has experienced volatile movements over time. While the share
of foreign workers in the male high-wage population remained quite stable between
1984 and 1995 (9 to 10%), this fraction more than doubled from 13 to 28% in the
male low-wage sector. This development, which - albeit to a somewhat lesser extent
- is also observed for females, reflects the rise in migration flows especially into the
low-wage sector after the fall of communism and the opening of the Iron Curtain
(e.g. Bauer et al. 2005). By 2002, the share of foreigners among low-paid male
workers declined back to 20%. As foreign workers faced a higher risk of remaining
low paid at the beginning of the observation period, these developments may have
fostered an increase in ASD until the mid 1990s and a slight decrease afterwards.
For an overview, Table 2.A4 summarizes the development of the composition of
the low-wage sector for males and females by selected characteristics for the years
1984 and 2002.
Taken together, the descriptions shown above provide clear evidence of an in-
creasing degree of persistence in the low-wage sector. Moreover, the degree (and
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the evolution) of persistence varies considerably across observable attributes. It re-
mains, however, unclear whether the increasing persistence can be fully attributed
to a compositional shift towards more unfavorable observable characteristics. In
addition to the observed developments fostering a rise in low-wage persistence,
such as the increasing fraction of older workers and the less favorable skill compo-
sition among the low-paid, a low-wage job per se might have increasingly caused
low-wage employment in the future, regardless of the evolution of observable at-
tributes. Such a development could stem from an increase in “true” or genuine
state-dependence. The question of to what extent the observed increase in ASD is
accounted for by a less favorable composition of the low-wage relative to the high-
wage sector will therefore be addressed in the next section using a multivariate
econometric framework.
2.3 Econometric Analysis of Low-Pay Transitions
2.3.1 Model specification
To isolate the evolution of genuine state dependence, we characterize the deter-
minants of low-pay persistence and exit rates by explicitly distinguishing between
observed and unobserved heterogeneity and true state dependence. To do so, we
analyze low-pay transitions for each year in our sample period by estimating the
probability of being low paid in period t, conditional on the lagged pay status in
t−5, with t = 1989−2004. An endogeneity issue which is commonly referred to as
the ’initial conditions problem’ (Heckman 1981) arises if the starting point of the
earnings process cannot be observed in the data and the unobservables affecting
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this process are correlated. A common solution is to specify an additional equa-
tion for the initial condition and to allow for a correlation between the error terms
of the initial conditions and the transition equation. A second endogeneity issue
arises since pay transitions are only observable for employees who stay full-time
employed five years later. If unobservables affecting the probability of dropping
out and the initial low-pay status are correlated, the resulting earnings attrition
will be endogenous to the pay transition process.29
In order to account for these selection mechanisms, we estimate a series of
annual trivariate probit models. Each model includes the determination of low-
pay status in period t − 5 (to account for the initial conditions problem), the
determination of whether full-time earnings are observed at both points in time,
t− 5 and t (earnings retention), the determination of pay status in period t, and,
finally, the correlation of unobservables affecting these processes.30
We first specify the initial low-pay status. Let l∗it−5 denote a latent low-pay
propensity for individual i at the start of the observation period and xit−5 rep-
resents a set of individual-specific characteristics. To capture labor market ex-
perience and human capital endowment, xit−5 includes tenure, tenure squared, a
dummy indicating foreign nationality as well as dummies on educational attain-
ment (three categories), occupational status as well as seven different age groups.
By allowing the selection on age to vary across years we capture that increasing
29The descriptive evidence from Table 2.A2 already suggests that the likelihood of earnings
retention is larger for high-paid than for low-paid workers.
30Due to computational constraints, we do not exploit the panel structure of our data as
we estimate the trivariate model separately for each of the 16 years of our observation period.
However, as our main focus is to analyze the evolution of GSD over time in general, the individual
correlations over time as well as the occurrence of lagged state dependence or feedback effects as
investigated, e.g. by Biewen (2009) and Wooldridge (2005), are beyond the scope of this chapter
and might be subject to further research.
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persistence over time causes low-wage workers to become older, which in turn
affects the age-specific selection into low-wage employment. We also include infor-
mation on the previous employment history such as the employment status prior
to entry into the current establishment, the number of previous unemployment and
non-employment spells as well as the cumulated duration of previous unemploy-
ment and non-employment spells. We further control for the sectoral affiliation as
well as regional dummies. uit−5 is the sum of an individual-specific effect, µi, and
an orthogonal white-noise error, δit−5, and is assumed to follow a standard normal
distribution:
l∗it−5 = β′xit−5 + uit−5, uit−5 ∼ N (0, 1) . (2.1)
If l∗it−5 exceeds some unobservable value (normalized to zero), individual i is ob-
served to be low paid. We define a binary indicator Lit−5 = 1 if l∗it−5 > 0 and zero
otherwise.
The next process to be specified is the earnings retention. We assume that the
propensity to observe full-time earnings of individual i in period t − 5 and t can
be described by a latent retention index r∗it,
r∗it = δ′yit−5 + εit, εit ∼ N (0, 1) , (2.2)
where the error term εit is standard normally distributed and specified as the sum
of an individual-specific effect, ηi, and an orthogonal white-noise error, ξit−5. yit−5
includes factors affecting both earnings and the attachment to paid employment.
yit−5 contains xit−5, i.e. we assume that factors affecting earnings levels are gen-
erally also relevant in determining earnings retention. In order to identify the
equation, we need to exclude one variable from xit−5 and add an additional one
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that affects the attachment to paid employment which is not part of xit−5 (see be-
low). If the latent retention propensity of individual i is lower than some critical
unobserved value (again normalized to zero), earnings and low-pay status cannot
be observed in period t. Let Rit be a binary variable of the earnings retention
outcome of each individual, where Rit = 1 if r∗it > 0 and zero otherwise.
The third component of the model is the specification of the low-pay status in
period t. We assume that the latent propensity of low pay can be characterized
by
l∗it = [(Lit−5) γ′1 + (1− Lit−5) γ′2] zit−5 + υit, υit ∼ N (0, 1) , (2.3)
with υit denoting the sum of an individual-specific effect, τi, and an orthogonal
white-noise error, ζit−5. The column vector zit−5 comprises individual-specific at-
tributes affecting the pay status in t. In order to deal with simultaneous changes
in covariates and pay status, the individual characteristics pertain to period t− 5.
The switching specification in (2.3) allows the impact of the explanatory variables
to differ according to the low-pay status in the initial period. Again, Lit denotes a
binary variable Lit = 1 if l∗it > 0 and zero otherwise, where Lit is only observable if
Rit = 1. As a consequence, the sample likelihood will be endogenously truncated.
We assume that the error terms in each of the three equations are jointly dis-
tributed as trivariate normal with unrestricted correlations, which can be written
as
ρ1 ≡ corr (uit−5, εit) (2.4)
ρ2 ≡ corr (uit−5, υit) (2.5)
ρ3 ≡ corr (vit, εit) . (2.6)
68
The cross-equation correlations provide a parameterization of unobserved hetero-
geneity. The correlation ρ1 describes the relationship between unobservable factors
affecting the initial low-pay status and earnings retention. A negative sign sug-
gests that individuals who were more likely to be low paid in the initial period are
more likely to drop out of full-time employment compared with high-paid individ-
uals. The correlation ρ2 summarizes the association between unobservable factors
determining the initial and the current low-pay status. Here, a positive sign would
imply that individuals earning a low wage in t − 5 are more likely to remain in
the low-pay status. The correlation ρ3 characterizes the relationship between un-
observables affecting the retention propensity and the current low-pay status. A
negative sign would indicate that individuals employed at both points in time are
more likely to escape low pay in t as compared to individuals dropping out of
full-time employment. Estimation of unconstrained cross-correlation coefficients
provides a test of whether initial conditions and the earnings retention process
may be treated as exogenous. In particular, ρ1 = ρ3 = 0 would imply that the
earnings retention process is exogenous and would give rise to a bivariate probit
model. Similarly, testing the exogeneity of initial conditions amounts to testing
ρ1 = ρ2 = 0. Finally, if all cross-equation correlations are zero, then γ1 and γ2 can
be consistently estimated using univariate probit models on subsamples depending
on individuals’ initial pay status (Lit−5 = 0 or Lit−5 = 1).
Estimating the model with unrestricted cross-equation correlations requires
identifying restrictions, i.e. variables entering xit−5 and yit−5 but not zit−5. In
other words, one ideally needs variables that affect the initial condition and the
retention probability but not the transition process. In what follows, we will ar-
gue that variables proxying the stability of a worker’s employment history might
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satisfy these requirements. This is based upon the notion that low-wage jobs may
be the result of asymmetric information about a worker’s true productivity, which
is not known ex-ante and becomes known more precisely as a worker’s job tenure
increases (Jovanovic 1979). In this case, the less regular the employment history,
the more difficult it becomes for an individual to signal high productivity, which
determines the initial wage. Once, however, an individual is observed five years
later in the sample, the employment history may be expected to lose importance
in determining an individual’s wage position. Thus, employment history variables
may be suitable instruments as they are likely to affect the attachment to full-time
employment and the probability of being initially low paid, but not the low-pay
transition. We will test the validity of our exclusion restrictions imposed for iden-
tification using functional form as the identifying restriction. As will be shown in
Section 2.3.3.1., excluding the number of previous employers until 1989 (the num-
ber of previous unemployment spells after 1989) from the transition and retention
equation as well as the number of employment interruptions with the current em-
ployer from the transition and initial conditions equation fulfills the requirements
for the validity of these restrictions for the men’s model. For women, we use the
total unemployment duration as an identifying variable for the retention process as
well as the number of employment interruptions with the current employer for the
initial low-pay status and exclude these variables from the transition equation.31
2.3.2 Measures of state dependence
To investigate the extent to which the decline in the probability of escaping low
31Although Jovanovic (1979) does not explicitly allow for recalls in his model, it is reasonable
to assume that the number of employment interruptions may worsen the precision of workers’
signals with respect to their true productivity.
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earnings is caused by an increase in the persistence of low-wage employment, we
distinguish between aggregate state dependence (ASD) and genuine state depen-
dence (GSD). ASD is obtained by computing the difference in average predicted
transition probabilities for those who were low paid in t − 5 and for those who
were initially high paid:
ASDt =
∑
i∈(Lit−5=1,Rit=1) Pr (Lit = 1|Lit−5 = 1)∑
i Lit−5 ·Rit
−
∑
i∈(Lit−5=0,Rit=1) Pr (Lit = 1|Lit−5 = 0)∑
i (1− Lit−5) ·Rit
=
∑
i∈(Lit−5=1,Rit=1)
Φ2(zit−5γ̂1,xit−5β̂;ρ2)
Φ(xit−5β̂)∑
i Lit−5 ·Rit
−
∑
i∈(Lit−5=0,Rit=1)
Φ2(zit−5γ̂2,−xit−5β̂;−ρ2)
Φ(−xit−5β̂)∑
i (1− Lit−5) ·Rit
, (2.7)
where Φ (·) and Φ2 (·) are cumulative density functions of the univariate and
bivariate standard normal distributions.32 This measure does not take into account
individual observed or unobserved heterogeneity.
Genuine state dependence arises if initial low pay causes low-pay employment
in the future for reasons of, e.g., stigmatization or human capital depreciation.
The absence of GSD can be directly tested by using the endogenous switching
structure in (2.3) and amounts to testing the null hypothesis H0 : γ1 = γ2. To
account for individual-specific heterogeneity, the GSD is based upon individual-
specific probability differences. In particular, GSD is derived by first predicting for
each individual with earnings retention five years later two transition probabilities,
of which one will be counterfactual: i) the probability of staying in the low-wage
sector (conditional on being initially low paid) and ii) the probability of descending
32Depending on the model’s predictive performance, the predicted ASD should be close to the
descriptive ASD that we introduced in Section 2.2.3. As we will show later, this is indeed the
case.
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into the low-wage sector (conditional on being initially high paid). In a second step,
the individual differences of these predicted transition probabilities are averaged
over the sample of those with observed earnings in t and t− 5:
GSDt =
1∑
i
Rit
∑
i∈Rit=1
[Pr (Lit = 1|Lit−5 = 1)− Pr (Lit = 1|Lit−5 = 0)]
= 1∑
i
Rit
∑
i∈Rit=1
Φ2
(
zit−5γ̂1, xit−5β̂; ρ2
)
Φ
(
xit−5β̂
) − Φ2
(
zit−5γ̂2,−xit−5β̂;−ρ2
)
Φ
(
−xit−5β̂
)
 (2.8)
The log-likelihood contribution for each individual i with earnings information
observed in period t− 5 is:
log£i = Lit−5Rit log [Φ3 (giγ′1zit−5, hiδ′yit−5, diβ′xit−5; gihiρ3, gidiρ2, hidiρ1)]
+ (1− Lit−5)Rit log [Φ3 (giγ′2zit−5, hiδ′yit−5, diβ′xit−5; gihiρ3, gidiρ2, hidiρ1)]
+ (1−Rit) log [Φ2 (hiδ′yit−5, diβ′xit−5;hidiρ1)] , (2.9)
where Φ3 is the cumulative density function of the trivariate standard normal
distribution and gi ≡ 2Lit − 1, hi ≡ 2Rit − 1, di ≡ 2Lit−5 − 1. We compute
the trivariate standard normal distribution by applying the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-
Keane simulator, yielding a maximum simulated likelihood estimator (see Cappel-
lari and Jenkins 2003 and 2006).
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2.3.3 Results
In Section 2.3.3.1, we next examine whether the model that we introduced in the
last section is correctly specified and validly identified. Section 2.3.3.2 presents
the regression results that show the impact of different individual characteristics
on our binary outcome variables. Section 2.3.3.3 deals with the development of
aggregate GSD as the main outcome of interest derived from the model. Due
to the switching specification of the transition equation, the evolution of GSD
will still reflect both changes in the workforce composition as well as changes in
the differential impacts of the observed covariates on the transition probabilities.
Therefore, Section 2.3.3.4 presents a decomposition of the evolution of GSD into
a characteristics and a coefficients effect.
2.3.3.1 Correlation structure and hypothesis tests
For each year, our estimation sample is based on those individuals for whom we
observe full-time earnings in our data set. That the trivariate probit model is
necessary to derive consistent estimates of our parameters of interest is confirmed
for all years as the hypothesis that ρ1 = ρ3 and ρ1 = ρ2 has to be clearly rejected at
the 0.1% significance level for both men and women. This provides evidence of the
endogeneity of the initial-conditions process and the earnings retention process.
The tests also show for men as well as for women that the hypothesis γ1 = γ2 and,
thus, the hypothesis of no genuine state dependence must be rejected at the 0.1%
significance level in each of the 16 years of our observation period.
The cross equation correlation structure is summarized in Table 2.1 for both
male and female workers. As expected, the correlation between unobservables af-
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Table 2.1: Equation correlation structure
Year Males Females
ρ1 ρ2 ρ3 ρ1 ρ2 ρ3
1984 -.223*** 0.008 0.272** -.157*** 0.607 0.213
1985 -.202*** 0.054 0.406*** -.131*** 0.082 0.477**
1986 -.176*** -.200 0.348*** -.132*** 0.285* 0.412**
1987 -.206*** -.183 0.140 -.115*** 0.200 0.409*
1988 -.207*** -.299 0.131 -.118*** 0.078 0.544***
1989 -.198*** -.046 0.298** -.113*** 0.114 0.459***
1990 -.199*** -.368* 0.199* -.117*** 0.227 0.436***
1991 -.210*** -.206 -.070 -.132*** 0.183 0.394**
1992 -.218*** -.261 0.009 -.132*** 0.148 -.194**
1993 -.240*** -.229 0.279 -.142*** -.902*** 0.003
1994 -.214*** -.061 -.205** -.145*** -.127 -.239***
1995 -.223*** 0.099 -.176** -.150*** 0.108 -.279***
1996 -.235*** -.351* -.297*** -.154*** -.103 -.048
1997 -.221*** -.098 -.171** -.150*** 0.053 -.146
1998 -.225*** -.356 -.056 -.144*** 0.176 -.209**
1999 -.234*** -.204 -.255*** -.160*** -.275 -.181
Note: ρ1: Correlation between initial conditions and retention;
ρ2: Correlation between initial conditions and low-pay transition;
ρ3: Correlation between retention and low-pay transition;
Significance levels: ***: p<0.01; **: p<0.05; *: p<0.1.
fecting retention and initial conditions is estimated to be negative in each year
for both sexes, indicating that those who were initially low paid are less likely to
be employed at both points in time. A significant correlation between the initial
condition and the transition equation cannot be found, neither for male nor for
female workers. This suggests that any bias due to the selection into low-wage
employment influences the transition process through its impact on employment
retention. Interestingly, the correlation between the retention and the transition
equation has changed over time for men as well as for women. In the first years
of our observation period, we observe a significantly positive relationship between
unobservables affecting the retention propensity and low-pay persistence. This in-
dicates that individuals employed at both points in time were less likely to escape
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low pay in t as compared to individuals dropping out of full-time employment. In
the mid 1990s, the sign switches for both sexes and becomes significant in some
years. Note that a potential explanation for this finding may relate to the change
in the age composition of the low-wage sector. Figure 2.5 reveals that the start
of the deceleration in the decline in the young workers’ share roughly coincides
with the estimated switch in the correlation between retention and low-pay per-
sistence. Given that low-pay is more likely to reflect entry wages in the first half
of our observation period, this may help explain the positive association between
unobservables favoring low-pay persistence as well as employment stability. In
the second half of our observation period, in contrast, low-pay workers appear to
be more negatively selected upon unobservables fostering persistence as well as
instable employment histories.
To be validly identified, the typical identifying conditions need to hold for each
of the trivariate models, i.e. the excluded variables should have a significant im-
pact on retention (the initial condition) but not on the low-pay transition. Thus,
in our case the conditions require the number of employment interruptions with
the current employer to significantly affect the men’s probability of staying in the
sample in a given year but, at the same time, to have no significant impact on
the probability of staying in the low-wage sector. As can be seen from Table 2.2,
the two excluded variables have a significant impact on the retention and the ini-
tial conditions equation for male workers in each of the 16 years. For women, we
similarly observe a significant effect of the number of employment interruptions
with the current employer on the probability of initially earning a low wage for all
years. The effect of the total unemployment duration on the retention probability
is, however, only significant in 8 out of the 16 years. An overview of the tests con-
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Table 2.2: Inclusion of instruments
Year Males FemalesInstr. 1 in Instr. 2 in Instr. 1 in Instr. 2 in
retention eq. init. cond. eq. retention eq. init. cond. eq.
1984 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.000
1985 0.004 0.000 0.059 0.000
1986 0.001 0.000 0.652 0.000
1987 0.003 0.000 0.463 0.000
1988 0.000 0.000 0.132 0.000
1989 0.000 0.000 0.460 0.000
1990 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000
1991 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.000
1992 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000
1993 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.000
1994 0.001 0.000 0.172 0.000
1995 0.006 0.000 0.382 0.000
1996 0.000 0.000 0.401 0.000
1997 0.001 0.000 0.369 0.000
1998 0.023 0.000 0.013 0.000
1999 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: All values are p-values. For men, instrument 1 denotes the number of employment
interruptions with the current employer; instrument 2 denotes the number of previous
employers until 1989; after 1989 instrument 2 refers to the number of previous unemployment
spells. For females, instrument 1 denotes the total unemployment duration; instrument 2
is the number of employment interruptions with the current employer.
cerning the second condition - the insignificant impact of the excluded variables in
the transition equation - is given in Table 2.3 for both men and women. While the
first two columns show for each sex the significance tests for each excluded variable
separately, the third column displays the joint significance test of the two excluded
variables in the transition equation. We observe for male workers that the num-
ber of previous employers (until 1989) and the number of previous unemployment
spells (since 1990) seem to be valid instruments for the initial conditions equation.
With the exception of 1987, the impact of these variables on the likelihood to stay
in the low-wage sector is insignificant at the 5% level. The number of employment
interruptions also turns out to be a suitable exclusion restriction as the variable
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has no significant impact in the transition equation in the majority of years. As
a result, the joint significance test accepts the hypothesis (at the 5% significance
level) of the two variables having no impact in the transition equation in 12 out
of 16 years.
Table 2.3: Exclusion of instruments from the transition equation
Year Males FemalesInstr. 1 Instr. 2 Instr. 1+2 Instr. 1 Instr. 2 Instr. 1+2
1984 0.159 0.328 0.181 0.488 0.611 0.659
1985 0.026 0.316 0.092 0.838 0.724 0.908
1986 0.382 0.495 0.506 0.604 0.444 0.619
1987 0.024 0.021 0.001 0.994 0.008 0.047
1988 0.333 0.376 0.271 0.498 0.030 0.076
1989 0.008 0.388 0.013 0.715 0.001 0.004
1990 0.268 0.301 0.245 0.818 0.000 0.001
1991 0.042 0.156 0.031 0.702 0.001 0.004
1992 0.007 0.742 0.031 0.467 0.570 0.607
1993 0.388 0.435 0.432 0.849 0.256 0.565
1994 0.576 0.213 0.430 0.342 0.975 0.696
1995 0.071 0.314 0.103 0.301 0.244 0.251
1996 0.443 0.751 0.690 0.142 0.427 0.214
1997 0.069 0.312 0.119 0.027 0.603 0.077
1998 0.037 0.442 0.086 0.007 0.961 0.042
1999 0.898 0.252 0.562 0.074 0.189 0.063
Note: All values are p-values. For men, instrument 1 denotes the number of employment
interruptions with the current employer, instrument 2 denotes the number of previous
employers until 1989; after 1989 instrument 2 refers to the number of previous unemployment
spells. For women, instrument 1 denotes the total unemployment duration, instrument 2 is
the number of employment interruptions with the current employer.
The tests of the insignificance of the excluded variables for women reveal that
both variables seem to provide valid exclusion restrictions for the majority of years.
This is shown by the joint significance test that accepts the hypothesis (at the 5%
significance level) that the two variables have no impact in the transition equation
for 11 out of 16 years. However, for both excluded variables there are some periods
where the requirements for a valid identification are not fully met. While the total
unemployment duration has a significant impact in the transition equation in the
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last three years of our observation period (1997-1999), the number of employment
interruptions with the current employer affects the likelihood of staying in the
low-wage sector significantly between 1987 and 1991. Since - as seen in Table 2.2
- the impact of this variable on the initial conditions equation is at the same time
not significant, a valid identification of the women’s model might not be achieved
for some years in the late 1980s, so that the results for these years should be
interpreted with caution. Taken together, however, the tests show that for the
majority of years the trivariate probit models are well identified for both sexes.
2.3.3.2 Regression results
After having clarified the conditions for identification, we summarize the estima-
tion results over all 16 years for male workers in Table 2.4 and for female workers in
Table 2.5. The tables show for all variables their impact on the retention probabil-
ity (Rt), the initial conditions (Lt−5), the likelihood of entering the low-wage sector
conditional on being initially high paid (Lt | Lt−5 = 0) and the likelihood of stay-
ing in the low-wage sector conditional on being initially low paid (Lt | Lt−5 = 1).
We summarize the estimation results for each equation by two different indicators.
To get an impression of each variable’s robustness over time, the first column not
only displays for each equation the direction of the sign, which is most often ob-
served over time, but also the frequency of the signs’ appearance of the estimated
coefficients on a scale of one (+/−) to three (+ + +/−−−), with + + +/−−−
representing a positive/negative effect in each of the 16 years. The second column
provides insights into each covariate’s consistency over time by summing up the
number of years in which the sign of the estimated coefficient switched.
The variables explain the dependent variables over time quite robustly as the
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estimated coefficients do not change their sign over time for the majority of the
covariates. If they do so, they most likely change it only once, indicating a possible
structural change in the variables’ influence on the different processes. This result
applies to men as well as to women, although the estimation results for men seem
to show a somewhat higher degree of robustness with respect to both indicators.
Turning first to the earnings retention (Rt) and the initial conditions process
(Lt−5), a comparison of the equations reveals that for male workers almost all
covariates exhibit opposite signs with respect to their impact on both processes (see
Table 2.4). Characteristics that reflect unstable employment records like longer un-
and non-employment durations, a higher number of non-employment spells as well
as employment interruptions and a change of the employer, favor the likelihood of
being initially low paid and reduce the probability of remaining full-time employed
five years later. Also, being foreign makes it more likely to be initially low paid
and decreases the retention probability. For other variables, the interpretation
works just the other way around: not surprisingly, a higher tenure as well as a
higher education reduce the probability of an initial low-wage status and increase
the retention probability. Only for blue-collar workers as well as for previous full-
time employed individuals, we observe that the signs of the two coefficients point
into the same direction. The retention probability as well as the probability of
being initially low paid is higher for blue-collar (than for white-collar) workers
and for those individuals who were previously full-time (rather than not full-time)
employed. At first glance, the positive association between a previous full-time
employment status and the probability of being initially low paid appears to be
somewhat counterintuitive. However, this result may reflect the fact that males
exhibiting non-standard employment relationships reflect a particularly selected
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Table 2.4: Regression summary for men, 1984 - 1999
Variables Rt Lt−5 Lt|Lt−5 = 0 Lt|Lt−5 = 1
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Age 26 - 30 (ref.: age 20 - 25) +++ 1 0 −−− 0 −−− 0 +++ 0
Age 31 - 35 +++ 0 −−− 0 −−− 0 +++ 0
Age 36 - 40 ++ 1 −−− 0 −−− 0 +++ 0
Age 41 - 45 ++ 1 −−− 0 −−− 0 +++ 0
Age 46 - 50 −− 1 −−− 0 −− 2 +++ 0
Age 51 - 55 −−− 0 −−− 0 − 0 +++ 0
Tenure +++ 0 −−− 0 −−− 0 +++ 0
Tenure squared −−− 0 ++ 1 ++ 1 −− 3
Being foreign (=1) −−− 0 +++ 0 +++ 0 ++ 4
Medium-skilled (ref.: low-skilled) +++ 0 −−− 0 −−− 0 −−− 0
High-skilled +++ 0 −−− 0 −−− 0 −−− 0
Previously full-time empl. (=1) +++ 0 +++ 0 −−− 0 + 6
Total non-employment duration −−− 0 +++ 0 +++ 0 +++ 0
Total unemployment duration −−− 0 +++ 0 +++ 0 +++ 0
Number of non-empl. spells −−− 0 +++ 0 +++ 0 ++ 3
Employment interruption (=1) −−− 0 + 7 + 7 ++ 2
Change of employer (=1) −− 1 +++ 0 +++ 0 −− 4
Blue-collar worker (=1) +++ 0 +++ 0 +++ 0 +++ 0
Number of unemployment spells2 +++ 0 −−− 0 −−− 0 −−− 0
Number of previous employers3 −−− 0 −−− 0 +++ 0 + 3
Number of empl. interruptions +++ 0
1) Measure of direction robustness:
+ + +/−−−: Variable has a positive/negative impact in all 16 years.
++/−−: Variable has a positive/negative impact in 12 to 15 of the 16 years.
+/−: Variable has a positive/negative impact in 9 to 11 of the 16 years.
2) Coefficients for Rt and Lt|Lt−5 are only available for the years 1984-1989.
3) Coefficients for Rt and Lt|Lt−5 are only available for the years 1990-1999.
group in the labor market. Considering age, we observe that workers below the
age of 26 years face the highest risk of being low paid, whereas we see a U-shaped
pattern with respect to the retention probability. Young workers (20 - 25 years) and
older workers above 45 years face a lower retention probability than the middle-
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aged.
All in all, the signs of the variables vary little for female workers in comparison
to men (see Table 2.5). Exceptions are skill and occupational status. Other than
for men, being high-skilled (versus low-skilled) and being a blue-collar (versus
a white-collar) worker reduces the retention probability. The estimation results
demonstrate that especially females between 26 and 30 years have a lower proba-
bility of staying in the sample five years later compared to young female workers
below 26 years. This result might be explained by the fact that women leave the
labor market more frequently during that period, for example due to maternity
leave. With respect to the initial condition process, the main difference between
men and women concerns the previous employment status. In line with what one
would expect, a previous full-time employed position decreases the probability of
being initially low paid for women.
Turning next to the transition equation, the coefficients of all covariates are
allowed to differ - in line with our switching regression specification - across those
who were initially low paid (Lt | Lt−5 = 1) and for those initially high paid
(Lt | Lt−5 = 0). As one might expect, for most variables the signs of the estimated
coefficient point into the same direction as in the initial conditions equation, par-
ticularly for those initially high paid. With respect to age, however, we see de-
viations conditional on the initial low-pay status for male as well as for female
workers. Conditional on being initially high paid, younger individuals up to an
age of 35 years have a higher probability than those older than 35 years to descend
into the low-wage sector five years later. In contrast, conditional on being ini-
tially low paid, the group of the youngest workers exhibits the lowest probability
of sticking to a low-wage job. Thus, once earning a low wage, it is much more
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Table 2.5: Regression summary for women, 1984 - 1999
Variables Rt Lt−5 Lt|Lt−5 = 0 Lt|Lt−5 = 1
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Age 26 - 30 (ref.: age 20 - 25) −− 1) 1 −−− 0 ++ 4 +++ 0
Age 31 - 35 +++ 0 −− 2 + 3 +++ 0
Age 36 - 40 +++ 0 −− 4 −−− 0 +++ 0
Age 41 - 45 +++ 0 −−− 0 −− 2 +++ 0
Age 46 - 50 +++ 0 −− 2 −− 2 +++ 0
Age 51 - 55 − 2 − 2 −− 3 +++ 0
Tenure +++ 0 −−− 0 −− 2 +++ 0
Tenure squared −− 2 ++ 1 ++ 3 −−− 0
Being foreign (=1) −−− 0 — 0 −− 4 −− 2
Medium-skilled (ref. low-skilled) +++ 0 −−− 0 o 1 −− 2
High-skilled − 1 −−− 0 −−− 0 −−− 0
Previously full-time empl. (=1) +++ 0 −−− 0 −−− 0 − 4
Total non-employment duration −−− 0 +++ 0 +++ 0 +++ 0
Number of non-empl. spells −−− 0 +++ 0 ++ 2 − 6
Number of previous employers −−− 0 −−− 0 + 1 −− 5
Employment interruption (=1) −−− 0 +++ 0 ++ 4 ++ 1
Change of employer (=1) −− 3 +++ 0 ++ 2 + 4
Number of unemployment spells + 4 ++ 1 +++ 0 ++ 6
Blue-collar worker (=1) −−− 0 +++ 0 +++ 0 +++ 0
Total unemployment duration −− 2
Number of empl. interruptions −−− 0
1) Measure of direction robustness:
+ + +/−−−: Variable has a positive/negative impact in all 16 years.
++/−−: Variable has a positive/negative impact in 12 to 15 of the 16 years.
+/−: Variable has a positive/negative impact in 9 to 11 of the 16 years.
o: Variable has a positive and a negative impact in 8 of the 16 years.
difficult for older individuals to escape from it than for the younger ones. This
result is valid for both men and women and confirms the descriptive findings from
Section 2.2.3.
To assess the quantitative meaning of a variable’s impact, it is necessary to
derive the marginal effects as is described in Appendix 2C. Table 2.6 exemplarily
displays the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the low-pay transition
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probabilities for male workers in 1999. In line with the switching regression specifi-
cation, the effects are reported separately for those who were initially low paid and
for those initially high paid. For the former group, the effects are to be interpreted
in terms of persistence effects, whereas for the latter group the marginal effects
refer to the probability of descending into low pay. Marginal effects (in short ME)
are to be interpreted as deviations from a reference person who has all dummies
set to zero and is defined by setting the continuous covariates equal to their sample
median values.33
The first two rows in Table 2.6 report the average transition probabilities -
which represent the two components of the ASD derived in equation (2.7) - as
well as the transition probabilities for the reference individual - which are referred
to as the baseline probabilities. The baseline persistence probability of 0.589 is
considerably larger than the average transition probability, whereas no difference
is observed for entry probabilities. The ME estimates indicate that observable
individual attributes significantly affect the probability of both staying and be-
coming low paid. While a better education reduces the probability of both staying
and becoming low paid, other variables have opposite effects on the low-wage per-
sistence and entry probabilities. The marginal effects confirm earlier results from
Table 2.4, which suggest that the likelihood of descending into the low-wage sec-
tor is highest for the youngest workers below 26 years, whereas the likelihood of
remaining low paid is the lowest for this subgroup. An individual who is between
41 and 45 years, for example, has a persistence (entry) probability which is 17.2
33A reference individual is a German between the age of 20 to 25 years who has a vocational
degree, a white-collar occupation, who has had no regular employment relationship, and three
previous employers prior to entry into the current establishment. Moreover, the reference worker
has a median tenure of 2,040 days, has been non-employed for 90 days, and has not yet been
unemployed.
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Table 2.6: Marginal effects for male workers in 1999
Lt|Lt−5 = 1 Lt|Lt−5 = 0
ME Std. error ME Std. error
Average prediction 0.476 0.022
Baseline 0.589 0.022
Tenure 0.000 0.572 -.000 3.476
Tenure squared -.000 0.001 0.000 0.004
Total non-employment duration 0.000 0.072 0.000 0.841
Total unemployment duration 0.000 0.092 0.000 5.608
Number of non-employment spells -.004 19.967 0.003 754.08
Number of previous employers 0.008 39.628 0.001 188.82
Age 26 - 30 0.063*** 0.000 -.009*** 0.000
Age 31 - 35 0.099*** 0.001 -.010*** 0.000
Age 36 - 40 0.121*** 0.001 -.011*** 0.002
Age 41 - 45 0.172*** 0.003 -.011*** 0.000
Age 46 - 50 0.185*** 0.003 -.008*** 0.002
Age 51 - 55 0.231*** 0.002 -.004 0.003
Being foreign 0.000 0.008 0.009 0.005
Medium-skilled -.049*** 0.009 -.008** 0.003
High-skilled -.140*** 0.011 -.021*** 0.001
Previously full-time employed 0.018*** 0.005 -.012** 0.004
Employment interruption (=1) 0.020*** 0.005 -.001 0.003
Change of employer (=1) 0.005 0.012 0.005 0.003
Blue-collar worker (=1) 0.012* 0.005 -.041* 0.016
N (Individuals) 14,549 175,771
Note: All specifications additionally include regional, sectoral, and occupational dummies.
Significance levels: ***: p<0.001; **: p<0.01; *: p<0.05.
(1.1) percentage points higher (lower) than that of an individual aged between 20
and 25 years, ceteris paribus. The continuous employment history variables like
tenure and total unemployment duration do not have any explanatory power.
Overall, the estimation results indicate that for both males and females age
rather than the employment history variables drive the persistence probability.
For example, whether an individual has a long or a short record of days in unem-
ployment is not of major importance once an individual earns a low wage. This
suggests that the extent of true state dependence is quite substantial.
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2.3.3.3 The evolution of genuine state dependence (GSD)
After having estimated the transition equations, we next turn to the evolution of
genuine state dependence (GSD) as given by equation (2.8). In Figure 2.6, we plot
the estimated aggregate state dependence (ASD) and genuine state dependence
(GSD) against time, separately for men and women. The estimated ASD values
are nearly equal to the descriptive values that we showed earlier in Figure 2.3.
Comparing the evolution of GSD and ASD, Figure 2.6 demonstrates that the
measures are characterized by a quite divergent development. While the male
ASD has steadily risen over time from 25% in 1987 to 45% in 2002, the GSD
measure exhibits a stationary pattern by fluctuating at a rate around 40% over
the whole observation period. Thus, once observable characteristics are controlled
for, our findings argue against an upward trend in genuine state dependence for
the overall male workforce.
Figure 2.6: Evolution of aggregate (ASD) and genuine state dependence (GSD)
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For women, in contrast, there seems to have been a slight increase in GSD
between 1990 and 1999 from 47 to 56%. However, the growth of GSD has been
distinctly lower than that of ASD which rose from 46 to 65% between 1987 and
2002. This result highlights the importance of accounting for changes in the com-
position of the low-wage relative to the high-wage labor work force and makes clear
that the omission of such changing trends might lead to wrong inferences.
An important pattern that emerges from Figure 2.6 is that, especially for male
workers, the extent of GSD has been substantially higher than the ASD during
the first part of the observation period until 1991. This contrasts with earlier re-
sults from other studies (e.g. Cappellari and Jenkins 2004 and Cappellari 2007).
Recall, however, that in our GSD measure we contrast for each individual - given
his or her observed characteristics - the probability of entering the low-wage sector
conditional on being initially high paid with the respective probability conditional
on being initially low paid. One would typically expect that individuals working in
the high-wage sector exhibit observed attributes that shelter them from low-wage
persistence, even evaluated at the counterfactual persistence probability. However,
our strong results with respect to the age structure’s impact on transition proba-
bilities lead to the opposite pattern. As individuals from the high-wage sector are
on average four years older than those in the low-wage sector, their counterfactual
persistence probabilities are considerably higher than their respective entry prob-
abilities. This gives rise to a large GSD value, which even exceeds the (observed)
ASD especially in the first years of our observation period when the difference in
the average age between low and high-wage earners was considerably larger than
in later years.34
34While male (female) high-wage earners were on average 10 (5) years older than low-wage
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Figure 2.7: GSD by high-paid and low-paid individuals and ASD, men (upper
part) and women (lower part), 1984 - 1999
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We next turn to the evolution of GSD separately for the low-wage and high-
wage sector. Figure 2.7 reveals that the level of GSD differed substantially across
earners in 1984, this difference dropped to 4 (1) years in 2002.
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low and high-paid workers during the 1980s, especially for men. In other words,
had a high-paid male worker earned a low wage, his probability of staying in the
low-wage sector would have been about 20 percentage points higher than for an
actual low-paid worker. During the end of the 1980s, the GSD of high-paid and
low-paid workers converged for both sexes mainly because the GSD of low-paid
workers increased more sharply. Note that this reflects the compositional shift
of the low-wage relative to the high-wage sector that was already established in
Figure 2.6. Since 1992, the evolution of GSD among low-paid women has been
very similar to that for high-paid women, whereas male low-paid workers in 1999
still faced a lower GSD level than their high-paid counterparts.
Overall, Figure 2.7 demonstrates that there has actually been an increase in
GSD for both male and female low-paid workers. Thus, the evolution of GSD for
the overall male workforce - as shown in Figure 2.6 - masked substantial hetero-
geneity across low and high paid workers as the majority of male workers earns
a wage above the low-wage threshold. Comparing the evolution of GSD among
low-wage workers with the evolution of ASD, we see, however, that the increase
in ASD cannot fully be accounted for by the increase in GSD among the low-
paid. The GSD/ASD ratio decreases from 0.90 in 1984 to 0.78 in 1999 for male
low-paid workers while it ranges quite stationarily between 0.84 and 0.94 over the
observation period for low-paid women.
A closer look at the evolution of GSD reveals that the increase during the 1990s
for both high and low-paid workers was preceded by a decline in the mid 1980s. We,
thus, observe some cyclical pattern which differs across men and women only at
the end of the observation period. One possible explanation for this pattern could
relate to the evolution of the unemployment rate as a proxy for business cycle
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effects. The argumentation works similar as in Chapter 1 when wage mobility
over the entire wage distribution was considered. As a consequence of the wage
procyclicality which is stronger for low-wage (and highest-wage) earners compared
to median earners, the probability of ascending from a low to a high paid job might
be higher in times of low unemployment. This would imply a positive correlation
between the GSD of low-wage workers and the unemployment rate.
Figure 2.8: Evolution of GSD and the unemployment rate, 1984 - 1999
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Although we are not able to make any causal inferences on the relationship
between the extent of GSD and the unemployment rate, Figure 2.8 provides some
support for the similarity of the evolution of both factors. For both men and
women, there is evidence that the evolution of the unemployment rate in year t
matches the evolution of low-wage workers’ GSD (measuring the probability of
sticking to the low-wage sector in t+ 5). The low-paid women’s decrease in GSD
from 49 to 45% between 1984 and 1990 was accompanied by a decrease in the
female unemployment rate, which fell from 8 to 6% during the same period. After
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1990, the unemployment rate as well as the GSD of the low-paid workers rose
distinctly. The positive association between the GSD and the unemployment rate
is confirmed by a high correlation coefficient of 0.87, which is highly significant
(p=0.000). A positive relationship is also observed for men for whom the corre-
lation coefficient of 0.55 is significant at the 5% significance level (p=0.026). The
results therefore indicate that a higher unemployment rate is associated with an
increase in the probability of sticking to a low-wage job.
2.3.3.4 Decomposing the evolution of genuine state dependence
While the divergent development of ASD and GSD may be attributed to com-
positional shifts of the low relative to the high-wage sector, it does not permit
us to infer any conclusions about the counterfactual evolution of GSD, had the
low-wage workforce composition remained unchanged. Since we allowed GSD to
vary across observable attributes, the evolution of GSD still reflects both changes
in the workforce composition as well as changes in the differential impacts of the
observed covariates on the transition probabilities. In order to disentangle these
effects, we employ decomposition techniques by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973)
adapted to our non-linear framework:
GSDt −GSDt-h = (GSDtt −GSDt-ht )︸ ︷︷ ︸
coefficients effect
+ (GSDt-ht −GSDt-ht-h)︸ ︷︷ ︸
characteristics effect
(2.10)
= (GSDtt −GSDtt-h)︸ ︷︷ ︸
characteristics effect
+ (GSDtt-h −GSDt-ht-h)︸ ︷︷ ︸
coefficients effect
, (2.11)
where t and t−h are two different points in time with t > t−h and GSDtt and
GSDt-ht-h estimated as described in equation (2.8). While the superscript marks the
90
changes in coefficients, the subscript reflects changes in characteristics. Due to the
cyclical evolution of GSD over time, we apply the decomposition for two different
time periods (1984 to 1989 and 1990 to 1999). The decompositions (2.10) and
(2.11) differ with respect to the chosen counterfactual GSD. In equation (2.10),
GSDt-ht denotes how the GSD would have evolved in t−h (i.e. 1984 or 1990), had
the composition of the workforce remained constant at its level in t (i.e. 1989 or
1999). The term GSDtt-h in equation (2.11) instead uses predictions for individuals
in t (1984 or 1990) based on the coefficients in t− h (1989 or 1999). The charac-
teristics effect, thus, involves the part of the overall change between 1984 (1990)
and 1989 (1999) which can be attributed to changes in observed characteristics of
the individuals in the sample at given coefficients, whereas the coefficients effect
captures the part which is due to changes in the coefficients at given characteristics.
Table 2.7: Decomposition of the GSD over time for the low-wage workforce, by
sex
Base year
Men Women
1984/1989 1990/1999 1984/1989 1990/1999
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A) 1989 / 1999
Change in GSD 0.4 9.5 -5.0 9.8
Coefficients effect -2.1 4.4 -4.4 4.5
Characteristics effect 2.5 5.1 -0.5 5.3
B) 1984 / 1990
Change in GSD 0.4 9.5 -5.0 9.8
Coefficients effect -1.5 6.2 -3.9 6.0
Characteristics effect 1.9 3.3 -1.0 3.8
Note: All values in percentage points.
Table 2.7 reports the results of the decompositions for the low-wage sector for
the two time periods separately for men and women. Panel A shows the results
for the base year 1999 (1989) resulting from equation (2.10), Panel B for the base
year 1990 (1984), cp. equation (2.11). Turning first to the time period 1984-1989,
the decomposition for men in column (1) of Table 2.7 shows that the change in
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observables would have actually favored an even higher increase in GSD which
has been overcompensated by the (negative) change in the coefficients. This result
is valid independent of the chosen base year. For female workers, the change in
coefficients was the driving force of the observed decline in GSD between 1984
and 1989, although part of the observed decline in their GSD is accounted for
by the characteristics effect (column (3)). This result holds irrespective of the
base year chosen. During the 1990s, GSD rose for both low-paid men and women
(columns (2) and (4)). Irrespective of the base year chosen, the decompositions
give very similar results across gender. While around 54% of the increase in GSD
can be attributed to an unfavorable evolution of characteristics for both males and
females with 1999 as base year (Panel A), the base year 1990 yields a contribution
of the characteristics effect of 35 to 39% (Panel B).
To sum up, this section has shown that the extent of GSD slightly increased
from 52 to 56% for women, whereas it fluctuated quite stationarily around 40%
over time for men over our observation period. Differentiating between low and
high-wage earners shows that especially the low-wage earners have experienced an
increase in GSD catching up with the level of high-wage earners at the end of
the observation period. The fluctuation of GSD over time - mainly a decrease
at the end of the 1980s followed by an increase in the early 1990s - matches for
both men and women the evolution of the unemployment rate. The decomposition
of GSD over time into a characteristics and a coefficients effect reveals for male
workers that the change in GSD during the 1980s can be mostly attributed to
a compositional shift. For female workers, it is rather the change in coefficients
that accounts for the decrease in GSD. During the 1990s, the characteristics
effect has become more important in determining GSD for both sexes indicating a
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compositional shift towards more unfavorable characteristics among the low-paid.
2.4 Conclusions
The purpose of this chapter was to study how individual wage mobility in the
low-wage sector has changed over the last two decades of the 20th century in
West Germany. Using a large administrative data set, we first document that the
low-wage sector has increased since the mid 1980s by around 14%. The overall
growth of the low-wage sector was accompanied by a distinct rise in the probability
of sticking to a low-wage job for both men and women. However, the extent of
persistence, as measured by the extent of aggregate state dependence (ASD),
varies greatly across different groups of individuals. Younger workers below 26
years, for example, face a much smaller risk of sticking to a low-wage job than the
oldest age group (50-55 years). As the share of young workers among the low-paid
has decreased to a much larger extent than the corresponding fraction in the high-
wage sector, this compositional shift might have contributed to the observed rise
in ASD over time.
In order to explore whether the observed decline in low-wage mobility is ac-
counted for by compositional shifts of the low-wage relative to the high-wage sector
or by an increase in “true” low-wage persistence, our analysis primarily seeks to
infer conclusions about the evolution of “genuine” state dependence (GSD). Gen-
uine state dependence arises when low-wage employment today causes low-wage
employment in the future for reasons of stigmatization or human capital depreci-
ation. We compute a measure of GSD by contrasting each individual’s transition
probability of staying in the low-wage sector conditional on being initially low paid
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with the probability of descending into the low-wage sector conditional on being
initially high paid. The GSD is then calculated by averaging these differences over
the sample of workers with earnings retention. Hence, to obtain such predicted
probabilities, we need to model low-pay transitions depending on a variety of low
and high-wage workers’ observable characteristics. In order to address the initial
conditions problem and the endogeneity of earnings attrition, we estimate a series
of annual trivariate probit models that account for the selection into low-wage
employment and earnings retention.
Based upon the estimated transitions, our results show that between 1984 and
1999 male workers’ GSD - opposed to their increasing ASD - exhibits a quite
stationary development at a rate of about 40% with some fluctuations over time.
Concentrating only on those individuals in the low-wage sector, an increase in
GSD can be observed which is, however, clearly less accentuated than the rise
in ASD. For women, there seems to have been a slight increase in GSD during
the 1990s from 47 to 56%, which is observed for both high and low-wage earners.
However, the increase is clearly less pronounced than the rise in ASD. The ob-
served fluctuation of GSD over time, mainly a decline in the late 1980s followed
by an increase in the early 1990s, mirrors the evolution of the unemployment rate
and indicates that a higher unemployment rate is associated with an increase in
the probability of sticking to a low-wage job for both men and women.
As we allowed the GSD to vary across observables, the evolution of GSD still
reflects both changes in the workforce composition as well as changes in price ef-
fects. We therefore use decomposition techniques to disentangle these effects for
the low-wage workforce. The decomposition of GSD over time into a character-
istics and a coefficients effect reveals for male workers that the change in GSD
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during the 1980s can be mostly attributed to a change in characteristics. For fe-
male workers, it is rather the change in coefficients that accounts for the decrease
in GSD. During the 1990s, the change in characteristics has become more impor-
tant in determining GSD for both sexes. Depending on the base year chosen, we
show that between 35 and 54% of the increase in genuine state dependence dur-
ing the 1990s can be attributed to compositional shifts towards more unfavorable
observable characteristics among the low-paid.
What do these results tell us about the ongoing discussion of decreasing wage
mobility in the low-wage sector in Germany? Taken together, our analysis high-
lights the importance of accounting for possible compositional changes in the low-
wage population. It also makes clear that the omission of such changing trends
might lead to wrong inferences about the development of true low-wage persis-
tence. In disentangling compositional shifts from changes in price effects, our
findings show that - contrary to common perceptions - the decline in low-wage
mobility cannot be fully explained by an increase in “true” state dependence, but
also by changes in the relative composition of the low-wage relative to the high-
wage sector. These “between” compositional effects are reinforced by “within”
compositional effects, which give rise to a larger increase in GSD compared to its
counterfactual evolution had the low-wage workforce composition remained un-
changed. Our results therefore lend strong support to the notion that appropriate
policy interventions should aim at working against such compositional shifts by,
e.g. improving low-wage earners’ skills and intensifying older low-paid employees’
vocational training opportunities.
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Appendix 2
2.A - Tables
Table 2.A1: Description of the variables used in the analysis
Variable Definition
Age Age (20-55 years) categorized in seven sub-groups
Tenure Sum of all previous days of employment at current employer
Tenure squared Square of sum of all previous days of employment
Nationality Dummy=0 if German
Medium-skilled1) Dummy=1 if completed vocational training but no university degree
High-skilled Dummy=1 if university degree
Previous occupation status Dummy=1 if previously employed, Dummy=0 if previously
un-/non- or part-time employed or in vocational training
Total unemployment duration2) Sum of all previous days of unemployment
Total non-employment duration Sum of all previous days of non-employment
Number of unemployment spells Sum of all previous unemployment spells
Number of non-employment spells Sum of all previous non-employment spells
Number of previous employers Sum of all previous employers
Previous employment interruption Dummy=1 if recall from current employer
Number of empl. interruptions Sum of all previous recalls at current employer
Change of employer Dummy=1 if employer or employment status changes
Profession Dummy=1 (=0) if blue-collar (white-collar) worker
6 occupation dummies Either agrarian, salary, sale, clerical, service or production worker
16 sector dummies Two-digit sectors (for categorization see Drews 2008)
11 regional dummies The 10 Western German states plus West-Berlin (until 1990)
Low wage in t (1989-2004) Dummy=1 if gross daily wage in t <2/3 of the median wage3)
Low wage in t-5 (1984-1999) Dummy=1 if gross daily wage in t-5 <2/3 of the median wage
Retention in t Dummy=1 if full-time employment status is observed in t-5 and t
1) To improve the education variable, we use the imputation rules derived by Fitzenberger et al. (2006).
2) Following the procedure proposed by Lee andWilke (2009), involuntary unemployment is defined as comprising
all continuous periods of transfer receipt. Gaps between periods of transfer receipt or gaps between transfer
receipt and a new employment spell may not exceed four weeks, otherwise these periods are considered as
non-employment spells (involving voluntary unemployment or an exit out of the social security labor force).
Similarly, gaps between periods of employment and transfer receipt are treated as involuntary unemployment
as long as the gap does not exceed six weeks, otherwise the gap is treated as non-employment.
3)Due to the introduction of the Euro in 1999, all wages before 1999 are transformed from Deutschmark into
Euros at a rate of 1e = 1.95583 Deutschmark. Since the wage variable delivers unrealistic daily wages at the
lower end of the wage distribution, we exclude all observations with earnings of less than 16e per day (in
prices of 1995).
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Table 2.A2: Mean values of the characteristics used in the estimation, by wage
sector
High wage Low wage
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Females (share in %) 0.28 0.45 0.72 0.45
Age (in years) 37.50 9.58 33.81 10.48
Low-skilled (share in %) 0.13 0.34 0.25 0.43
Medium-skilled (share in %) 0.77 0.42 0.73 0.44
High-skilled (share in %) 0.10 0.30 0.02 0.12
Tenure (in days) 2,797 2,201 1,571 1,646
Being foreign (share in %) 0.08 0.28 0.12 0.33
Blue-collar worker (share in %) 0.48 0.50 0.54 0.50
Previously full-time employed (share in %) 0.42 0.49 0.23 0.42
Previous employment interruption (=1) 0.22 0.41 0.18 0.39
Number of employment interruptions 0.31 0.96 0.29 1.05
Change of employer (share in %) 0.10 0.30 0.21 0.41
Number of previous employers 3.11 2.59 3.44 3.11
Previous unemployment duration (in days) 102 258 163 352
Number of unemployment spells 0.65 1.56 0.86 1.66
Previous non-employment duration (in days) 368 809 727 1,297
Number of non-employment spells 0.96 1.72 1.50 2.46
Retention after five years (share in %) 0.78 0.42 0.56 0.50
Low paid five years ago (share in %) 0.02 0.16 0.55 0.50
Observations 4,866,868 766,533
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Table 2.A3: Median gross daily wage and low-wage threshold in daily and hourly
wages of full-time employed men, in e, by year, 1984 - 2002
(1) (2) (3)
Median gross wage Low-wage threshold
per working day in daily wages in hourly wages
1984 70.87 47.24 5.98
1985 73.01 48.68 6.16
1986 75.88 50.58 6.40
1987 78.02 52.02 6.58
1988 80.17 53.45 6.77
1989 82.32 54.88 6.95
1990 86.61 57.74 7.31
1991 92.34 61.56 7.79
1992 96.64 64.42 8.15
1993 100.21 66.81 8.46
1994 102.36 68.24 8.64
1995 105.94 70.63 8.94
1996 107.37 71.58 9.06
1997 108.80 72.54 9.18
1998 110.95 73.97 9.36
1999 112.00 74.67 9.45
2000 114.80 76.53 9.69
2001 116.20 77.47 9.81
2002 119.00 79.33 10.04
Note: The BA data provides gross wages per calendar day. The median gross
wage per working day in column (1) is approximated by multiplying the median
gross daily wages in the data by 7/5.
The low-wage threshold displayed in column (2) is column (1) multiplied by 2/3.
The hourly wage per working day is approximated by dividing column (2) by
7.9, the average hour worked by a full-time worker.
98
Table 2.A4: Share of selected characteristics in % among the total low-wage pop-
ulation
Males Females
1984 2002 1984 2002
Age 20-25 52 24 40 19
Age 51-55 5 8 7 11
Low-skilled 27 33 29 21
Medium-skilled 71 65 70 77
High-skilled 2 2 1 3
Being foreign 14 20 8 9
Blue-collar worker 77 82 47 41
Previously full-time employed 16 25 20 25
Observations 7,760 15,170 28,858 27,053
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2.B - Figures
Figure 2.B1: Mean share of low-wage earners by age group and sex, 1984 - 2002
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Figure 2.B2: Aggregate state dependence by tenure group, 1984 - 1999
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Figure 2.B3: Mean share of low-wage earners by tenure group and sex, 1984 - 2002
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Figure 2.B4: Aggregate state dependence by degree and sex, total working popu-
lation, 1984 - 1999
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Figure 2.B5: Mean share of low-wage earners by degree and sex, 1984 - 2002
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Figure 2.B6: Aggregate state dependence by nationality and sex, total working
population, 1984 - 1999
asd_nation.pdf
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Figure 2.B7: Aggregate state dependence by occupation and sex, total working
population, 1984 - 1999
asd_collar.pdf
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Figure 2.B8: Evolution of the age composition in the high-wage sector, 1984 - 2002
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Figure 2.B9: Evolution of the composition of sex in the low and high-wage sector,
1984 - 2002
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Figure 2.B10: Evolution of the skill composition in the low and high-wage sector,
1984 - 2002, women
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Figure 2.B11: Evolution of the skill composition in the low and high-wage sector,
1984 - 2002, men
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
hi
gh
-/
 lo
w
-w
ag
e 
po
pu
la
tio
n
Year
low-skilled,
low pay
medium-skilled,
low pay
high-skilled,
low pay
low-skilled,
high pay
medium-skilled,
high pay
high-skilled,
high pay
Figure 2.B12: Evolution of the low and high-wage sector by collar and sex, 1984
- 2002
complow_collar_hl.pdf
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 b
lu
e 
co
lla
r w
or
ke
rs
Year
low paid men
high paid men
low paid women
high paid women
106
Figure 2.B13: Evolution of the low and high-wage sector by nationality and sex,
1984 - 2002
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2.C - Derivation of the marginal effect
In order to be able to interpret the estimation results, we report the ME showing
the impact on the relevant probabilities of a change in the chosen covariate. For
a dummy variable, the ME is calculated as a change in the probability resulting
from a change in the indicator’s value from zero to one, holding all other covariates
fixed at their sample median values. ME for continuous variables are usually
estimated by evaluating the partial derivative, which is equal to the corresponding
coefficient multiplied by an evaluation of the normal density function. However,
the computation is not straightforward here because the transition probabilities
are conditional in nature (e.g. the probability of low pay in t conditional of being
low paid in t− 5). To clarify this point, the conditional probabilities are given by:
eit ≡
[
Pr (Lit = 1|Lit−5 = 1)] = [Φ2
(
zit−5γ̂1, xit−5β̂; ρ2
)
Φ
(
xit−5β̂
)]
(2.12)
and
fit ≡
[
Pr (Lit = 1|Lit−5 = 0)] = Φ2
(
zit−5γ̂2,−xit−5β̂;−ρ2
)
Φ
(
−xit−5β̂
)]
(2.13)
As is evident from equations (2.12) and (2.13), a change in the value of a covariate
may affect both the numerator and denominator of the conditional probabilities.
In order to deal with this issue, we adopt the procedure suggested by Stewart and
Swaffield (1999) (see also Cappellari (2007) and Cappellari and Jenkins (2008))
by keeping the elements of xit−5 fixed. To do so, we first predict the low-pay
probability in t − 5 for all low-paid individuals and take the average over these
values - denoted as q. By inserting w = Φ−1 (q) into equation (2.12), we obtain
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Φ2 (zit−5γ̂1, w; ρ2) /q. This expression is used to calculate ME as deviations between
the conditional probabilities for a reference person and hypothetical probabilities
induced by changing each covariate by one unit. For the reference person, we set
continuous covariates to the sample median values and dummy variables to zero.
The same procedure is applied to fit.
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Chapter 3
The Minimum Wage Affects Them
All: Evidence on Employment
Spillovers in the Roofing Sector∗
3.1 Introduction
Most minimum wage research focusses on the average employment effect that
minimum wages exert on workers with a binding minimum wage, i.e. workers
whose wage has to be raised in order to comply with the minimum wage level. In
a competitive labour market with a heterogenous workforce and an elastic product
demand, for example, workers for whom the minimum wage raises labour costs are
expected to experience negative employment outcomes (Brown 1999)35. However,
depending on the production technology, the minimum wage (in short MW) may
also affect workers for whom the minimum wage is not binding, see e.g. (Neumark
34∗This contribution is joint work with Melanie Arntz and Terry Gregory and has been pub-
lished as ZEW Discussion Paper No. 12-061 (Aretz et al. 2012a). We thank for financial support
through the grant “Minimum wage effects in the roofing sector” by the ZEW Sponsors’ As-
sociation for Science and Practice. We would further like to thank Stephan Dlugosz and the
participants of the “Workshop on Minimum Wage Research” in Mannheim for fruitful discus-
sions. The project also profitted from a preceding evaluation of minimum wage effects in the
German roofing sector that was financed by the German Federal Ministry of Labour and Social
Affairs (BMAS). The authors are responsible for all results and conclusions derived in this study.
They do not necessarily reflect the views of the BMAS.
35In case of a monopsonistic labour market that allows employers to set wages below the
equilibrium wage, a minimum wage may instead induce positive or zero employment effects.
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and Wascher 2008). If workers with and without a binding minimum wage are
complements, a negative scale effect that results from a reduced product demand
negatively affects all workers’ employment chances. If the two types of workers are
substitutes, the MW may raise the demand for workers who earn a wage above
the MW, thereby counteracting the negative scale effect by a positive substitution
effect. In this case, we may observe negative employment effects for workers with a
binding MW and even positive employment effects for workers with a non-binding
MW. Moreover, profit-maximising firms may potentially substitute capital for the
relatively more expensive labour input, thereby inducing an additional employment
decline for all workers who are substitutable by capital. In this latter case, a firm
might, in fact, lay off the poorest performers of each type of worker and reduce
employment also among workers with a non-binding MW.
The existing literature mainly discusses employment spillovers, i.e. indirect
employment effects for workers with a non-binding minimum wage, as a potential
source of bias. Linneman (1982), Currie and Fallick (1996), Abowd et al. (2000),
and Neumark et al. (2000), e.g., identify the average employment effect on work-
ers with a binding MW by comparing workers with and without a binding MW.
Attempts to estimate substitution effects between workers tend to focus on the
elasticity of substitution between skill or age groups rather than between workers
with and without a binding MW.36 The only study that we are aware of that focuses
on employment effects along the wage distribution is by Neumark et al. (2004).
They report evidence for a negative employment spillover for workers with a wage
just above the minimum wage level.
36See e.g. Neumark and Wascher (1995) for the substitution between age groups, Abowd and
Kilingsworth (1981), and Neumark and Wascher (1994) for the substitution between skill groups,
and Hsing (2000) for substitution between part-time and full-time work.
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The aim of this chapter is to make a contribution on the sparse literature on
employment spillovers by investigating employment effects along the entire wage
distribution. In particular, our contribution is fourfold. First of all, we are able
to analyse employment effects in a context where the minimum wage bites very
hard: the roofing sector in Germany. Its minimum wage was introduced in 1997
and was subsequently raised several times. With a Kaitz Index, i.e. the ratio of
the minimum wage level and the median wage, that is around 1 in East Germany,
the bite has to be considered exceptional even by international standards (Machin
et al. 2003, Dolton and Bondibene 2011). The German roofing sector, thus, is
an ideal setting to study employment effects along the entire wage distribution
since its bite is likely to render indirect employment effects for workers above the
minimum wage.
Secondly, we are able to exploit a natural experiment since, for institutional
reasons, the minimum wage was introduced only in parts of the construction sector
including the roofing sector. Uncovered, yet comparable, subsectors may thus serve
as a benchmark for the counterfactual development in the roofing sector in order
to derive the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) with respect to the
chances of remaining employed in the roofing sector. Since the entire construction
sector experienced a dramatic decline in demand after the end of the unification
boom in the mid 1990s that almost halved the workforce in East Germany, this is
a highly relevant employment outcome.
Thirdly, we contrast the ATT from an intersectoral comparison with an ATT
derived from a comparison of workers with and without a binding MW within the
roofing sector. Under a number of identifying assumptions, a deviation between
these ATTs may hint at employment spillovers within the roofing sector. In order
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to make such spillovers visible, we then combine both identification strategies.
For this purpose, we estimate the counterfactual wage that workers of the control
sector would receive in the roofing sector given their characteristics. This enables
a comparison of workers with and without a binding MW across sectors and also
allows for estimating the employment effects along the entire wage distribution.
Finally, we make use of two administrative linked-employer-employee panels
one of which contains the full sample of workers in the roofing sector over the
observation period of interest. Hence, we are able to take account of unobserved
heterogeneity at the individual level, which may be relevant if employers mainly
substitute workers along unobservable skills as is suggested by Fairris and Bujanda
(2008). Our contribution, thus, yields much broader insights into the employment
effects of minimum wages than most previous studies.
The findings indicate that the chances to remain employed in the roofing sec-
tor have deteriorated due to the minimum wage introduction, especially in East
Germany where the bite of the MW was particularly hard. However, the im-
pact suggested by comparing workers with and without a binding MW appears
to be underestimated compared to the intersectoral comparison, thus hinting at
employment spillovers of the MW on workers earning above the MW level. An
intersectoral comparison suggests negative employment outcomes for east German
workers along the entire wage distribution. According to personal interviews with
sector insiders, capital-labour substitution rather than scale effects drive this find-
ing. Our results highlight the need for a broader perspective on the employment
impact of minimum wages and also put doubts on any attempt to identify employ-
ment effects of minimum wages by comparing workers with and without a binding
MW within a covered sector.
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This chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 contains information on the
German roofing sector, the introduction of the minimum wage and discusses some
expectations for the empirical estimations given its market structure. Section 3.3
describes the data basis before Section 3.4 discusses the bite of the minimum wage.
Section 3.5 describes the general difference-in-differences estimation framework for
the identification of employment effects that is applied to different treatment and
control groups in Sections 3.6 and 3.7. Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 The German Roofing Sector
Market structure. The goods and services that are provided by the roofing
sector encompass the roofing of new buildings as well as the mending of old roofs.
Roofing is a traditional craft in Germany requiring a master craftsman’s diploma
in order to start a business.37 These traditional roofing companies usually employ
less than ten employees and provide their services regionally and mainly to private
home owners whose demand may be rather inelastic given the few available and
mainly illegal substitutes such as moonlighting. In a survey among 250 roofing
companies in 2011, more than three quarters of all companies considered quality
rather than prices to be the main dimension of competition (Aretz et al. 2011 and
Aretz et al. 2012b). For those companies with more than 30 employees, which
constitute less than 10% of all roofing companies, however, price competition may
be more relevant since they tend to work for public contractors and are active
beyond regional boundaries.38
37As an exception, it is not required to hold such a diploma if someone works as an itinerant
worker. Such workers tend to work alone and mainly provide mending services only.
38Information on company size is based on the BA data (see Section 3.3 for details).
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Moreover, in contrast to most sectors that have been studied extensively in
the MW literature, the roofing sector has a rather high level of qualification and
is not very labour intensive. More than 95% of all workers work fulltime, and a
relatively high share of around three quarters has at least a vocational training
degree.39 Moreover, labour costs account for less than 40% of total costs only (Cost
Structure Survey 2001), and technical advances regarding materials and roofing
techniques appear to be quite important as reported by roofing companies in a
number of qualitative interviews.40
Business cycle. The entire construction sector experienced a boom period in
the early 1990s due to German reunification, but began to shrink from the mid
1990s on, see Figure 3.1. In East Germany, this post-unification downturn was
much more dramatic than in West Germany and reduced the construction sector’s
revenues in the subsequent years by more than half. After 2004, all construction
sectors reinstalled revenue levels in West Germany similar to the early 1990s, while
the recovery in East Germany was rather marginal. Compared with structural en-
gineering, the roofing sector and other sub-construction sectors such as plumbing,
glazing and painting services experienced a less dramatic decline in the demand
for their services in the mid 1990s and a faster recovery after 2004. The demand
for sub-construction work hinges on the demand for new buildings as well as the
age structure of the existing stock of houses with the latter apparently having a
smoothing impact on the business cycle compared to structural engineering.
39The part-time information is taken from the Cost Structure Survey for 2001 (Kostenstruk-
turerhebung), which is released by the German Statistical Office. The share of qualified workers
is calculated based on the BA data (see Section 3.3 for details).
40Ten qualitative interviews with roofing companies and four additional interviews with rep-
resentatives of the trade union and the employer’s association were conducted within a report
prepared for the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, see Aretz et al. (2011) for details.
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Figure 3.1: Overall revenues in West and East Germany by sector, 1994 - 2009
Source: Revenue tax statistics, German Federal Statistical Office
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Moreover, sub-construction sectors broadened their portfolio during the last
years, thereby stabilising the demand for their services. In particular, roofing
companies are increasingly involved in the assembling of photovoltaic cells as well
as the ex post insulation of old roofs.41 The plumbers and, to a lesser extent,
glaziers and painters also benefited from this development. At least in West Ger-
many, this has presumably contributed to a faster recovery in the roofing and the
plumbing sector compared to the other sub-construction sectors and structural
engineering.
Minimum wage regulations. Apart from shrinking demand, additional pres-
sures in the mid 1990s stemmed from the introduction of a free movement of
labour that allowed Eastern European firms to send workers to German construc-
tion sites while paying home country wages. In order to protect German workers,
legally binding minimum wages that had to be paid to all workers on German con-
struction sites irrespective of the origin of their contract were introduced in the
structural engineering and some sub-construction sectors. Since minimum wages
41Both of these developments have been boosted by government initiatives for subsidising solar
energy generation since 2000 (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz) and energy-saving renovations since
2002 (Energetische Gebäudesanierung).
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are negotiated separately for certain sub-divisions of the construction sector, not
all sub-divisions agreed on minimum wage regulation, resulting in a coexistence
of quite comparable sectors with a legally binding minimum wage (e.g. structural
engineering and roofing sector since 1997; painting sector since 2003) and sectors
such as glazing and plumbing services that are not subject to a legally binding
minimum wage until now. Hence, these sectors may potentially serve as a bench-
mark for the counterfactual development in the roofing sector in the absence of a
legally binding minimum wage.
The minimum wage in the roofing sector applies to all blue-collar workers of
any roofing company or roofing branch within a larger company who are at least
18 years of age, who are not an apprentice and who are not working as a custo-
dial worker. Thus, all white-collar workers such as office clerks as well as certain
parts of the blue-collar workforce are exempted from the minimum wage regula-
tion. Introduced in October 1997, the minimum wage was subsequently raised
several times, but was also interrupted by short periods without any legally bind-
ing minimum wages, see Figure 3.2. These interruptions reflect the fact that the
minimum wage is negotiated between the responsible trade union (IG Bau) and
the association of employers in the roofing sector (Zentralverband des Deutschen
Dachdeckerhandwerks) as a part of the general collective bargaining agreement.
When these agreements expire, there may be short interruptions before a new
agreement is reached. Because the continuation of a minimum wage was not sub-
ject to any debate since its introduction, roofing companies could, however, expect
a new minimum wage agreement, rendering any behavioural adjustments during
these interruptions very unlikely. Moreover, minimum wages were harmonised be-
tween West and East Germany in 2003 despite wages in West Germany exceeding
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wages in East Germany by about 25%. This results in an extremely hard bite of
the minimum wage in East Germany as we will see in Section 3.4.
Figure 3.2: Minimum wage level in the German roofing sector by region, 1995-2010
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Taking all this evidence together, the roofing sector’s market structure suggests
a rather limited impact of minimum wages on employment given its limited labour
intensity, the ability of roofing companies to at least absorb some of additional costs
by raising prices and the fact that technical advances and increases in productivity
offer options for cushioning rising labour costs. At the same time, however, the
lower wage floor was fixed on a rather high level (see also section 3.4), particularly
in East Germany, thus rendering employment effects likely. Moreover, changes in
relative input prices may create incentives for substituting labour by capital and/or
less skilled by skilled workers. Finally, the minimum wage in the roofing sector
was introduced during a period of economic downturn and a shrinking market
size. This strongly reduced the sector’s workforce (see Figure 3.B1), although
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the number of companies even slightly increased at the same time as the share
of single-person companies jumped from 8% in 1995 to 23% in 2010. With the
number of unemployed workers with sector-specific human capital queuing for jobs
on a rise, the bargaining power of those still working in the sector may have come
under pressure.
3.3 Administrative Linked Employer-Employee
Data
For our analysis, we are able to exploit two administrative linked employer-employee
panel data sets: i) data that is collected by the central pay office of the roofing
sector (Lohnausgleichskasse, LAK ), in short the LAK data, and ii) data that is
collected by the Federal Labour Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, BA) for all
employees that are subject to social insurance contributions, in short the BA data.
3.3.1 LAK data
In order to balance out the seasonal fluctuation of the sector, all roofing companies
have to pay an insurance premium to the LAK that is related to the total payroll
of their blue-collar workers. Therefore, they are obliged to give a monthly record
to the central pay office of the roofing sector. For our analysis, we have access
to the full sample of blue-collar workers on a monthly basis for the years 1995 to
2010, thus covering both the pre- and post-minimum wage period. Information on
monthly working hours and monthly gross wage allows for calculating the hourly
gross wage. Between October and April, however, reported working hours need
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not match the true working hours because of special regulations for cushioning the
seasonal character of the sector’s activities. Hence, we use the June information
for the analysis based on the LAK data in order to avoid such distortions and to
ensure the comparability of the analysis with the BA data (see below).
The LAK data contains additional information only on sex and age of the
workers. Since we do not know whether someone is an apprentice or working as a
custodial worker, who are both exempted from the minimum wage regulation, we
are not able to exactly identify all covered workers. Since most custodial workers
are female, however, and the share of females among covered roofers is less than
2% according to the BA data, we exclude women from the LAK sample. We
also exclude all workers below the age of 19 and assume that this also eliminates
most uncovered apprentices. Our sample, thus, differs from the exact coverage
by missing some covered women and including some uncovered apprentices in the
sample. Overall, we observe a total of 1,094,609 observations between 1995 and
2010 that stem from 217,779 individuals in 22,879 firms. Note that we are able to
calculate some firm level information such as average gross pay, average firm size
and average age of the company’s workforce that we can use in addition to the
individual information.
3.3.2 BA data
A major disadvantage of the LAK data is that it is only available for the roof-
ing sector, thus precluding any identification strategy that rests upon inter-sector
comparisons. Such an alternative identification strategy, however, becomes avail-
able based on the BA data since it includes information for 75% of all companies
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in the roofing sector as well as sub-samples of companies in other sub-construction
sectors such as painting, plumbing and glazing services for the observation period
from 1994 to 2008.42 For all individuals who are subject to social insurance con-
tributions and work in one of these companies on June 30th, the data contains
the corresponding period of continued employment in that company within the
calender year that overlaps June 30th.43 Thus, the longest spell encompasses the
full calender year, while the shortest employment spell would be an employment
period of one day on June 30th only.
For each employment spell, we have information on age, sex, educational back-
ground, the gross daily wage, occupation, and occupational status. Thus, the data
allows for identifying covered individuals quite precisely. In particular, we are able
to exclude custodial workers, apprentices and white-collar workers as well as under-
age workers.44 Overall, the sample consists of 791,910 observations in the roofing
sector that stem from 172,257 covered roofers in 17,186 roofing firms and 1,557,661
observations by 354,834 workers in 35,250 firms from other sub-construction sec-
tors who fulfill the same criteria.
Since the data only distinguishes between full-time and part-time workers and
includes information on daily gross wages only, the main restriction of the BA data
refers to the corresponding lack of information on hourly gross wages. As a remedy,
we impute the hourly gross wage by estimating the observed hourly gross wage in
42This information is taken from the Betriebshistorikdatei, a data set that aggregates the
individual data that is collected by the BA to the firm level, see Hethey-Maier and Seth (2010)
for details on the data.
43This information is taken from the employee record of the BA (Beschäftigtenmeldungen), see
e.g. Drews (2008) for details.
44We also exclude workers with a minor employment which is defined as earning below the
social insurance contribution threshold of 400e per month because these workers are included in
the data only after 1998. For comparability reasons, we also dropped such workers in the LAK
data.
122
the LAK data as a function of explanatory variables that are available in both data
sets. For this purpose, we first adjust the LAK data to have a similar data structure
as the BA data by creating employment spells for each individual who has worked
on June 30th. For these spells, both data sets provide information on or allow for
computing the length of the spell, the beginning of the spell, the daily gross wage,
dummies for part-time or full-time employment, individual information on sex
and age as well as a number of firm-level information such as firm size, workforce
composition, and average gross daily wage.45 Using all these explanatory variables
and allowing for additional heterogeneity by estimating the wage model separately
for each year, East and West Germany as well as for workers of different quintiles
of the daily gross wage distribution, we are able to explain 88% of the variation in
hourly gross wages in the LAK data. We then use these estimates for predicting
the hourly wage in the BA data. The quality of this imputation not only hinges
on the R2 of the wage estimation, but also depends on the comparability of the
LAK and the BA sample and explanatory variables. Figure 3.B2 shows that the
imputed and observed wage distribution are very comparable. As a result, the
average predicted mean wage for full-time workers of 13.26e and 9.94e in the BA
data in West and East Germany, respectively, comes very close to the observed
average wage in the LAK data with 13.22e for West Germany and 9.85e for East
Germany.
45Although we do not use women in the LAK analyses, we do use their LAK wage and estimate
the corresponding wage in the BA data to include them in the analyses conducted with the BA
data.
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3.4 The Minimum Wage and Its Bite
Table 3.1 displays several indicators of the bite of the minimum wage (MW) for the
June preceding the introduction of a new MW regulation within the next year. In
particular, we look at the share of covered workers for whom the upcoming MW is
binding due to earning a wage below the minimum in the June preceding the new
MW regulation.46 We also show the average wage increase these workers would
have to receive in case of full compliance with the upcoming MW. This individual
wage gap for a worker i with a binding MW in period t is thereby defined as
follows:
wage gapit =
MWi,t+1 − wit
wit
, (3.1)
where wit represents the workers’ hourly gross wage and MWi,t+1 the upcoming
MW. We contrast this wage gap to their actual wage increase within the next year
and the actual wage increase during the same time period among workers for whom
the MW was not binding. We complement this information by the Kaitz-Index,
i.e. the ratio between the MW level and the median wage in the sector. Note that
the indicators may slightly underestimate the bite of the MW due to the fact that
the hourly wage may contain overtime compensation that is not subject to the
MW.47
The indicators based on the LAK data allow for several interesting insights.
First of all, the share of covered workers for whom the MW was binding by the time
46We do not adjust for nominal wage changes between the two dates of comparison because
the intermediate time span is quite short.
47On average, overtime hours account for 6% of the working hours in June and, thus, may
lead to an estimated hourly wage that is up to 1.6% too high depending on the applied overtime
compensation scheme ranging from no additional compensation to a markup of 25%. Since we
do not know which scheme is applied, we left the data uncorrected as the resulting imprecision
appears to be rather marginal.
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Table 3.1: Indicators of the minimum wage bite measured in June prior to the
next MW regulation, LAK and BA data
Workers with a binding MW?
Yes No
New MW regulation MW Share Share Wage gapa ∆ Wageb ∆ Wageb Kaitz
takes effect on (in e ) (in %) (in %) (in %) (in %) (in %) Index
LAK BA LAK LAK LAK LAK
West Germany
01.10.97 8.2 1.3 2.4 11.0 7.2 2.3 64.7
01.09.01 9.0 1.5 3.9 8.7 6.8 1.4 67.2
01.03.03 9.0 1.5 3.4 8.9 6.0 2.4 67.2
01.04.04 9.3 2.2 4.8 8.1 5.7 1.4 68.4
01.05.05 9.7 2.9 5.8 8.5 4.9 0.6 70.3
01.01.06 10.0 4.4 6.9 7.9 4.9 1.1 72.6
01.01.07 10.0 4.6 7.5 8.1 6.7 3.2 72.7
01.01.08 10.2 5.4 8.2 6.7 5.3 2.2 73.1
01.01.09 10.4 4.9 7.5 6.6 8.1 3.0 73.4
East Germany
01.10.97 7.7 12.5 11.5 9.7 6.7 0.0 82.0
01.09.01 8.4 14.2 12.0 3.9 4.6 0.6 89.2
01.03.03 9.0 34.1 23.3 4.2 4.1 0.1 95.0
01.04.04 9.3 44.1 28.7 3.8 4.1 0.3 97.9
01.05.05 9.7 46.9 33.5 4.3 4.0 0.1 99.2
01.01.06 10.0 55.5 40.8 4.1 4.0 0.1 100.2
01.01.07 10.0 45.5 28.1 1.6 1.9 0.9 99.6
01.01.08 10.2 53.5 32.1 2.6 3.3 1.3 100.7
01.01.09 10.4 50.0 28.9 2.4 3.3 0.7 99.9
a Wage gap refers to equation (3.1)
b ∆ wage corresponds to the actual observed percentage wage change (wit+1 − wit)/wit
between the June preceding and the June following the new MW regulation.
of its introduction was as low as 1.3% in West Germany compared to 12.5% in East
Germany. While this share rose up to 5% in West Germany until 2008, around 50%
of all East German workers earned below the upcoming MW at that time, a share
that clearly exceeds the impact level that Machin et al. (2003) considered a hard
biting MW. This extreme bite was fostered by the introduction of a common MW
level in both parts of the country in 2003. Since then, the MW level approximately
corresponds to the median wage in East Germany so that the Kaitz-Index ranges
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around 100%. Even in West Germany, the Kaitz-Index still ranges between two
thirds and three quarters of the median wage. Compared to Dolton and Bondibene
(2011), who find the Kaitz-Index to range between 30% and 70% in a survey among
22 OECD countries, the bite of the MW in the roofing sector is extremely hard,
especially in East Germany.
We also observe that the MW has been effective, i.e. actual wage increases
among workers with a binding MW exceeded the wage increases among workers
for whom the MW was not binding. While the change in the west German wage
distribution is rather marginal, the wage compression in East Germany results
in a huge spike of workers whose wages range around the MW level, see Figure
3.3. Finally, note that despite these actual increases, they still fall short of the
increases workers would have had to receive in case of full compliance, especially in
West Germany during the initial years after the MW introduction. The improved
compliance with the MW regulation during the last years might be due to stronger
controls after 2006 according to interviews that we conducted with sector insiders.
Table 3.1 also contrasts the share of workers with a binding MW based in the
LAK data to the corresponding share based on the imputation in the BA data. In
contrast to the LAK data, however, the share of workers with a binding MW follows
a probabilistic concept because we do not only impute the mean wage prediction
for each individual but also the corresponding distribution that results from the
unexplained variance and the variance of the estimated parameters. Assuming
this distribution to be normally distributed, we are then able to calculate the
probability that the wage of a worker falls below the MW level which we denote
by PMW . For the BA data, Table 3.1 thus reports the average predicted probability
of being affected by a binding MW among all covered workers.
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Figure 3.3: Kernel densities of hourly gross wages in East and West Germany,
1995 and 2008, LAK data
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As we can see from Table 3.1, the resulting share of workers with a binding MW
resembles the LAK patterns, but differs in levels, especially for East Germany in
the last years. In fact, imputing the probability of being affected by a binding MW
in the LAK data, gave very similar deviations to the observed share of workers
with a binding MW. Hence, it is apparently the extreme wage compression that
leads to the asymmetric form of the wage distribution in Figure 3.3 and, thus, to
a systematic underestimation of the share of workers with a binding MW in East
Germany, see Appendix 3C for further explanation.
Despite the large bite of the minimum wage, especially demonstrated by the
high wage compression in East Germany, the overall labour cost burden is still
modest for two reasons. First, even in the case of full compliance with respect to
the minimum wage regulations, total labour costs only increased by 1% in West
Germany and 2.5% in East Germany on average during the observed time period.
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Second, labour costs amount to less than 40% of total costs, so that the change in
average total costs varies across time between 0.2-0.5% in West Germany and 0.3-
0.8% in East Germany. However, despite the low impact on total costs on average,
some firms may well be affected more strongly. Moreover, the cost burden may
cumulate over time due to the gradual increase in the minimum wage level.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that individuals with a binding MW clearly
differ between West and East Germany. While the average worker with a binding
MW in East Germany does not differ much from an average worker without a
binding MW, the average worker with a binding MW in West Germany rather
corresponds to a marginal worker with below average human capital, short tenure
and part-time employment in firms with a skill and wage level below average, see
Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Characteristics of workers in West and East Germany by binding status,
BA data, 1995-2008
West Germany East Germany
MW for workers is binding? Yes No Yes No
Individual characteristics
Worker with voc. training deg. (in %) 24.1 67.2 70.2 80.4
Workers without voc. training (in %) 34.5 31.1 25.2 19.0
Part-time workers (in %) 41.3 1.7 4.6 0.5
Previous work exp. in sector (in years) 2.2 4.3 2.9 3.6
Previous tenure in firm (in years) 1.9 3.7 2.2 3.0
Firm characteristics
Average firm size 4.0 6.2 5.7 7.8
Firm’s share of skilled workers (in %) 63.1 83.1 79.9 82.2
Firm’s mean daily gross wage (in e) 51.78 72.33 50.43 56.08
Number of observations 15,523 485,640 39,960 196,981
Note: Workers with PMW > 0.5 are considered to be bound by the MW.
128
3.5 General Framework for the Identification of
Employment Effects
Since the minimum wage was introduced for the entire sector at the same time, a
strategy for the identification of the minimum wage impact on employment cannot
rest on regional variation as has been done in many US studies (among others Dube
et al. 2007 and 2010 and Card and Krueger 1994 and 2000). Exploiting the existing
variation in the minimum wage level between East and West Germany in the mid
1990s is also not advisable since the business cycle after the reunification boom
differed between both parts of the country, see Figure 3.1.
Thus, there are mainly two potential approaches available for the identification
of employment effects. Either one exploits the variation in treatment intensity
within the roofing sector by comparing workers with and without a binding MW,
or one uses a sub-construction sector that is not covered by a minimum wage
regulation, but is as similar as possible to the roofing sector. To see why and under
which assumptions these control groups allow for an estimation of the average
treatment effect on the treated (ATT), let eit denote the employment status in
period t for an individual i. In particular, let eit+1 = 1 in case of being employed
in the same sector as in the previous period and eit+1 = 0 otherwise, an outcome
measure that we are able to observe in both the LAK and the BA data.
This outcome measure is of main interest in a market context that is dominated
by a shrinking market size and a corresponding reduction in employment since the
mid 1990s, compare Figure 3.B1. The question of whether someone was able
to keep his job in this market context given the additional cost pressures of the
minimum wage is of main concern. Note, however, that this outcome should not
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be equated with effects on the total employment in the roofing sector. As an
example, additional market entries by single person companies are not captured
by this employment outcome.
With this outcome measure in mind, denote the group of treated individuals
as g1 and the group not treated as g0. Let the minimum wage be introduced
in t∗ with t0 < t∗ < t1. Note that all years prior to 1997 measure the ex-ante
situation t0, while observations for the ten observable years after 1997 measure
the ex-post situation t1 because the employment outcome in the following June,
eit+1, is already influenced by the MW introduction in October 1997 for workers
observed in June 1997. For the ex-post situation, we either get an estimate for
E[eit+1|g1, t1] or E[eit+1|g0, t1]. The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT),
θ, can now be estimated by assuming that the difference in employment outcomes
between t0 and t1 was the same for both groups in the absence of the treatment.
Moreover, we need to assume that the treatment does not indirectly affect the
control group, for example, via substitution effects. In this case, the causal impact
θ is given by the difference-in-differences (DiD) estimator
E[eit+1|g1, t1]− E[eit+1|g1, t0]− (E[eit+1|g0, t1]− E[eit+1|g0, t0]) = θ. (3.2)
In order to relax the assumption that the control group captures the counterfactual
employment outcome, we can also estimate the DiD effect within a regression
framework that controls for observable differences across both groups. Since the
outcome measure calls for a non-linear analysis, we use a Logit estimation with
P (eit+1 = 1) = Λ[αg + γt + δDit + βXit + it] (3.3)
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where αg captures the time constant difference between both groups, γt captures
the change across time that is common to both groups, and X corresponds to a
set of control variables. Dit is the treatment indicator with Dit = 1 for individuals
of group g1 for the period t > t∗, i.e. for the treatment group after treatment has
taken place, and Dit = 0 otherwise. Note that neither the coefficient for Dit nor
its odds ratio capture the treatment effect of interest due to the non-linearity of
the estimator. Following Puhani (2012), we estimate the marginal effect of δ to
derive the treatment effect of interest θ by using the following formula:
θ = ME(δ) = Λ[αg + γt + δDit + βxˆ]− Λ[αg + γt + βxˆ], (3.4)
where xˆ indicates that we calculate the marginal effect for the average indi-
vidual observed in the sample. In particular, we add covariates that may affect
employment outcomes and could potentially be related to the treatment indicator
such as sex, age, education, occupational status, and work experience in the sector
and in the company as well as some firm characteristics such as size, the composi-
tion of the workforce, and mean wage level. By including these firm characteristics,
we control for the fact that unproductive workers may be selected into less pro-
ductive and thus less well-paying companies that differ with regard to employment
chances irrespective of the minimum wage.
In addition, selection on unobservables may be relevant. If, for example, em-
ployers mainly dismiss the most unproductive workers for a given type of qualifica-
tion and experience, not controlling for this would upward bias our estimates. Due
to the longitudinal nature of our data, we can mitigate this problem by allowing for
individual-specific time-constant effects. Note, however, that one cannot calculate
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the marginal effect of interest for a Fixed Effects Logit Estimator because the fixed
effects are not identified in this model framework (Wooldridge 2002). Moreover,
the Fixed Effects Logit Estimator only uses the sub-sample of the observations for
which we observe a change in the outcome across time. This is problematic since
we find evidence that the conditional sample depends on the treatment, thereby bi-
asing the estimates. Hence, we estimate a simple linear fixed effects model, thereby
avoiding the non-linear complications. We find that in most cases, only very few
observations have predictions outside the plausible range. Moreover, pooled Logit
and pooled OLS estimates also turned out to be quite similar. We, thus, report
linear fixed effects results whenever individual fixed effects seem necessary.
3.6 Average Employment Effects
In this section, we apply the general framework introduced in the latter section to
the intersectoral comparison (Section 6.1) and the comparison within the roofing
sector (Section 6.2). As we will see, the comparison of both approaches yields first
insights into possible spillover effects. In Section 7, we will then explicitly look at
spillovers in the roofing sector by separately running the intersectoral comparison
for workers with and without a binding MW as well as for workers falling in
different wage deciles. This is feasible because we are able to identify comparable
workers in the control sector.
3.6.1 Intersectoral comparison
Approach. A feasible control sector needs to capture the counterfactual change
in employment outcomes for roofers in the absence of the minimum wage. For this
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to be a plausible assumption, the control sector should have a comparable market
structure as well as comparable demand conditions. Among the sub-construction
sectors without a legally binding minimum wage - the plumbing and the glazing
sector48 - the plumbing sector is preferable for a number of reasons. According
to Figure 3.1, the business cycle in the plumbing rather than the glazing sector
resembles the business cycle in the roofing sector. In fact, for West Germany de-
mand conditions almost follow the same path, while in East Germany the demand
for plumbing services started to drop somewhat earlier than in the roofing sector,
a deviation that we will return to in the robustness analysis.
Moreover, the plumbing sector is similar to the roofing sector with regard to
important market indicators that moderate the potential impact of a minimum
wage, see Table 3.3.49 In particular, roofing and plumbing companies are similarly
sized in terms of both the number of employees and the revenues generated. Also,
the value added is highest in the roofing sector, closely followed by the plumbing
sector. Moreover, the glazing sector is more labour-intensive and invests almost
twice as much per employee than the other sectors while the average gross daily
wage is quite comparable across all sectors. Finally, the number of companies per
one million euro of revenues in the sector, a measure of the degree of competition,
is almost identical in the roofing and plumbing sector but much lower in the glazing
sector, suggesting less competition.
Therefore, we consider the plumbing sector as a suitable and better benchmark
for the roofing sector than the glazing sector. For the intersectoral comparison, the
treatment group g1, thus, corresponds to all workers of the roofing sector that are
48The painting sector introduced a MW in 2003.
49We display the pre-minimum wage indicators for 1996 wherever it is available as the basis
for judging the usefulness of a sector as a benchmark for the roofing sector.
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Table 3.3: Comparison of the roofing, the glazing, and the plumbing sector by
various economic indicators
Roofers Plumbers Glaziers Source
Number of companies 11,295 37,720 3,752 A, 1996
Number of employees 113,996 364,393 25,393 A, 1996
Avg. number of employees per company 8.8 9.0 6.6 A, 1996
Share of firms by revenues (in 1,000) B, 1996
< 100 DM 6.8 8.8 13.6
100-500 DM 24.6 33.7 42.6
500-1, 000 DM 26.1 23.5 21.5
1, 000-2, 000 DM 25.1 19.3 13.5
> 2, 000 DM 17.4 14.6 8.5
Value added in e per employee 37,195 35,949 32,931 C, 2001
Investments/employee (in e) 1,472 1,229 2,482 C, 2001
Share of labour costs (in %) 36.0 32.5 49.0 C, 2001
Avg. gross daily wage/fulltime employee (in e) 61.25 63.23 64.28 A, 1996
Number of companies/1 Mio. sector revenue 1.3 1.3 0.6 B, 1996
Note: A - BA data (see Section 3.3); B - Revenue tax statistics of the German Federal Statistical
Office (Umsatzsteuerstatistik); C - Cost Structure Survey of the German Federal Statistical Office
(Kostenstrukturerhebung)
covered by the minimum wage regulations, while workers in the plumbing sector,
who would have been covered if they worked in the roofing sector, are considered as
the control group g0. Hence, this approach can only be estimated based on the BA
data. The treatment refers to being covered by the minimum wage regulations and
the resulting estimates give us the average employment effect for covered workers
in the roofing sector if changes in employment outcomes of plumbers between the
ex-ante situation (t0 : 1994-1996) and the ex-post situation (t1 : 1997-2007) capture
the counterfactual change in employment outcomes for roofers in the absence of
the minimum wage. Moreover, we need to assume that there is no control group
contamination, i.e. there is no indirect effect of the minimum wage regulations
in the roofing sector on the plumbing sector. If the plumbing sector provides
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some substitutes for roofing services, for example, a negative employment effect
in the roofing sector would boost employment in the plumbing sector, thereby
overestimating a negative impact of the minimum wage. However, the lack of any
evident improvement in the revenues realised by the plumbing sector relative to
the roofing sector after the MW introduction puts doubt on such spillovers, see
Figure 3.1. Moreover, we find that transitions between both sectors are negligible
and independent from the MW introduction. Both before and after 1997, only
about 0.2% (0.1%) of all roofers (plumbers) enter the plumbing sector (roofing
sector) in the next year.
Results. Descriptives regarding both the dependent variable and the set of co-
variates for both roofers and plumbers prior to and after the minimum wage in-
troduction are provided in Table 3.A1 for East and Table 3.A2 for West Germany.
On average, 80% (77%) of all West (East) German roofers are still employed in the
same sector after one year. The unconditional DiD of the dependent variable for
the intersectoral comparison corresponds to 3 percentage points for West and −1
percentage point for East Germany. However, the DiD controlling for observable
characteristics across sectors suggests some relevant changes in observables such
as a relative increase in skilled workers in the roofing sector that needs to be con-
trolled for in a regression approach. For the regression approach, Dit in equation
(3.3) equals one for all roofers in the period after the minimum wage introduction
(t1 : 1997-2007).
Table 3.4 shows the marginal effect (the ATT) ofDit from equation (3.4) for the
logit model (LPM) specification for the average worker in East and West Germany.
As previously discussed, we compare estimates from the pooled specifications and
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Table 3.4: Minimum wage effect on the probability of being employed in the roofing
sector in the next year, intersectoral comparison based on BA data, 1994-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pooled Logit Pooled Logit Pooled LPM FE LPM
East Germany
ME / ATT of Dit in pp.a -2.0*** -2.2*** -2.3*** -2.9***
Robust s.e. (0.3) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3)
Obs. (in 1000) 497 497 497 497
Share of Yˆ /∈ [0; 1] n/a n/a 0.4% 9.0%
Individual covariatesb Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-level covariatesc No Yes Yes Yes
West Germany
ME / ATT of Dit in pp.a 2.0*** 1.8*** 1.2*** -1.2***
Robust s.e. (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2)
Obs. (in 1000) 1,110 1,110 1,110 1,110
Share of Yˆ /∈ [0; 1] n/a n/a 0.9% 0.4%
Individual covariatesb Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-level covariatesc No Yes Yes Yes
a Marginal effect of Dit in percentage points; for logit estimations calculated as in equation
(3.4)
b Occupational status and educational attainment (6 dummies) in the fixed effects estima-
tions plus age, age2, sex, 2nd order polynomial of previous work experience in the sector
and in the company in the pooled estimations
c Age and qualification of company workforce, company size (4 dummies), 2nd order poly-
nomial of mean daily gross wage
Significance levels: * 5%, ** 1%, *** 0.1%
estimates from a LPM that takes account of individual-specific fixed effects. Ir-
respective of the specification, the minimum wage in East Germany appears to
have reduced the chances for roofers to remain employed in the sector by around
2 to 3 percentage points on average compared to plumbers who have not been
subject to minimum wage regulations. Adding firm-level covariates in column 2
compared to a specification that includes individual covariates only, does not have
much influence on the estimated impact. Moreover, both the pooled Logit model
and the pooled LPM yield quite similar results and, with only 0.4% of all obser-
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vations falling outside the admissible range, the LPM estimator performs quite
well. Controlling for time-constant unobservables at the individual level (column
4) yields very comparable results although the share of observations outside the
[0; 1] interval rises to still acceptable, albeit higher, 9.0%.
In West Germany, the impact appears to be similarly robust when controlling
for firm-level in addition to individual covariates. Both specifications indicate
a positive minimum wage effect for roofers as compared to plumbers of around
2 percentage points. Also the pooled LPM model suggests a positive minimum
wage effect, which is slightly lower than for the pooled logit models. However,
when controlling for time-constant unobservable characteristics in the FE LPM
specification, the findings for West Germany indicate that the chances for a roofer
to remain employed in the next year after the minimum wage was introduced
decrease by around 1 percentage point compared to plumbers who have not been
subject to minimum wage regulations. This suggests that minimum wages in
West Germany increased layoffs mainly among workers with poor unobservable
characteristics so that pooled estimations are upward biased.
Robustness. The validity of the previous results critically hinges on the common
trends assumption. Unfortunately, we only have three years prior to the MW
introduction in order to examine the pre-treatment trend in employment outcomes.
For East Germany, Table 3.A1 suggests a dip in employment chances in the roofing
sector in 1996 that deviates from the trend in the plumbing sector. Indeed, placebo
tests confirm the common trend assumption between 1994 and 1995, while there
are significant deviations between 1995 and 1996, see Table 3.A3. The decline in
employment outcomes in 1996 may hint at anticipation effects since employment
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outcomes for the last pre-MW year are measured just three months prior to the
MW introduction in October 1997. Excluding observations for 1996, however,
suggests even somewhat stronger negative effects, see Table 3.5. If the dip in 1996
does not result from an anticipation effect, we should, however, not exclude this
year, but adjust our estimates for diverging trends. A corresponding extension
of the previous estimation that allows for diverging trends across sectors mainly
supports the previous findings with only the pooled LPM estimates deviating from
the previous estimates. For West Germany, Table 3.A2 suggests that there was
a dip in employment outcomes for roofers relative to plumbers in 1995. Thus,
compared to plumbers, the placebo tests suggest a less favourable trend for roofers
between 1994 and 1995, but a positive trend from 1995 to 1996, see Table 3.A3.
Estimations that allow for diverging trends across sectors, however, confirm the
previous findings, see Table 3.5.
Adjusting for diverging trends based on the few pre-MW years, however, may
not suffice if the common trends assumption fails in the long run. As some ten-
tative robustness check, we ran estimations that were extended by interacting the
treatment indicator Dit to allow for a heterogeneous ATT for periods with distinct
levels of a MW bite (1997-2001, 2002-2004 and 2005-2007) in order to examine the
timing of the effect after the MW introduction. As shown in Table 3.5, the im-
pact of the minimum wage in East Germany was significantly negative in all three
sub-periods. Moreover, according to the preferred fixed-effects specification, the
strongest impact occurred in the second period after the minimum wage was raised
to the level in West Germany. In West Germany, the fixed effects specification also
suggests that the minimum wage impact was strongest in the intermediate period,
followed by the period after its introduction. The smaller effect in the last period
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Table 3.5: Marginal effects and ATTs of Dit in percentage points for various ro-
bustness checks of the intersectoral comparison in Table 3.4
(1) (2) (3)
Pooled Pooled FE Obs.
Logit LPM LPM (in 1000)
East Germany
Sample without 1996 -3.4*** -3.6*** -3.4*** 400
Trend-adjusted DiD -2.1*** 0.7 -1.8*** 497
Extension with period-wise effects
ME / ATT of Ditxt97−01 in pp. -1.3*** -1.7*** -3.1***
ME / ATT of Ditxt02−04 in pp. -3.0*** -2.8*** -3.6*** 497
ME / ATT of Ditxt05−07 in pp. -4.7*** -3.7*** -2.7***
West Germany
Trend-adjusted DiD 2.6*** 1.6*** -1.2*** 1,110
Extension with period-wise effects
ME / ATT of Ditxt97−01 in pp. 1.8*** 1.0*** -1.3***
ME / ATT of Ditxt02−04 in pp. 1.5*** 0.7*** -1.8*** 1,110
ME / ATT of Ditxt05−07 in pp. 1.8*** 1.9*** -0.6**
Note: Same specification as in Table 3.4 with individual and firm-level controls;
Significance levels: * 5%, ** 1%, *** 0.1%
may suggest that firms were able to bear the additional costs that were imposed
by the minimum wage during these years of economic revival in the West German
roofing sector. All in all, the estimation results appear to be quite robust and also
show a plausible impact pattern across time.
3.6.2 Comparison within the roofing sector
Approach. The treatment group g1 in this approach corresponds to roofers with
a binding MW due to earning a wage in June that is below the minimum wage
level that takes effect until June of the next year. For the pre-regulation years,
we consider someone to belong to the treatment group if his wage falls below the
minimum wage level that would have to be applied in the pre-regulation years
given the increases of the median nominal wage in the LAK data. Workers of the
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roofing sector whose wages are above that minimum level are used as the control
group g0. While we are able to exactly identify these groups in the LAK data, we
define g1 in the BA data to encompass all covered workers whose probability to
fall below the minimum wage level exceeds 50%.50
Hence, the treatment indicator Dit equals one for all covered workers with
a binding minimum wage after the MW introduction and zero otherwise. The
resulting estimates give the average treatment effect on the treated if changes in
employment outcomes for workers without a binding MW between the ex-ante
situation (t0 : 1995-1996)51 and the ex-post situation (t1 : 1997-2007) capture
the counterfactual change in employment outcomes for the treated roofers in the
absence of the minimum wage. To the extent that all roofers are affected by the
same demand conditions, this is clearly a plausible assumption. However, for a
period of 13 years that we cover in the estimations, diverging trends may arise
due to, e.g., skill-biased technological advances. We will return to this potential
problem in the robustness section. Moreover, the suggested approach only yields
unbiased estimates if there are no minimum wage induced employment effects
for workers without a binding minimum wage. In fact, note that, if all identifying
assumptions hold, the intersectoral comparison and the estimate of the comparison
within the roofing sector yield the same employment effects for an average covered
worker in the roofing sector.
Results. This approach can be estimated using both the BA and LAK data.
Corresponding descriptives for the BA data are provided in Table 3.A4 for East
50A specification with PMW as a continuous treatment variable gave similar results.
51Note that we have only two pre-regulation years because the LAK data that are used for
imputing hourly wages are only available from 1995 onwards.
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and Table 3.A5 for West Germany.52 The unconditional DiD for the probability of
still being employed in the next year indicates strong positive effects, but this raw
DiD has to be interpreted with caution. Since the minimum wage level repeatedly
increased after 1998, the share of individuals with a binding MW also increased
until 2008 (see Table 3.1). As a consequence, the pool of workers with a binding
MW is likely to improve across time resulting in upward biased estimates. We
therefore decided to exploit the variation in the status of being affected by a
binding MW across time on the individual level by taking account of individual
fixed effects. In fact, the pooled Logit and pooled LPM model show strongly
positive and comparable employment effects that are likely to reflect the described
non-comparability of the pool of workers with a binding MW prior to and after
the MW introduction. Since we do not consider these estimates informative, Table
3.6 reports the estimates for the fixed effects LPM only.53
The DiD results for East Germany in columns (1) and (2) indicate that workers
with a binding MW were 9 to 10 percentage points less likely to remain employed
after the MW introduction relative to workers without a binding MW. This neg-
ative effect is confirmed by both the LAK and BA data suggesting that the BA
data yield quite reliable estimates despite the imprecision in the distinction be-
tween workers with and without a binding MW. For West Germany, the LAK data
show an insignificant reduction in the probability of continued employment by−2.7
percentage points, while the treatment effect is slightly larger and significant at
52Descriptives for the LAK data are available from the authors upon request.
53As an alternative, one could evaluate each minimum wage level separately by defining workers
with and without a binding MW corresponding to each MW level. However, corresponding
estimates did not show any clear pattern, thus indicating that anticipation effects or the catching
up with past increases make it difficult to isolate the impact of subsequent MW increases.
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the 5% significance level when using the BA data.54
Table 3.6: Minimum wage effect on the probability of being employed in the roofing
sector in the next year, DiD estimations between workers with and without a
binding MW, FE LPM, BA and LAK data, 1995-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DiDa DiD taDiDb DiDiDc
LAK BA BA BA
East Germany
ATT of Dit in pp.d -8.5*** -10.0*** -8.8*** -5.6***
Robust s.e. (0.7) (0.8) (1.1) (1.2)
Obs. (in 1000) 288 224 224 446
Share of Yˆ /∈ [0; 1] 7.3% 8.6% 4.0% 6.9%
ATT for all covered workers -1.7 -2.0 -1.8 -1.1
West Germany
ATT of Dit in pp.d -2.7 -5.0* -0.8 -7.2*
Robust s.e. (2.3) (2.0) (2.5) (2.9)
Obs. (in 1000) 601 457 457 1,013
Share of Yˆ /∈ [0; 1] 0.1% 0.9% 0.1% 3.6%
ATT for all covered workers -0.1 -0.3 -0.04 -0.4
a DiD estimation for workers with and without a binding MW within the
roofing sector
b Trend-adjusted DiD estimation for workers with and without a binding
MW within the roofing sector
c DiDiD estimation for workers with and without a binding MW within the
roofing sector compared to the plumbing sector
d ATT in percentage points for the treatment indicator Dit from a linear
probability model with individual fixed effects; all estimations include
individual and firm level covariates as in Table 3.4 for the BA data and
the same covariates except educational attainment for the LAK data.
Significance levels: * 5%, ** 1%, *** 0.1%
If all identifying assumptions regarding common trends in the absence of the
treatment and the lack of any spillovers held, multiplying the ATT from the com-
parison of workers with and without a binding MW within the roofing sector in
54When including individuals with a minor employment in the LAK estimates, the treatment
effect amounts to highly significant −17.3 percentage points. For a better comparability with the
BA data, we leave these individuals out. Still, the estimates with minor employment indicate
that the MW may have had a strong effect on their employment chances, a finding that should
be approached in future research.
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Table 3.6 by the share of workers with a binding MW should yield the ATT from
the previous intersectoral comparison, i.e. the average effect for all covered work-
ers in the roofing sector.55 The implied ATT for covered workers are included
in Table 3.6. For East Germany, this yields an ATT for all covered workers of
−2.0(= −10.0 × 0.204) percentage points for the BA results since, on average,
20.4% of all workers in East Germany are affected by a binding MW across the
entire period. In West Germany, the MW is binding for 5.5% of the workforce
on average, implying an ATT for all covered workers of −0.3% percentage points.
Compared to the fixed-effects estimates in Table 3.4, the fixed-effects estimates in
Table 3.6 appear to be underestimated. Since we consider the assumptions under-
lying the previous intersectoral comparison plausible given the robustness checks,
this deviation either indicates that the common trend assumption between workers
with and without a binding MW is violated and/or that workers without a binding
MW must be indirectly and negatively affected by the MW.
Robustness. In order to rule out that the observed deviation between the ATT
from both estimation approaches results from a violation of the common trends
assumption between workers with and without a binding MW, we need to test
the robustness of this assumption. Therefore, we examine placebo tests for the
two years that are available prior to the MW introduction, see Table 3.A3. While
the placebo test confirms the common trend for West Germany, the placebo test
for East Germany is insignificant only for the LAK data, but suggests a diverging
trend based on the BA data despite the fact that estimation results were quite
comparable across data sets. Surprisingly, however, allowing for diverging trends
55This is the case because the comparison within the roofing sector assumes a zero effect of
the MW for workers without a binding MW.
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between workers with and without a binding MW does not alter the estimation
results much for East Germany, but suggests an insignificant negative impact for
West Germany, see column (3) in Table 3.6.
Since the observable pre-regulation period is, however, very short, it is ques-
tionable to what extent placebo tests may confirm or disprove the validity of the
common trends assumption for the whole period and to what extent trend-adjusted
estimations based on this short pre-regulation period help to tackle a potential vi-
olation of this assumption. Moreover, diverging trends in the long run due to, for
example, skill-biased technological advances might still bias our estimates.
As an alternative robustness check, we therefore capture the potentially diverg-
ing trends in the absence of the MW between workers with and without a bind-
ing MW by using comparable workers from the plumbing sector as an additional
benchmark. In particular, we identify those plumbers for whom the minimum wage
would have been binding if they worked in the roofing sector given their individual
and firm characteristics. We do so by imputing the wage plumbers would receive
in the roofing sector given their characteristics, thus applying the wage imputation
described in Section 3.3 not only to roofers but also to plumbers and estimating
the probability of being bound by the minimum wage (PMW ) analogous to roofers.
Figure 3.B3 indicates that the distribution of PMW is astonishingly similar across
sectors, thus indicating the similarity of both sectors with respect to observable
characteristics. Hence, if we think about the imputation of the counterfactual
PMW among plumbers as an approach that is similar to matching individuals with
a similar treatment intensity, the necessary common support along the whole dis-
tribution seems to be given.
We then use plumbers with and without a counterfactually binding MW to run
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a DiDiD estimation where the treatment indicator Dit equals one for workers of
the roofing sector with a binding MW after the MW introduction and zero for all
other groups and time periods. If roofers with and without a binding MW had
experienced different trends in their employment chances even in the absence of
the minimum wage, reflecting, for example, skill-biased technological progress, we
assume that plumbers with and without a counterfactually binding MW capture
these diverging trends across time. The corresponding DiDiD results in column (4)
of Table 3.6 indicate that the employment effect in East Germany continues to be
negative, but somewhat smaller. This may suggest that part of the negative effect
in Table 3.6 is in fact due to a negative trend for workers with a binding MW
relative to workers without a binding MW. Since representatives of the roofing
sector repeatedly mentioned the need for catching up with technological progress
in East Germany (see Aretz et al. 2011), this appears a plausible finding. For
West Germany, the difference between the DiD and DiDiD estimates are smaller
and suggest that trends in West Germany rather diverge in the opposite direction.
More importantly, we find that the implied ATT for an average covered worker
is smaller than suggested by the intersectoral comparison in the previous section.
Therefore, employment spillovers between workers with and without a binding
MW remain the prime suspect for this deviation, a hypothesis that we examine in
the next section.
3.7 Making Employment Spillovers Visible
Approach. The treatment group g1 corresponds to all workers of the roofing
sector who are covered by the minimum wage regulations, while workers in the
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plumbing sector, who would have been covered if they worked in the roofing sector,
are considered as the control group g0. However, we do not estimate the average
employment effect for covered roofers as in the intersectoral comparison in Section
3.6, but allow the treatment effect to differ by binding status. In particular, we
distinguish between workers with a binding MW (p1 = PMW > 0.5), workers
with wages significantly above the minimum level (p3 = PMW < 0.1) and an
intermediate group of workers p2 for whom PMW ranges between these extremes.
Since we have estimated the counterfactual probability of earning a wage below
the MW for workers in the plumbing sector, we are thus able to extend the DiD
framework to identify the treatment effect for all three groups:
P (eit+1 = 1) = κp + αg×p + γt×p + δDit × p+ βXit + ci + it (3.5)
where κp captures the time constant difference between workers of a different
binding status and αg×p captures the time constant deviation between roofers and
plumbers of the same binding status. Furthermore, γt×p allows for changes in
employment outcomes of workers with a particular binding status across time that
are common to roofers and plumbers, while the same set of covariates X as before
controls for observable differences across workers. The treatment indicator Dit
equals one for covered roofers in the period after the MW introduction (1997-2007)
and zero for plumbers as well as roofers in the ex-ante period (1995-1996). This
treatment indicator is interacted with the binding status so that we get an ATT
for all three groups of workers. If spillover effects are relevant, we should observe
non-zero outcomes for workers with wages above the minimum level, i.e. with
PMW < 0.5.
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Note that due to the change in the pool of workers with a particular binding
status across time (see previous section), we again use a fixed-effects linear proba-
bility model for estimation, i.e we exploit the change in binding status across time
on the individual level for identification by including ci in equation (3.5). The
identifying assumption is that plumbers and roofers with the same set of covari-
ates X and the same changes in the binding status would experience comparable
changes in employment outcomes across time in the absence of the MW. In fact,
note that this assumption is less strict than the assumption in Section 3.6.1 because
we condition on the binding status in addition to X.
Results. Columns (1) and (3) in Table 3.7 show the estimated impact of the
minimum wage on the probability of still being employed in the sector in the
next year by binding status of the worker. The outcomes for workers with a
binding MW (p1) range around −9 percentage points in both East and West
Germany. As expected from the previous discussion, the estimated treatment
effect for workers with wages above the minimum wage level significantly differs
from zero and suggests employment spillovers. For the intermediate group (p2),
the chances of remaining employed in the roofing sector are reduced by almost 5
percentage points in East Germany and by almost 4 percentage points in West
Germany. Even for workers whose probability to fall below the MW is less than
10%, we find an increased risk of leaving the roofing sector of almost 3 percentage
points in East Germany and around 1 percentage point in West Germany. Note
that these findings imply an ATT for an average covered roofer that is largely in
line with the estimates in Section 3.6.1.56 However, the effect is not only caused
56This implied ATT results from calculating the weighted ATT across the three groups of
workers that differ by binding status.
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Table 3.7: Minimum wage effect on the probability of being employed in the roofing
sector in the next year, intersectoral DiD estimations by binding status, BA data,
1995-2007
East Germany West Germany
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FE LPM with trend adjustment? Nob Yesc Nob Yesc
ATT of Dit × p1 in pp.a -8.6*** -8.5*** -8.8*** -8.4***
ATT of Dit × p2 in pp.a -4.8*** -4.7*** -3.7* -3.7*
ATT of Dit × p3 in pp.a -2.8*** -2.4*** -1.2*** -1.5**
Obs. in 1,000 446 446 1,013 1,013
Implied ATT analogue to section 3.6.1 -4.4 -4.1 -1.8 -2.0
a ATT in percentage points by binding status p.
b Linear DiD estimation as in equation (3.5); covariates X as in Table 3.6.
c Linear DiD estimation as in equation (3.5) extended by sector-specific time trends;
covariates X as in Table 3.6
Significance levels: * 5%, ** 1%, *** 0.1%
by workers with a binding MW, but to a lesser extent also by workers who are not
affected by a binding MW. Therefore, the ATT for workers with a binding MW
relative to workers without a binding MW in Section 3.6 is downward biased.
Robustness. Note that interpreting the above cross-sector comparisons for work-
ers of a different binding status as evidence for employment effects for workers
who earn a wage above the minimum wage threshold rests on several assump-
tions. First of all, spillovers between the sectors need to be at least negligible
compared to spillovers between workers within the roofing sector. As discussed
in Section 3.6.1, we consider this to be a plausible assumption given the low and
quite time-constant rate of intersectoral transitions of workers. Secondly, roofers
and plumbers of a particular binding status must have experienced a similar trend
in employment outcomes in the absence of the MW. We test for the robustness
of the common trends assumption by allowing for different trends across sectors
based on the years prior to the MW introduction. The results in Table 3.7 sug-
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gest that the trend-adjustment does not have much of an effect on the estimation
results.
However, the common trends assumption could fail in the long run, and a
trend-adjustment based on two pre-regulation years may not suffice to tackle the
problem. A further concern with the previous estimates might be that there is
some statistical uncertainty regarding the binding status of the worker due to the
imputation. In other words, even the group that is considered to be unaffected by
a binding MW (p3) still has a probability of earning a wage below the minimum
wage level of up to 10%. As a result, the previous results might simply reflect the
individuals within each group for whom the MW is in fact binding.
In order to counteract such concerns, we conduct the previous intersectoral
comparison along the deciles of the wage distribution and distinguish between
three sub-periods (1997-2001; 2002-2004; 2005-2007) that differ by bite. As an
advantage, we also observe wage deciles for which the probability of being affected
by a binding MW is zero or very close to zero, see Table 3.A6 for corresponding
descriptives. Effects on these deciles cannot be driven by the previously mentioned
measurement problem. Secondly, we are able to examine whether the pattern of
employment effects follows the extension of the bite to higher wage deciles across
time. Using again the counterfactual wage for plumbers if they worked in the
roofing sector, we thus estimate the ATTs for each wage decile by exchanging p
in equation (3.5) by the decile dit = 1, . . . , 10 and by further interacting Dit × dit
with the three sub-periods. Note in Table 3.A6 that the share of plumbers whose
counterfactual wage falls in the lowest wage decile is quite high due to the wage
compression in the roofing sector. Still, we have high numbers of observations
in the plumbing sector for each wage decile in the roofing sector so that we are
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able to estimate the ATT for each decile. The approach is related to the study
of Neumark et al. (2004), who also study the minimum wage effects throughout
the wage distribution. Compared to our study, the authors exploit the regional
and time variation of the minimum wage level in the UK and look at next years’
employment status along the wage distribution, defined as the distribution of initial
earnings relative to the old minimum wage.
Figure 3.4 displays the corresponding ATTs on the probability of continued
employment in the roofing sector in percentage points as long as the effect is
significant at least at the 5% level. The results indicate that the prospects of
continued employment in East Germany have deteriorated due to the minimum
wage almost along the entire wage distribution in East Germany. Moreover, note
that the impact on workers with wages in the upper wage deciles are partially
significant only for the latest period where the bite of the minimum wage was
strongest. For West Germany, wage deciles that are not affected by a binding MW
appear to be less affected by the MW. For workers whose wages fall in the 7th to
9th decile, no significant effects can be found at all. Still, there is some evidence for
employment spillovers in line with the previous results because workers in the 3rd
to 6th decile, for whom we find a decline in the chances of continued employment,
are only marginally affected by a binding MW (see Table 3.A6). Also, the effect
seems to follow the extended bite of the MW since wage deciles 5 and 6 are only
affected in the later periods with a higher minimum wage level. The negative
effect on continued employment of roofers in the 10th decile might be caused
by voluntary quits of predominantly master craftsmen who leave the sample by
deciding to become self-employed and to establish a single-person company whose
share of all companies markedly increased during the observation period.
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Figure 3.4: Minimum wage effect on the probability of being employed in the
roofing sector in the next year by decile of the wage distribution and sub-period,
by West (top) and East Germany (bottom), BA data, 1995-2007
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Note: The figures only display effects that are significant at least at the 5% significance level.
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This additional analysis confirms that there are relevant spillovers in East Ger-
many whose temporal pattern confirms a link to the extending minimum wage
bite. For West Germany, employment spillovers are less strong, but seem to exist
for workers earning wages just above the minimum wage and for workers in the
highest wage decile. These negative employment outcomes for workers with wages
above the MW allow for two not necessarily competing explanations. On the one
hand, the observed result pattern may suggest that workers are substituted by
capital and that the substitutability differs for different types of workers with the
least skilled workers being easiest to substitute. On the other hand, the result
pattern is compatible with negative scale effects that mostly, if not for all work-
ers, dominate a positive substitution effect between different types of workers. Of
course, both explanations may be relevant to some extent, albeit qualitative in-
terviews with leading experts in the roofing sector (see Aretz et al. 2011) suggest
that the first may be the dominant explanation. In particular, the insiders doubt
that the minimum wage in the roofing sector had much of a scale effect while the
relevance of technological advances such as the introduction of new roofing systems
that reduce the necessary labour input have been stressed.
The results are partly in line with Neumark et al. (2004), who find that workers
whose wages are initially close to the minimum wage (up to 1.3 times the minimum
wage) are most likely to be affected by changes in the wage floor. However, the
authors find no evidence for spillovers in the upper part of the wage distribution,
as opposed to our study.
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3.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have analyzed the impact of minimum wages in the German
roofing sector on workers’ chances of continued employment. For the identification
of average employment outcomes, we contrasted the estimated minimum wage
impact when comparing the chances of continued employment in the roofing sector
with a control sector and when comparing the chances of roofers with and without
a binding minimum wage. In addition, we estimate the causal impact of the
minimum wage for workers with and without a binding minimum wage as well
as along the entire wage distribution. We are, thus, able to also identify indirect
effects of the minimum wage on workers in the upper part of the wage distribution
for whom the MW is not binding. Our main conclusions are:
• On average, the minimum wage in the roofing sector resulted in poorer
chances of remaining employed according to both the intersectoral com-
parison as well as the comparison of workers with and without a binding
minimum wage within the roofing sector. This is especially true for East
Germany, where the minimum wage level gave rise to a much higher share
of affected workers of up to 56% compared to 12% in West Germany. Given
the limited compliance with the minimum wage regulations, the impact could
even be stronger if compliance was fully enforced.
• Estimates from the comparison of workers with and without a binding min-
imum wage seem to be underestimated compared to estimates from an in-
tersectoral comparison. If one is willing to assume that the common trend
assumption holds and that the control sector is not affected by spillover ef-
fects, assumptions that are supported by some robustness checks, this devi-
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ation indicates that the minimum wage also affects the employment chances
of roofers who are not directly affected by a binding minimum wage.
• Running an intersectoral comparison of employment chances along the entire
wage distribution by exploiting the counterfactual position of workers of the
control sector in the wage distribution of the roofing sector confirms this
previous suspicion. The prospects of continued employment deteriorated due
to the minimum wage along the entire wage distribution in East Germany.
In West Germany, spillovers are less strong, but also exist for workers just
above the minimum wage level.
• The decline in employment chances among workers without a binding min-
imum wage may indicate that scale effects dominate substitution effects
and/or that minimum wages induce some capital-labour substitution. While
both may be relevant to some extent, the latter may be the dominant force
according to interviews that we conducted with sector insiders. In partic-
ular, they consider new roofing systems as a potential means of reducing
minimum-wage induced labour costs, but question a strong decline in out-
put since the demand for roofing services appears to be rather price-inelastic.
These findings on the impact of the minimum wage regulations on the chances
of continued employment should not, however, be equated with the overall min-
imum wage impact on the sector’s employment. In particular, the single-person
companies, whose share among all companies tripled during the observation pe-
riod to 23% in 2010, are not accounted for by our analysis. Furthermore, given the
specific conditions of the roofing sector, e.g. the rather high level of qualification
and the low labour intensity, a transferability of the results to other sectors which
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might be subject to minimum wage regulations in the future has to be viewed with
caution.
Despite these reservations, the presented evidence clearly highlights the need
for a broader perspective on employment effects of minimum wages by also taking
a closer look at workers who do not appear to be affected by the minimum wage
at a first glance. Moreover, our results put doubt on any attempts to identify
employment effects of minimum wages by comparing workers with and without a
binding minimum wage within a covered sector.
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Appendix 3
3.A - Tables
Table 3.A1: Mean values of independent and dependent variables by sector prior
to and after the minimum wage introduction, East Germany, BA data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Roofers Plumbers Unconditional
before MW after MW before MW after MW DiD
1994 - 1996 1997 - 2007 1994 - 1996 1997 - 2007
Dependent variable: Employed in the same sector in June of next year
1994 0.80 0.83
1995 0.78 0.81
1996 0.75 0.81
Total 0.78 0.74 0.82 0.79 -0.01
Individual covariates
Age 34.45 35.80 36.04 38.48 -1.08
Female 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
No vocational degree 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.03 -0.02
Secondary education 0.81 0.88 0.89 0.93 0.04
Tertiary education 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Missing educational status 0.10 0.04 0.08 0.04 -0.02
Skilled workers 0.73 0.78 0.86 0.87 0.04
Unskilled workers 0.24 0.19 0.10 0.09 -0.04
Master craftsman 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.00
Part-time <15 hours/week 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Part-time >15 hours/week 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
Prev. work exp. in sector (in years) 1.95 9.20 1.95 7.14 2.05
Prev. tenure in firm (in years) 1.78 7.09 1.92 8.08 -0.85
Firm-level covariates
Share of skilled workers 0.73 0.76 0.86 0.83 0.06
Share of unskilled workers 0.24 0.19 0.10 0.09 -0.04
Mean age of workforce 34.46 36.00 36.00 38.65 -1.11
1-5 employees 0.07 0.17 0.11 0.19 0.01
6-10 employees 0.16 0.25 0.17 0.19 0.06
11-20 employees 0.32 0.29 0.22 0.20 0.00
> 20 employees 0.45 0.30 0.50 0.42 -0.07
Mean daily gross wage in firms with > 2 workers 54.95 54.91 53.32 51.66 1.62
Number of observations 75,227 172,249 73,178 176,752
Note: The unconditional DiD is computed the following way: columns (2)-(4)-((1)-(3)).
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Table 3.A2: Mean values of independent and dependent variables by sector prior
to and after the minimum wage introduction, West Germany, BA data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Roofers Plumbers Unconditional
before MW after MW before MW after MW DiD
1994 - 1996 1997 - 2007 1994 - 1996 1997 - 2007
Dependent variable: Employed in the same sector in June of next year
1994 0.81 0.87
1995 0.79 0.87
1996 0.81 0.87
Total 0.80 0.82 0.87 0.85 0.03
Individual covariates
Age 34.92 36.52 35.77 37.62 -0.25
Female 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
No vocational degree 0.26 0.22 0.06 0.07 -0.04
Secondary education 0.65 0.73 0.89 0.91 0.06
Tertiary education 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Missing educational status 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.02 -0.02
Skilled workers 0.61 0.64 0.83 0.81 0.04
Unskilled workers 0.34 0.31 0.11 0.12 -0.04
Master craftsman 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.00
Part-time <15 hours/week 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Part-time >15 hours/week 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
Prev. work exp. in sector (in years) 2.03 10.69 2.12 8.12 2.65
Prev. tenure in firm (in years) 1.88 8.64 2.06 9.62 -0.80
Firm-level covariates
Share of skilled workers 0.61 0.62 0.83 0.77 0.06
Share of unskilled workers 0.34 0.30 0.11 0.12 -0.05
Mean age of workforce 35.00 36.88 35.77 38.07 -0.42
1-5 employees 0.14 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.03
6-10 employees 0.26 0.27 0.19 0.20 0.01
11-20 employees 0.31 0.30 0.22 0.22 -0.01
> 20 employees 0.29 0.24 0.42 0.39 -0.02
Mean daily gross wage in firms with > 2 workers 69.23 72.09 71.44 72.81 1.49
Number of observations 125,334 375,344 137,444 471,454
Note: The unconditional DiD is computed the following way: columns (2)-(4)-((1)-(3)).
Table 3.A3: Marginal effect of Dit in percentage points for placebo tests of ap-
proaches in section 3.6.1 and 3.6.2
Pooled Pooled Obs. Pooled Pooled Obs.
Logit LPM (in 1000) Logit LPM (in 1000)
East Germany West Germany
Placebo tests for approach in Section 3.6.1
1994-95 with plumbers 0.3 0.2 99 -1.7*** -1.7*** 181
1994-96 with plumbers -3.2*** -3.2*** 150 0.6** 0.8** 267
Placebo tests for approach in Section 3.6.2
1995-96, DiD BA data 6.5*** 5.2*** 52 -0.8 -0.1 82
1995-96, DiD LAK data 1.9 1.0 66 -3.3 -2.0 109
Note: Same specification as in Tables 3.4 and 3.6 with individual and firm-level controls;
Significance levels: * 5%, ** 1%, *** 0.1%
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Table 3.A4: Mean difference between non-binding and binding workers of inde-
pendent and dependent variables by sector prior to and after the minimum wage
introduction, East Germany, BA data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Roofers Plumbers Unconditional
before MW after MW before MW after MW DiD
1995 - 1996 1997 - 2007 1995 - 1996 1997 - 2007
Dependent variable: Employed in the same sector in June of next year
1995 -0.25 -0.14
1996 -0.20 -0.14
Total -0.22 -0.10 -0.14 -0.07 -0.05
Individual covariates
Age -3.16 -2.36 -3.24 -2.75 -0.31
Female 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.01
No vocational degree 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02
Secondary education -0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.03
Tertiary education 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Missing educational status -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 0.02
Skilled workers -0.17 -0.05 -0.06 -0.01 -0.06
Unskilled workers 0.18 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.08
Master craftsman -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01
Part-time < 15 hours/week 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Part-time > 15 hours/week 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01
Prev. work exp. in sector (in years) -0.86 -0.75 -0.61 0.32 0.83
Prev. tenure in firm (in years) -0.83 -1.68 -0.43 -0.99 0.28
Firm-level covariates
Share of skilled workers 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Share of unskilled workers 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02
Mean age of workforce -0.66 -0.05 -0.85 -0.41 -0.16
1-5 employees 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.11 -0.01
6-10 employees 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.03
11-20 employees 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.05
> 20 employees -0.10 -0.11 -0.04 -0.12 -0.07
Mean daily gross wage in firms with > 2 workers -9.00 -5.87 -9.55 -8.64 -2.22
Number of observations 51,605 172,090 49,426 172,982
Note: The unconditional DiD is computed the following way: columns (2)-(4)-((1)-(3)).
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Table 3.A5: Mean difference between non-binding and binding workers of inde-
pendent and dependent variables by sector prior to and after the minimum wage
introduction, West Germany, BA data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Roofers Plumbers Unconditional
before MW after MW before MW after MW DiD
1995 - 1996 1997 - 2007 1995 - 1996 1997 - 2007
Dependent variable: Employed in the same sector in June of next year
1995 -0.22 -0.02
1996 -0.24 -0.08
Total -0.23 -0.26 -0.04 -0.10 -0.03
Individual covariates
Age -1.84 -2.21 1.05 -0.22 -0.91
Female 0.12 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.07
No vocational degree 0.11 0.14 0.03 0.09 0.03
Secondary education -0.16 -0.20 -0.02 -0.10 -0.05
Tertiary education 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00
Missing educational status 0.05 0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.02
Skilled workers -0.33 -0.37 -0.06 -0.16 -0.06
Unskilled workers 0.16 0.20 0.03 0.10 0.03
Master craftsman 0.05 0.05 -0.02 -0.02 0.01
Part-time < 15 hours/week 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.01
Part-time > 15 hours/week 0.12 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.04
Prev. work exp. in sector (in years) -0.94 -6.09 -0.36 -2.08 3.44
Prev. tenure in firm (in years) -0.93 -5.25 -0.36 -2.69 1.99
Firm-level covariates
Share of skilled workers -0.08 -0.19 0.01 -0.08 0.02
Share of unskilled workers 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.04 -0.01
Mean age of workforce -0.65 -0.64 1.02 0.88 -0.15
1-5 employees 0.12 0.21 -0.10 0.00 0.01
6-10 employees 0.04 -0.03 -0.16 -0.10 0.13
11-20 employees -0.04 -0.08 -0.13 -0.14 0.02
> 20 employees -0.11 -0.10 0.39 0.24 -0.16
Mean daily gross wage in firms with > 2 workers -15.13 -22.52 -2.61 -7.02 2.97
Number of observations 81,969 375,079 90,937 465,157
Note: The unconditional DiD is computed the following way: columns (2)-(4)-((1)-(3)).
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Table 3.A6: Probability of being affected by a binding MW (PMW ), by year, sector,
and wage decile of the wage distribution in the roofing sector, BA data, 1995-2007
East Germany
Year Sector 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 N
1995 Roofers 69.6 39.6 10.0 0.8 0.1 0.1 0 0 0 0 25,470Plumbers 74.7 36.9 8.6 0.7 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 25,208
1996 Roofers 81.0 38.9 9.4 1.1 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 26,135Plumbers 82.4 36.5 7.1 0.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 24,218
1997 Roofers 73.6 33.3 8.1 0.8 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 24,960Plumbers 75.3 31.4 5.2 0.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 23,182
1998 Roofers 63.9 29.2 8.0 1.4 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 22,489Plumbers 67.9 24.3 4.9 0.7 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 21,934
1999 Roofers 57.6 24.7 6.1 0.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 21,524Plumbers 66.4 20.6 2.5 0.4 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 21,384
2000 Roofers 73.7 52.3 28.3 9.9 1.8 0.2 0 0 0 0 18,908Plumbers 82.3 52.4 26.8 8.7 2.3 0.2 0.1 0 0 0 18,586
2001 Roofers 66.3 40.5 21.3 8.3 2.4 0.5 0.1 0 0 0 14,968Plumbers 78.9 40.3 18.7 7.7 2.3 0.5 0 0 0 0 16,164
2002 Roofers 80.3 66.6 52.5 34.9 17.1 4.0 0.5 0.1 0 0 13,076Plumbers 88.8 68.9 52.8 35.7 18.7 4.4 0.7 0.1 0 0 13,763
2003 Roofers 82.0 70.5 59.9 47.6 31.3 13.6 3.1 0.2 0 0 12,865Plumbers 88.0 70.2 60.6 47.6 30.7 13.5 3.1 0.3 0 0 12,549
2004 Roofers 85.9 75.6 67.2 56.3 42.7 26.5 10.4 1.3 0.1 0 11,681Plumbers 95.1 79.3 68.6 56.6 43.0 25.4 9.4 1.4 0.1 0 12,195
2005 Roofers 87.4 79.3 72.6 65.5 55.2 40.6 21.2 5.9 0.7 0 10,214Plumbers 86.5 76.8 70.2 63.2 53.9 40.4 20.4 5.6 0.6 0 10,806
2006 Roofers 85.7 64.0 50.8 39.8 29.8 20.8 11.7 3.6 0.3 0 10,581Plumbers 96.3 63.7 51.4 42.0 33.4 22.7 11.3 3.2 0.2 0 10,807
2007 Roofers 83.8 70.9 60.4 49.2 37.6 25.0 11.9 2.9 0.4 0 10,824Plumbers 96.8 72.0 60.3 49.3 38.1 25.2 12.8 3.8 0.4 0 11,612
N Roofers 17,601 22,141 22,754 22,872 22,928 22,962 23,005 23,082 23,169 23,181 223,695Plumbers 36,831 26,062 23,183 20,713 16,990 18,468 17,675 16,391 16,578 29,517 222,408
West Germany
Year Sector 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 N
1995 Roofers 15.6 1.4 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 42,730Plumbers 32.6 1.2 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 46,324
1996 Roofers 20.4 2.7 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 39,239Plumbers 28.9 2.5 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 44,613
1997 Roofers 20.3 2.2 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 38,273Plumbers 33.0 2.3 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 44,087
1998 Roofers 18.4 1.8 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 36,553Plumbers 24.1 1.8 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 46,132
1999 Roofers 28.0 2.3 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 37,868Plumbers 24.6 2.0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 46,023
2000 Roofers 41.0 7.1 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 37,959Plumbers 48.3 5.7 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 45,715
2001 Roofers 35.0 5.9 0.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 35,316Plumbers 53.7 5.1 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 45,329
2002 Roofers 32.8 5.1 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33,977Plumbers 54.5 3.8 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 42,512
2003 Roofers 44.7 8.2 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 32,922Plumbers 42.7 6.4 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 39,843
2004 Roofers 58.2 14.7 0.8 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 31,172Plumbers 66.8 10.9 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 39,526
2005 Roofers 67.6 22.0 2.2 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 29,450Plumbers 67.2 20.2 1.6 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 37,979
2006 Roofers 69.3 23.9 2.7 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 29,793Plumbers 83.8 23.7 1.7 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 38,713
2007 Roofers 70.8 26 3.2 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 31,796Plumbers 84.8 25.1 2.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 39,298
N Roofers 28,920 45,648 47,697 47,771 47,797 47,848 47,860 47,857 47,859 47,791 457,048Plumbers 45,549 58,798 52,230 51,368 52,410 47,931 43,264 38,247 45,136 121,161 556,094
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3.B - Figures
Figure 3.B1: Evolution of the employment across sectors by region, year 1997=100,
BA data, 1994-2008
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Figure 3.B2: Distributions of observed LAK data and predicted BA data wage
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Figure 3.B3: The probability of being affected by a binding MW, by sector and
region, BA data, 1995 - 2007
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3.C - Explanation of the underestimation of the bite in the
BA data
The compressed wage distribution which is observed in Figure 3.3 indicates that
the imputation technique, which we use for implementing a hourly wage in the
BA data and which assumes a normal distribution of wages, leads to a systematic
underestimation of the share of workers with a binding MW in East Germany. For
illustration, consider two types of workers that capture the asymmetric form of
the wage distribution. Type A’s wage roughly corresponds to the MW, whereas
type B’s wage lies somewhere above the MW level. Due to the fact that there is
uncertainty which individual falls into which category, the imputed distribution of
the predicted mean wage always reflects a mixing distribution of these two types.
As a consequence, the imputed variance for type A is an overestimation whereas
type B’s imputed wage variance is an underestimation of the true variance. As
a result, too much probability mass for type A is above the MW and too little
probability mass for type B is below the MW, resulting in an underestimation of
the share of workers with a binding MW. Still, the probability of being affected
by a binding MW on an individual level should be highly related to the treatment
intensity, i.e. the higher this probability on an individual level is, the more likely
is an individual to fall below the MW threshold and the higher is the need for
increasing the wage in order to comply with the MW level.
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Chapter 4
Choosing Your Object of Benevo-
lence? A Field Experiment on Do-
nation Options∗
4.1 Introduction
Charitable giving has been in the focus of experimental research lately (e.g. Car-
penter et al. 2008, Corazzini et al. 2010, Bernasconi et al. 2009; see List 2011 for a
recent survey). These studies are part of a literature stressing that charitable ac-
tivities play an important role in economies. Many of these activities are financed
by charitable organizations, which in turn usually rely on voluntary donations.
The amount of such donations is quite substantial (e.g. in 2010, Americans gave
approximately $300 billion to charitable causes).57 The supported charitable orga-
nizations are, for various reasons, frequently rather specialized in their activities.58
Even if the organization engages in more than one activity, the most common way
56∗This contribution is joint work with Sebastian Kube and has been published as ZEW Dis-
cussion Paper No. 10-016 (Aretz and Kube 2010). This contribution has been accepted for
publication in a Special Issue on Field Experiments in the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
We are grateful to “Doctors for Developing Countries” and especially to Dr. Kischlat for his
willingness and effort to conduct the field experiment with us. For helpful discussions, we thank
Luca Corazzini, Armin Falk, Erin Krupka, Michel Maréchal, Jan Stuhler, and Matthias Wibral.
57Source: Giving USA Foundation, Center on Philanthropy, Indiana University.
58For example, some support children, while others support elderly people, or medical programs
in developing countries, or wildlife, etc.
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to raise funds is to send solicitation letters that ask for donations to a single ac-
tivity. Interestingly, however, the organizations usually do not discriminate with
respect to the countries that the donors can support. In this chapter, I report
evidence on a randomized field experiment that we used to study the effect of
providing donors with the option to choose the target country for their donations.
The “Doctors for Developing Countries” (“Ärzte für die dritte Welt”, DfDC in
the following) sent out more than 57,000 solicitation letters by mail in two different
versions. Both versions were basically identical. The letter described the project
work in five different developing countries and provided donors the same amount of
information about the present situation in these five countries. The only difference
was that donors in the control group could only specify the donation amount, while
donors in the treatment group additionally were provided with the opportunity to
select one or more particular countries as donation recipients. This allows us
to observe if the mere option of targeting donations to specific countries already
affects donations (by comparing response rates and average donation amounts of
donors in the control and in the treatment group). Additionally, we can check
if actually taking advantage of the option affects donation amounts (by focusing
only on the treatment group and comparing those who make use of the option to
those who do not specify a recipient).
The organization received 6,393 donations in total in response to the appeal
for funds. Response rates did not differ significantly between groups (11.2% in
control, 11.1% in treatment group). Also the average donation amounts of actual
donors did not differ significantly between control (135e) and treatment group
(138e); resp. 15.19e and 15.31e if donations of 0 are included for those who did
not donate. Only 3.5% of all donors in the treatment group make use of their
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option to choose a specific country. Those who actually state a recipient for their
donation give more. On average, their donations are about 14% higher than those
of the other subjects in the treatment group (160e compared to 138e). The
difference persists when we control for donors’ previous donations by using data
from the organizations’ two previous winter mailings.
Our study is closely related to the empirical research investigating the effects
of identification on benevolence and helping behavior (e.g. Fetherstonhaugh et
al. 1997, Jenni and Loewenstein 1997, Bohnet and Frey 1999, Small and Loewen-
stein 2003, Brosig et al. 2003). Starting with Schelling (1968), these studies
(backed up by casual empirical observations) mostly support the idea that people
care more about identifiable, or ‘familiar’, victims than about statistical victims.
Several potential causes are recognized for inducing the identifiable victim effect,
e.g. vividness, uncertainty, or the proportion of the reference group that can be
saved. Basically, however, the mediating factor behind the effect seems to be
evoked emotions. Identifiable victims evoke stronger emotional and moral reac-
tions than (equivalent) unidentifiable victims (cp. Kogut and Ritov 2005, who find
that self-reported sympathy towards the victim and willingness to help the victim
are correlated). Our results point into the same direction, but the difference is that
the information set provided by us is kept constant between the two solicitation
letters.59 Moreover, to the best of our knowledge the existing evidence up to now
either stems from questionnaire studies (e.g. Jenni and Loewenstein 1997) or from
lab experiments (e.g. Gueth et al. 2011, Andreoni and Petrie 2004), but not from
59By selecting particular countries as donation recipients, the donation cause is more ‘identifi-
able’ to these donors. Of course, victims are not as explicitly identified as it is usually the case in
this area of research. Still, one could speak of a “weak identifiability effect”, because the donor
reduces the reference group from the whole population of five countries to a particular country.
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a controlled field experiment.
Given that we study charitable giving in the field, our study fits into the field-
experimental literature that explores mechanisms to increase donations (for recent
surveys, see Bekkers and Wiepking 2011 and List 2011). For example, Falk (2007)
demonstrates that gift-exchange can increase donations by comparing returns to
a mail campaign with and without including small presents (one or several greet-
ing cards). Along these lines, Landry et al. (2010) explore if a regular appeal for
donation attracts different donors than an appeal that builds on gift-exchange by
giving small or large gifts (a bookmark, resp. a copy of the book Freakonomics);
additionally controlling for potential donors being on a warm or cold list (i.e. hav-
ing donated money to this charity before or not). Similar controls are also used
in Eckel and Grossman (2008), but they focus on pecuniary incentives. Using
different rates of rebates and matching subsidies, they show that donations are a
normal good with negative price elasticity, and that charities are better off under
the matching than under the corresponding rebate subsidy. Landry et al. (2006)
focus on monetary incentives, too. They observe that incentivizing donations with
raffle tickets raises more money than a plain door-to-door campaign. It also raises
more money than a campaign using seed money. Beside the monetary incentives,
the social interaction between solicitor and donor seems to matter as well, since
they find that physically attractive female solicitors raise more money than their
peers. Also DellaVigna et al. (2012) underline the importance of the social di-
mension. They find social pressure to be a strong determinant of door-to-door
giving, because the share of households opening the door is reduced significantly
when donors are informed ex-ante about the exact time of solicitation (via flyers
on their door-knobs). In contrast to these studies, our mechanism does neither
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change the monetary nor the social incentives structure. Instead, all it does is to
extend donors’ choice set for a given campaign: donors cannot only choose the
size of their donation, but can also target their donation to a specific subset of
countries. Compared to the strong effects in the above studies, the impact of the
mechanism reported here is negligible – yet in the future it might be interesting
to study its effectiveness in combination with monetary or social incentives.
4.2 Experimental Design
4.2.1 Charity
Since we wanted to provide donors with the option to choose the target country
for their donation in a natural environment, we searched for a charitable organiza-
tion that operated in at least two (sufficiently different) countries. Moreover, we
required the organization’s work in these countries to be similar60 and we wanted
to cooperate with an organization that was large enough to provide us with a
sufficiently large data set. Fortunately, the German organization DfDC agreed to
cooperate with us. The DfDC is officially certified by the German Donation Seal
and is listed there amongst their Top 40 organizations in Germany with respect
to private donation inflow.61 The DfDC operates in several countries, and their
work is almost identical in any country (primary health care). In 2007, they asked
for donations to support five countries, namely Bangladesh, India, the Philippines,
Kenya, and Nicaragua.
60Otherwise, observing a donor choosing a particular country might also be due to a difference
in the charity’s activities in that particular country. This, of course, might be interesting as well,
but is beyond the scope of this chapter.
61cp. DZI Spendenalmanach 2008/9 p.317; for more information (in German) see the German
Institute for Social Issues (DZI ) at http://www.dzi.de
169
4.2.2 Method
We used the DfDC ’s winter mailing campaign 2007 for our field experiment. Al-
together, 57,372 solicitation letters were sent out to the ‘house list’ consisting of
regular donors and members of the DfDC. We conducted two treatments. Allo-
cation of subjects to treatment was randomized by the organization. Based on
the first letter of the family name, subjects were either allocated to the Choice
treatment (30,325 people) or to the Baseline treatment (27,407 people). In the
Baseline treatment, donors could not choose their donation recipient. Instead
each donation was equally split between the five countries (which, however, was
not made explicit to the donors). In the Choice treatment, donors could declare
which country (or countries) should receive the donated amount; the default being
to support all five countries equally.
In both treatments, subjects received a solicitation letter including a cover
letter and a single remittance slip which had the organization’s account and bank
number pre-printed on it. The same cover letter was used in both treatments. It
explained the project work of the organization during the last year and explicitly
mentioned the five countries for which they asked for donations in 2007. The
amount and detail of information about the countries provided in the cover letter
were identical between treatments.
The only difference was that on the page containing the remittance slip in
treatment Choice, it was additionally explained that donors had the option to
donate to a specific country and how to use it: Simply by entering five digit
codes in the reference-field on the remittance slip, subjects were able to pick any
(combination) of the five countries to donate to. If a single code was entered, the
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entire donated amount went to the recipient that the donor had selected. If more
than one code was entered, the donated money was to be split equally between the
selected countries. If no code was entered, the donation was treated as in treatment
Baseline, i.e. it was split equally amongst all five countries.62 The latter was the
default because subjects received a remittance slip where the reference-field was
initially empty.
4.2.3 Behavioral predictions
In light of previous evidence, it is ex ante an open question whether our treat-
ment manipulation affects giving behavior. Some studies suggest that altruistic
motivation is mediated by aroused empathetic emotions (see the empathy-altruism
hypothesis by Batson et al. 1991, or the evidence provided by Cialdini et al. 1987,
Batson 1987, or Batson and Coke 1981). In our case, this would imply that donors
who have more intense feelings towards a particular country – maybe because they
have some specific link to it – would donate larger amounts if they were able to
target the donation to this country. Along these lines, it might also be that people
care about the efficacy of donations. If they expect efficacy to differ between coun-
tries, being able to target ones’ donation to the country with the highest efficacy
might increase donations. Linking these arguments to existing theoretical models,
one would need to build on models that allow for subjects receiving utility from
62One might think about other ways to implement our treatment manipulation. For example,
by providing boxes to tick next to country names, or by providing the option to state separate
donation amounts for each single country. These manipulations might be more salient than
our treatment manipulation, so the effects that we observe might be considered a lower bound.
Also note that our procedure is the only feasible way of implementing the choice option in
a mailing campaign with remittance slips. The only alternative would have been to include
multiple remittance slips, which increases the costs of the campaign significantly (which is why
the DfDC opted against it).
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giving, and where the size of this utility depends on beneficiaries’ (i.e. countries’)
characteristics.63 Whether the treatment manipulation increases giving behav-
ior or not, however, ultimately depends on the specific theoretical model and on
which exact functional forms and parameters are assumed within this model (in
particular since subjects’ preferences are usually assumed to be convex).64 The
only thing that is hardly reconcilable with existing theories of giving behavior is
that our treatment manipulation reduces donations, because subjects can always
choose not to use the option.
While our design does not allow us to discriminate between the relative impor-
tance of potential theories and channels, by comparing response rates and average
donation amounts between the two treatments we can clearly isolate the effect
of providing the opportunity of targeting donations to specific countries per se.
Moreover, using data from the reference-fields on the remittance slip allows us to
identify those donors who choose to target their donation, and to compare them
to those who do not specify a recipient.
63For example, this would be the case for the model of donation behavior introduced in Landry
et al. (2006), which in turn builds on impure-altruism models by Andreoni (1989) and Andreoni
(1990). In this model, parts of agents’ utility stems from a warm-glow effect of giving. The
relative strength of this part depends on an idiosyncratic factor γi, which is used to describe
solicitor and solicitee characteristics. In our context, one could assume it to capture beneficiary
characteristics as well, i.e. the strength of the emotion towards a country.
64This is a common problem (not only) in the context of donation behavior. For example,
Shang and Croson (2009) study the impact of social information on donations and list numerous
theories of giving behavior that create contradicting hypotheses for their treatment manipula-
tions; not only depending on the type of model, but also depending on the specification within
a given model.
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4.3 Results
DfDC told us how many solicitation letters had been sent out in treatmentChoice,
resp. Baseline. They also provided anonymous data of those subjects who actu-
ally did donate money in our field experiment in 2007. For each of those subjects,
the data set includes the date that the DfDC received the donation, the code
that was specified by the donor in the reference-field on the remittance slip, the
donated amount, a dummy variable indicating if the donor was part of treatment
Choice or of treatment Baseline, and an abstract id which allows to identify
subjects over time. Additionally, the data set includes donations of our subjects
in the previous two winter mailing campaigns (2005 and 2006).
Table 4.1: Donation behavior between treatments
Treatment Baseline Choice
Recipient specified? n/a no yes
# of letters sent 27,047 30,325
# of donations 3,036 3,239 118
Response rate 11.2% 11.1%
Average donation size 15.19e 15.31e
... excluding non-donors 135.37e 137.51e 160.39e
Total donations 410,975e 445,418e 18,926e
Let us first focus on subjects’ behavior in our field experiment in 2007. Table 4.1
provides an overview of the donation behavior in the two treatments. Our data set
includes 3,036 donations in treatment Baseline and 3,357 in treatment Choice.
The response rates of 11.2% (3,036 out of 27,047), resp. 11.1% (3,357 out of 30,325),
are almost identical in both treatments (χ2-test, p = 0.556, two-sided). This
suggests that the increased decision scope in treatment Choice does not affect
subjects’ decision to become a donor. Also the average size of the donations does
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not differ significantly between treatments (ranksum-test, p = 0.8042, two-sided).
The 3,036 donors in treatment Baseline donate on average 135e (s.d.=276). The
3,357 donors in treatment Choice give on average 138e (s.d.=302).65
Result 4.1 Providing donors with the possibility to choose their object of benev-
olence did not seem to affect subjects’ donation behavior in general. Neither the
response rates nor the average size of the donations differed significantly between
treatments Baseline and Choice.
We observe that only 3.5% (118 out of 3,357) of the donors in treatment
Choice actually make use of their choice option.66 Those 118 donors who do
choose their object of benevolence give on average 160e (s.d.=299). If we com-
pare this to the average donation of the 3,239 subjects who did not state a re-
cipient in treatment Choice (138e), the difference is significant (rank-sum test,
p = 0.0172, two-sided). The same holds true if we compare it to the 135e that are
on average donated by the 3,036 subjects in treatment Baseline (rank-sum test,
p = 0.0261, two-sided). Comparing all three groups jointly using a Kruskal-Wallis
test yields p = 0.0571. This suggests that donors in the treatment group Choice
who actually choose a recipient for their benevolence donate significantly higher
amounts.
One might argue that unobserved heterogeneity might confound the causal
treatment effect. For example, it could be that donors who donate higher amounts
in general are for some reasons more likely to choose a recipient. To shed light
65The difference between treatments stays insignificant if one compares the average donation
over the entire sample, thus taking also the non-donors into account. In that case, average
donation size is 15.19e in Baseline and 15.31e in Choice.
66All but one of the 118 subjects did specify a single country to be the recipient of the donation.
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on this issue, we ran panel regressions using also subjects’ donation data from the
previous winter-mailing campaigns, see Table 4.2 for the regression results.67
We estimate a fixed-effects model, where the dependent variable is the donated
amount of individual i in period t (2005, 2006, or 2007).68 We observe the following:
i) on average, donations in 2007 are per se slightly higher than in previous years
(5.66); ii) those subjects who are in the treatment group, but did not specify a
recipient donate about the same amount in 2007 than they did in previous years
(2.08); iii) but those subjects who did use the option donate significantly higher
amounts than they did in previous years (62.25). This indicates that the latter
effect is unlikely to be solely due to selection, i.e. only more generous persons
choosing to select a recipient.
This can also be seen when comparing the average donations in previous years
of subjects in the groups Baseline, Choice & “non-user” and Choice & “user”
(cp. Table 4.3). There are no significant differences, neither between nor across
any of the three groups in 2005 and 2006 (rank-sum test and Kruskal-Wallis test,
respectively, p = 0.3343 or above). Only in 2007, during the campaign in which
we implement the treatment, the difference in the average donation of the treated
who use the option is significantly higher than for the treated who do not choose
67The data contains a unique identification code for donors’ addresses that allows us to trace
individuals’ donation behavior across years. Not all of our subjects that participated in the field
experiment in 2007 have donated in previous years, so we include only those subjects who have
donated at least once in the two previous years. Estimating the model using the unbalanced
panel with all 12,578 observations yields qualitatively the same results; only the coefficient of the
constant changes slightly to 136.75 (s.e. 1.42). Also note that donations in 2007 of treatment and
control group do not vary systematically with the instances of previous donations. Interestingly,
however, subjects who choose a recipient for their donations do only give a significantly higher
amount in 2007 (compared to those who did not choose) if they had already donated before. The
average donation of first-time donors is not significantly different from the average donation of
second or third-time donors.
68Testing the random effects versus the fixed effects model using a Hausman test argues
strongly for the fixed effects model (χ2 = 31.34, p = 0.0000).
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Table 4.2: Regression table: Donation behavior
Donated Amount
2007 5.66
(3.04)
2007 x Treated 2.08
(4.43)
2007 x User 62.25*
(24.85)
Constant 142.13***
(0.89)
Number of observations 10,575
Number of individuals 4,210
Prob>F 0.0000
Notes: This table reports coefficient estimates and clustered standard errors on the individual
level in parentheses. The dependent variable is the amount donated by subject i in year t. The
model is specified as a fixed-effects model with standard errors clustered on the individual level.
2007 is a dummy variable which equals 1 for the campaign in 2007 in which our field experiment
was run (and 0 otherwise). Treated is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the subject was part of
treatment Choice (and 0 otherwise). User is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the subject used
the option to specify a donation target. 2007 x Treated and 2007 x User are the corresponding
interaction terms. Significance levels are denoted as follows: ∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
The regression only includes those subjects who have donated at least once in the two previous
years, leaving us with 2,026 subjects in the control group (1,046 in 2005 and 2006 and 980 in
2005 or 2006), 2,110 subjects in the treatment group who did not use the option (1,083 in 2005
and 2006 and 1,027 in 2005 or 2006) and 74 subjects in the treatment group who did use the
option to target their donation (26 in 2005 and 2006 and 48 in 2005 or 2006).
a recipient (rank-sum test, p = 0.0172; resp. p = 0.0571 when comparing all three
groups in 2007 using a Kruskal-Wallis test).
Result 4.2 Donors in the treatment group Choice who actually choose a re-
cipient for their benevolence donate significantly higher amounts. Moreover, they
donate significantly higher amounts than they did in previous years, while sub-
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jects who are given the option, but do not use it, do not significantly alter their
donations.
Table 4.3: Donation histories
Treatment Baseline Choice
Recipient specified? n/a no yes
Average Average Average
Campaign donation N donation N donation N
2005 145e 1430 144e 1455 130e 51
2006 148e 1642 142e 1738 141e 49
2007 135e 3036 138e 3239 160e 118
Concerning the previous result, it is important to consider at least two potential
confounds (we thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out to us). First, we
cannot rule out that time variant factors (e.g. income) have changed differently
across groups over time, which could potentially lead to biased estimates in our
regressions. Second, given the nature of a mail fundraising campaign and of the
mechanism that we study, one is inevitable confronted with sample attrition. This
implies that whether a donor actually responds and uses the option might not be
random, but instead might be related to some underlying donor characteristics
that we cannot observe.
4.4 Discussion
The results reported in this chapter might be particularly interesting for charitable
organizations that make use of mailing campaigns. On average, providing donors
with the option to choose their donation recipient does not increase total donations.
However, those donors who do use the option donate significantly higher amounts
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than they did in previous years. While our field experiment clearly demonstrated
these effects, more data is needed to sort out potential explanations and underlying
channels that drive behavior. In particular, why did most people prefer to leave the
reference-field on the remittance slip blank, thus sharing their donations equally
among the target countries instead of choosing a single recipient? This might
reflect a reluctance to consider the important tradeoff whom to help.69 It might
also be that our treatment manipulation was not salient enough, or that the steps
that one had to take for choosing a target were too “complicated” – in which
case our results should be considered a lower bound. In future research, it might
be interesting to see what happens, for example, if donors are forced to make a
decision, or if donors can state multiple amounts instead of choosing only a single
donation amount. It might also be interesting to get additional data on socio-
demographics or character traits from those subjects who did and from those who
did not donate (see, for example, Landry et al. 2006, or DellaVigna et al. 2012, who
gather more complete data through door-to-door elicitation that directly allow for
observation of a number of relevant subject traits). This would allow to study
selection effects in more detail, e.g. to check if different donors are attracted by a
campaign where money can be targeted to a specific country. Along these lines, one
might also want to collect data on actual empathy towards the countries included
in the choice set. Also repeated usage of our design might help to reveal potential
selection, resp. long-run composition effects of the solicitation design on donors
(see, for example, Landry et al. 2010 for this approach but studying different
mechanisms).
69For example, Ritov and Baron (1999) report evidence that people prefer not to decide on
a single recipient due to a reluctance to consider tradeoffs when those concern important, ‘pro-
tected’ values.
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Chapter 5
Small is Beautiful – Experimental
Evidence of Donors’ Preferences for
Charities∗
5.1 Introduction
When individuals make a real-life donation decision, they usually do not have
precise information about a charity’s income streams. They do not know whether
and how much their neighbors or other people in their social community donate
to a certain charity. Furthermore, it is questionable whether they are aware of
the exact amount of government subsidies given to that charity. They may rather
have a belief about the charity’s size in terms of entire revenues, i.e. whether it is
small or large. In this chapter, I report evidence on how we explored whether the
size of a charity increases or decreases the willingness to donate to that charity. To
this end, we conducted a donation experiment where we provided potential donors
with information about the charities’ revenues.
With regard to the impact of information about a charity’s revenues on chari-
69∗This contribution is joint work with Sarah Borgloh and Astrid Dannenberg and has been
published as ZEW Discussion Paper No. 10-052 (Borgloh et al. 2010a). We thank Bruno Frey,
Martin Kocher, Andreas Lange, Susanne Neckermann, Bodo Sturm, Christian Traxler, Joachim
Weimann, and Andreas Ziegler for very helpful comments and suggestions.
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table contributions, various approaches may be relevant. So far, most theoretical
models and empirical studies have analyzed either the effects of government con-
tributions or those of other individuals’ contributions on private donations. The
public goods model predicts complete or incomplete crowding out of voluntary con-
tributions by government financial support. On the other hand, the approaches of
quality signaling and conditional cooperation predict that donations increase with
others’ contributions. The experimental evidence hints at incomplete crowding
out of private donations by government subsidies, while several studies on social
information find a positive relation between others’ contributions and those of
one’s own. Unlike other approaches, the model of impact philanthropy explicitly
models the effect of an increase in a charity’s entire revenues - i.e. its endowment
- on donations. As the charity’s endowment goes up, the impact philanthropist’s
utility decreases because the relative impact of his or her donations is reduced.
In this chapter, a framed field experiment is presented where a non-student
subject pool was asked to make a real donation decision. Half of the subjects
could choose whether to give to a charity with relatively low annual revenues or
to a charity with relatively high annual revenues. We thereby present evidence
on the overall effect of a charity’s endowment on private donations and show a
negative relation between the two.
The outline of this chapter is as follows: Section 5.2 summarizes the findings
of the relevant theoretical and empirical literature and motivates our experimen-
tal framework. Section 5.3 describes the experimental setting before Section 5.4
delivers the results of the experiment. Section 5.5 concludes.
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5.2 Background and Motivation
Third-party contributions to a charity may stem from government subsidies or
other individuals’ donations, respectively. So far, several theoretical models and
empirical studies have separately looked at the effects of either government con-
tributions or others’ contributions on private donations.
The standard public goods model (Warr 1982, Roberts 1984, Bergstrom et
al. 1986), where an individual derives utility from private consumption as well
as the total supply of the public good, predicts that private contributions to the
public good are completely crowded out by government contributions to the same
good. It is reasonable, though, to assume that a potential donor also derives
positive utility from the mere act of contributing. Andreoni (1989, 1990) coins
the term ’warm glow’ to describe such preferences, where an individual’s utility
increases with the contributed amount. In this case, government contributions are
not a perfect substitute for voluntary contributions, which implies that the former
crowd out the latter only incompletely.
The empirical evidence on the theoretical predictions of crowding out is mixed.
While many studies find evidence for incomplete crowding out (among others
Ribar and Wilhelm 2002, Gruber and Hungerman 2007, Andreoni and Payne
2011)70, there is also empirical evidence for crowding in of voluntary contribu-
tions (e.g. Khanna et al. 1995, Khanna and Sandler 2000). Brooks (2000) uses
data for the special case of symphony orchestras and finds evidence for crowding
in at low levels of government funding and crowding out at high levels of govern-
ment funding indicating a non-linear relationship of private giving and government
70See Steinberg (1991) for a literature review
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funding. Furthermore, the majority of lab experiments, which test the hypothe-
sis of complete crowding out, find evidence for partial crowding out of voluntary
contributions (Andreoni 1993, Bolton and Katok 1998, Chan et al. 2002, Konow
2010).
As charities do not only earn income from government contributions, but also
from individuals’ private donations, further theoretical approaches have to be taken
into account. One approach is to model contributions by other individuals as a
signal of the charity’s quality as Vesterlund (2003) suggests. Typically, donations
are not made simultaneously, but rather in a sequential manner, where high dona-
tions by other individuals signal a high-quality charity which may induce donors
to give larger amounts to that organization. Andreoni (2006) remarks that lead-
ership gifts may also be perceived as a signal for the respective charity’s quality.
Furthermore, the phenomenon of conditional cooperation predicts that individuals
will be more willing to contribute if they know that others contribute (Fischbacher
et al. 2001). Several natural field experiments deliver evidence that information
about other individuals’ contributions affects donations positively, e.g. Frey and
Meier (2004), Croson and Shang (2008), Shang and Croson (2009), and Martin
and Randal (2008).
In his theory of impact philanthropy, Duncan (2004) explicitly models how a
change in a charity’s endowment affects individual donations. An impact philan-
thropist wants his or her donation to have a distinct effect on the supply of a
charitable good and thus to “personally make a difference”. According to Duncan
(2004), the revenues needed for the production of a charitable good consist of the
charity’s endowment e and the individual’s contributions g. The production func-
tion Z(y) with y = e + g satisfies Z ′ > 0 and Z ′′ < 0. The utility function of the
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impact philanthropist is V = U(w − g) + f(θ) where w is the individual’s wealth,
U
′
> 0 and f ′ > 0 and θ = Z(e + g) − Z(e) is the impact of the philanthropist’s
donation. Because
δV/δe = f ′(θ) · [Z ′(e+ g)− Z ′(e)] < 0 if g > 0, (5.1)
an increase in the charity’s endowment decreases the impact philanthropist’s
utility; the importance and the impact of the philanthropist’s donation are re-
duced. It then may be that an impact philanthropist - if provided with the choice
between two charities of different size - chooses to give to the charity with smaller
income streams because this strengthens the relative impact of his or her gift. The
model of impact philanthropy, however, does not lead to clear predictions how a
change in the endowment of a charity would affect the size of the gift.71 It can
be shown that δg∗/δe > −1, where g∗ is the contribution which maximizes the
impact philanthropist’s utility, so the direction of the effect is not clear a priori.
Moreover, Duncan (2004) emphasizes that an impact philanthropist dislikes the
administrative costs of a charity to be financed by his or her contribution because
this also reduces the charitable impact of the donation.
Our approach differs from previous experiments in two important aspects.
First, the information presented to each subject in our experiment consists of an
interval stating the yearly revenues received by an organization which comprises
donations, membership fees and public subsidies, i.e. its endowment. We deem
this kind of information to be very close to the situation potential donors find
themselves in the real world as they usually cannot distinguish the size of other
donors’ gifts and government subsidies. The information is provided to distinguish
71To keep our remarks as concise as possible, the interested reader is referred to Duncan (2004)
for a more detailed description of the derivation of this result.
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charities solely by their size. We empirically test the prediction of the model of
impact philanthropy by offering subjects two charities of different size for the same
charitable cause. If an increase in the endowment does affect utility negatively,
subjects should choose the smaller charity. Moreover, we test how a change in
the charity’s endowment affects the size of the gift and we compare the donation
decision of subjects who receive information about the charity’s endowment with
those who do not receive this information.
Second, we use a framed field experiment. Unlike in a natural field experiment,
subjects in a framed field experiment undertake the task in an artificial environ-
ment and know that they are part of an experiment (Harrison and List 2004).
Although this may bias the subjects’ behavior to some extent, we can make use
of the advantages of framed field experiments in terms of more control and the
elicitation of personal characteristics of our participants. In addition, we can ex-
ploit the fact that the donation decisions are made completely anonymously in our
setting. In door-to-door-fundraising, solicitation letter campaigns or other kinds of
donation campaigns the identity of the donor is usually known to the organization.
By means of our double-blind procedure, neither other experimental subjects nor
the experimenter know the decision made by a certain participant. This enables
us to rule out an experimenter effect or certain motivations such as signaling of
wealth (Glazer and Konrad 1996) or social approval (Holländer 1990). That such
social incentive effects can arise from removing anonymity or increasing visibility
is shown in the field (Soetevent 2005, 2011) as well as in the lab (Hoffman et
al. 1994, Andreoni and Petrie 2004).
Moreover, framed field experiments are characterized by a non-student sub-
ject pool and field context in the commodity and therefore offer more realism
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than conventional lab experiments (Harrison and List 2004). A weakness of lab
experiments is often seen in the low representativeness of the sample and, thus,
the lacking generalizability of results. Especially in the case of donation decisions
representativeness may be important. Carpenter et al. (2008), for example, show
that students in a lab experiment tend to be less likely to donate to a charity than
members from the broader community. In addition, a more representative sample
offers the possibility to analyze the impact of the socio-demographic characteristics
on charitable contributions.
5.3 Experimental Design
5.3.1 Implementation and participants
For subject recruitment, invitation letters were randomly distributed in the city of
Mannheim. The letter contained an invitation to take part in a scientific study and
informed people that they would receive 40e for participation. It was announced
that there would be a kind of survey in which they could (voluntarily and anony-
mously) make consumption decisions. We used a relatively high show-up fee in
order to avoid underrepresentation of people with high opportunity costs of time.
Furthermore, we already emphasized in the invitation letter that the money was a
reward for participation in the study in order to make people feel entitled to their
endowment and to avoid a bias due to unexpected gift money. The experiment
took place in July 2009 on the premises of the ZEW.
A total of 223 participants took part in the experiment. At the beginning of
each session, the participants individually drew lots to determine their ID number
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(which remained unknown to other participants and the experimenters) and chose
a table. The tables had privacy screens on every side to ensure private decisions
and answers. The participants were not allowed to talk to each other. If they
had questions, the experimenters answered them privately. The 12 experimental
sessions lasted around 60 minutes each.
Within one session, all subjects performed exactly the same task. At first, all
participants obtained detailed instructions about the course of the experiment,
see Appendix 5C. The main features were orally repeated. We emphasized that
all information given in the instructions were true. Each participant filled out a
questionnaire with questions about socio-demographic characteristics, their dona-
tion habits, and their attitude toward their own social standing within society and
toward government responsibilities. The attitudinal questions were taken from
the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS) which is conducted every two years
with a representative sample of the German population.72 At the end of each ses-
sion, the participants had the chance to comment on the experiment and to give
reasons for their decisions, see Figure 5.B1 for an overview of the experimental
proceedings.
The participants’ socio-demographic characteristics are shown in Table 5.A1.
The subject pool is highly diversified with, for example, age ranging from 18 to 75
years. Although it is not fully representative of the German resident population,
it is sufficiently diversified in all socio-demographic variables in order to examine
the influence of each variable on charitable behavior. Moreover, in case of gender,
income, and religion, the distribution of our subject pool does not significantly
differ from that of the German population (binomial test, chi squared test, t-test,
72For detailed information, see http://www.gesis.org/en/services/data/survey-data/allbus/.
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p≥0.1).73 More precisely, 46.2% of subjects are male. 22.9% dispose of a monthly
net household income of less than 1,000e most of the subjects live in households
with incomes between 1,000e and 3,000e and only 13.0% have more than 3,000e
per month disposable. With regard to religion, Catholics (31.4%) and Protestants
(31.8%) are equally represented, whereas 6.7% possess another religious affiliation
and 30.0% of all subjects do not belong to any religious community. The partic-
ipants’ responses to questions regarding their giving behavior in the past as well
as their attitudes are displayed in Tables 5.A2 and 5.A3, respectively.
5.3.2 Treatments
The experiment comprised two treatments which both contained a real donation
stage where the subjects simultaneously and independently decided how much (if
any) of their endowment to donate to a certain charity. The subjects were informed
that all of the selected charities have obtained the ’DZI Spendensiegel’, a label for
charities that use their funds economically and according to their statutes.74 The
subjects could choose one of four charitable causes, namely disabled care, devel-
opment aid, medical research, and animal protection. To avoid any reputation
effects, the subjects knew only the purpose but not the name of the organiza-
tions. The donation decision was completely voluntary and anonymous. We used
a double-blind procedure in which neither the other subjects nor the experimenters
came to know if, how much and to which cause a subject donated.
The subjects received a large envelope containing two small envelopes and the
endowment of 40e broken into two 10e notes, one 5e note, six 2e coins, and
73Unless stated otherwise, all tests in this chapter are two-sided.
74For more information (in German language), see www.dzi.de.
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three 1e coins. This breakdown enabled subjects to donate any integer amount
between 0 and 40e and abated incentives to only give the coins. The subjects
placed the amount they wished to donate in one of the small envelopes assigned
to donations, labeled the envelope with their ID number and, in case they were
willing to give a positive amount, the charitable cause to which they wished to
donate. The amount of money the subjects wished to keep for themselves was
placed in the other small envelope. Afterwards, the subjects dropped the sealed
envelope specified for donations in a box.
The baseline treatment (“NoInfo”) with 113 participants involved the above
described donation stage and the completion of the questionnaire. The 110 partic-
ipants in the treatment “Info” were informed not only about the charitable cause
of the organizations but also about the total revenues in 2006, which comprise
donations, membership fees and public subsidies. For each charitable cause, we
offered two organizations, one relatively small organization with revenues between
40,000 and 300,000e and one relatively large organization with revenues between 5
million and 11 million Euro. Thus, the subjects in this treatment could choose one
of eight organizations for their donation. All the donations made during the exper-
iment were transferred in full to the respective organizations. In case of the NoInfo
treatment, donations were equally assigned to small and large organizations of the
same cause. The counting of donations and the transfer to the organizations were
notarially monitored and certified. This procedure and the name of the notary
were also announced in the experimental instructions.75
75Some participants also completed another task (a dictator game) in the experiment which is
not part of this contribution, but is explained in detail in Borgloh et al. (2010b). As this task
did not affect the donation decision, we pooled the data.
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5.4 Results
5.4.1 The Effects of charities’ size
In total, 1,225e are donated to the charities. The mean donation per participant
is 5.49e or 13.7% of the endowment, the median donation is 3.00eB˙roken down
by purposes, 448e are donated to disabled care, 318e to development aid, 74e
to medical research, and 185e to animal protection. Disabled care is not only the
purpose which is selected most frequently (21%), but which also receives the high-
est average donations 9.53e. Whereas average donations do not significantly differ
between the four purposes, animal protection is the only charitable cause which is
chosen with a probability significantly below 0.25 (binomial test 5% significance).
Overall, 33% of the subjects do not make a donation at all. Table 5.1 contains the
descriptive statistics of the donation decisions.
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics
Total Average
N Share donation donation
(in %) (in e) (in e)
No donation 74 33 0 0
Donation 149 67 1,225 8.22
Disabled care 47 21 448 9.53
Development aid 39 17 318 8.15
Medical research 38 17 274 7.21
Animal protection 25 11 185 7.4
Total 223 100 1,225 5.49
In the NoInfo treatment in which the subjects do not obtain information about
charity revenues, the mean donation per participant is 5.56e. In the Info treatment
in which subjects obtain this information, the mean donation is 5.43e, see Table
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5.2. Interestingly, providing participants with the information about a charity’s
revenues and giving them the opportunity to choose between charities of differ-
ent size neither has an impact on individual donations nor on the probability to
select a certain charitable cause. However, it shifts donations within the group
of subjects who are given the choice and the information; 455eare donated to
the small organizations and only 132eare donated to the large organizations. On
average, the participants donate 8.92eto the small organizations and 6.95eto the
large organizations; this difference, however, is not statistically significant.
Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics - NoInfo versus Info Treatment
Total Average
N Share donation donation
(in %) (in e) (in e)
NoInfo treatment 113 100 628 5.56
No donation 35 31 0 0
Donation 78 69 628 8.05
Info treatment 110 100 597 5.43
No donation 39 36 0 0
Small organization 51 46 455 8.92
Large organization 19 17 132 6.95
Total 223 100 1,225 5.49
Out of the 110 subjects who receive the information and make a positive dona-
tion, 73% choose the small organization, and only 27% choose the large organiza-
tion. Thus, the shift of donations occurs mainly because the small organizations
are selected more frequently than the large organizations (chi squared test 1%
significance). We observe this effect for all the charitable causes, but if we look
at each cause separately it is only significant for disabled care (chi squared test
1% significance, compare Figure 5.1). Indeed, the preference for the small organi-
zations appears to be very pronounced in the case of disabled care; here, 86% of
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donors choose the small organization while only 14% choose the large one. In case
of development aid (medical research, animal protection), 68 (64, 69)% of donors
select the small organization.
Figure 5.1: Selection of organization size in the Info treatment (in % of donors)
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Overall, this result supports the prediction derived from impact philanthropy
theory that an increase in a charity’s endowment decreases the donor’s willingness
to give to that charity. So, if provided with the choice of charities of different size
which serve the same charitable cause, individuals tend to prefer the small ones.
However, there may be some other possible reasons for this preference which are
not captured by the impact philanthropy model. For example, Fong and Luttmer
(2009) show that people who feel close to their racial or ethnic group donate
substantially more when the recipients are of the same race than when they are
from a different race. Similar reasoning may hypothesize that people who feel
close to their region are more likely to donate to small charities if they associate
them with more local activities. Furthermore, it may be that in case of medical
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research, for example, donors deem a large charity to be more effective than many
small charities in fighting diseases whereas they prefer smaller and possibly more
locally oriented charities in the case of disabled care.
For this reason, we conducted an ex-post online survey with the subjects who
participated in the Info treatment. The survey was completely anonymous and
contained questions about the decisions in the experiment, namely (i) whether
subjects donated a positive amount, if so (ii) to which charitable cause, (iii) to a
small or a large organization, and given that choice (iv) for what reason they chose
the small or the large organization. All questions offered predetermined answers
including the option “I cannot remember”. If participants had chosen the small
organization, they were provided with the following answers: “For my decision
to donate to the small organization, it was decisive that (a) my donation to the
small organization has a higher impact compared to a large organization, (b) small
organizations are discriminated against compared to large ones and therefore need
more support, (c) small organizations have lower administrative costs compared to
large ones and therefore my donation is more likely to benefit the actual charitable
cause, (d) small organizations are more likely to act on a local level compared to
large ones, (e) small organizations are more specialized in certain fields of activity
compared to large ones, (f) other reasons.”
If participants had chosen the large organization, they were provided with the
following options: “For my decision to donate to the large organization, it was de-
cisive that (a) the large organization was able to already collect many funds (con-
sisting of donations, membership fees and public subsidies), (b) large organizations
can achieve more with my donation than the small ones, (c) large organizations
have a higher level of familiarity compared to small ones, (d) large organizations
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are more likely to act professionally compared to small ones, (e) other reasons.”
In both cases, the order of the predetermined options varied randomly between
participants, they could select several options and give further reasons in an open
description field.
Figure 5.2: Reasons to choose the small organization (in % of donors)
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Out of the 104 individuals who were invited to the survey 81 individuals took
part.76 The statements made in the survey are consistent with the observed behav-
ior in the experiment, i.e. there are no significant differences between the survey
data and the experimental data. For example, the 68% of responders stating in
the survey that they donated a positive amount correspond to 64% who in fact do-
nated a positive amount in the experiment. The reasons which are mentioned most
frequently for the decision to choose a small organization are lower administrative
costs (50%) and a possible higher impact of the own donation (44%), see Figure
76As an incentive to participate, everyone who completed the survey took part in a drawing
for 5 times 30e. A few people completed the survey via mail because they did not provide an
email address. Six participants in the Info treatment were not invited to the survey because they
did not provide any contact details.
193
5.2. Recall that both of these motives are captured by the impact philanthropy
theory. A further reason which is mentioned frequently is the neediness of small
organizations (39%), indicating that crowding out considerations may also play a
role.
Regarding the choice of the large organization, the most frequently stated rea-
son is the professionalism of large organizations (86%) followed by the achievement
of objectives (43%) and the apparent ability to acquire funds (29%). All these mo-
tivations support the quality signaling approach. However, this signal attracts
only few donors in our experiment.
5.4.2 The effects of individual characteristics
In the following, we report the results from a series of econometric estimations
to explore the impact of various socio-demographic variables which have been
surveyed in the questionnaire.77 Around 33% of the subjects decided not to donate,
hence there is a large number of observations clustered at zero donations. In this
case, ordinary least squares estimates would not be accurate, so we conduct a
maximum likelihood estimation of a Tobit model. In the baseline estimation,
we include the following socio-demographic variables: age, household size as the
absolute number of household members including children, dummy variables for
male subjects, unmarried subjects, subjects not having any religious affiliation (no
religion), voters of the left party, highly educated subjects (owning a graduate
degree), and high income subjects (monthly net household income of 2,000e or
more).
77The number of observations in the econometric analysis corresponds to the number of sub-
jects with complete socio-demographic information.
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We additionally include four attitudinal variables taken from the German Gen-
eral Social Survey (ALLBUS) to control for one’s perceived standing within soci-
ety and the attitude towards the state. More precisely, the variable position is a
dummy variable for subjects thinking they receive their fair share or more com-
pared to others living in Germany. The variable disparities is coded as ’1’ for those
subjects believing that the social disparities in Germany are just. The variable
state resp is a dummy for subjects who want the state to care for a good living in
case of illness, misery, unemployment, and old age. Similarly, the variable equalize
takes the value 1 if a subject indicates that it is the responsibility of the state
to reduce income disparities. Although it is quite common to include attitudinal
variables in econometric estimations (e.g. Corneo and Grüner 2002), the causality
between these variables and the dependent variable (donations) may run in both
directions, i.e. these variables may be endogenous.
For this reason, Table 5.3 displays both estimations without and with attitu-
dinal variables (column (1) and (2)) in order to show whether effects are robust to
this modification. The specification in column (2) furthermore includes a dummy
variable for the subjects who already made a charitable donation in the year 2009
(donor 2009 ) in order to control for offsetting effects. Furthermore, we run both
estimations excluding outliers (column (3) and (4)). Outliers are defined as those
subjects donating more than half their endowment (20e, five subjects).
Our results show a positive and highly significant effect of age on charitable
contributions, whereas the coefficients for male donors and household size are not
significant. These findings are robust across all four specifications. Moreover,
across all four estimations, the voters of the left party - which tend to assign the
responsibility for tackling social issues to the government - give significantly smaller
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Table 5.3: Tobit estimation results
Dependent variable: amount donated
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Including outliers Excluding outliers
Age 0.232*** 0.236*** 0.170*** 0.183***
-3.760 -3.780 -3.461 -3.648
Male -1.563 -1.658 -0.773 -1.083
(-1.094) (-1.147) (-0.689) (-0.950)
Household size -0.0062 -0.125 -0.298 -0.461
(-0.00738) (-0.147) (-0.451) (-0.686)
Unmarried 6.419*** 5.893*** 4.193*** 4.099**
-3.201 -2.939 -2.646 -2.572
No religion -1.279 -1.200 -3.179** -3.120**
(-0.812) (-0.762) (-2.522) (-2.457)
Left party -9.109*** -9.315*** -6.822*** -6.611***
(-2.996) (-2.996) (-2.899) (-2.747)
Education 3.991*** 3.962** 2.187* 2.271*
-2.622 -2.593 -1.834 -1.890
Income 4.695*** 4.614*** 3.357** 3.353**
-2.722 -2.675 -2.480 -2.470
Donor 2009 -2.194 -1.369
(-1.333) (-1.058)
Position 0,0959 -0.301
(0.0621) (-0.248)
Disparities 0.988 1.730
(0.605) -1.349
State resp -2.541 -0.212
(-1.411) (-0.145)
Equalize 1.100 -0.467
(0.748) (-0.398)
cons -11.27*** -9.088* -5.904* -5.685
(-2.671) (-1.931) (-1.782) (-1.532)
No. observations 189 189 184 184
LR Chi2 44.53*** 49.09*** 39.95*** 43.39***
Pseudo R2 0.042 0.046 0.041 0.045
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amounts than all other subjects whereas being unmarried affects the donation
decision positively.
The subjects without a religious affiliation seem to make significantly lower
contributions, but the corresponding coefficient is only significant when outliers
are excluded. As expected from previous empirical investigations, high income
and high education both have a positive impact on donations although the signif-
icance levels vary according to the estimation specification. The relation between
donations in the experiment and donations that have been made in the year 2009
previously to the experiment is negative, though not significant. Furthermore, the
attitudinal variables do not have any explanatory power.78
5.5 Conclusions
The results of our experiment contribute to the understanding of how the provision
of information about charities’ entire revenues affects individual donation decisions.
We deem this kind of information to be realistic, because in real-life donation
decisions, individuals usually do not precisely know whether and how much other
individuals or government institutions have given to a charity, but rather have a
belief about its size. While the announcement of other individuals’ contributions,
as implemented in previous experiments, is likely to lead to the emergence of anchor
points or the desire to comply with own or others’ expectations, the information
provided in our experiment does not point in one specific direction, but rather
offers two charities of different size.
78We also investigated whether the subjects’ characteristics differ between donors choosing the
small organization and donors choosing the large organization. Using a nested logit model, we
do not find any significant differences between the two groups.
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Providing individuals with the information about the charities’ revenues and
the opportunity to choose between small and large charities increases neither the
propensity to donate nor the donated amount compared to the situation without
this information. We do find, however, that the subjects prefer to give to small
charities with relatively low revenues as compared to large charities. Thus, our
results support the predictions that may be derived from the model of impact
philanthropy by Duncan (2004), which assumes that donors try to achieve the
biggest impact possible with their charitable contribution. More precisely, in our
experiment donors prefer smaller charities to larger ones, confirming the theoret-
ical prediction that an impact philanthropist’s utility decreases with a charity’s
endowment. As our survey results show, however, crowding out considerations
as well as quality considerations as suggested by Vesterlund (2003) and Andreoni
(2006) also play a role for some donors.
Moreover, the results of our econometric analysis confirm previous findings
that the individual willingness to donate increases with the subjects’ age, income,
and education (e.g. Pharoah and Tanner 1997, Schervish and Havens 1997). This
suggests that the donation decisions in our experiment are a good indicator of real-
life decisions. As individuals with certain characteristics are more likely to react
positively when provided with the opportunity to make a donation, fundraisers
may be able to increase donations by specifically targeting those individuals.
The key result of our study, the donors’ preference for smaller charities, has
to be seen in the light of the experimental design. The experiment offered the
participants a choice of pre-selected charities which all fulfill a certain minimum
quality standard. Thus, the preference for small charities is conditional on third-
party validation and may be different in the absence of such validation. Indeed,
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the lack of convergence of small and large charities, that would eventually be a
consequence of our findings, may be explained by this design element.
Our findings are nevertheless important as they indicate a general preference
for smaller charities when the donors can assume a minimum quality. Interestingly,
the strength of the preference for small charities differs between the four charitable
causes. For charities which are active in the field of medical research, for example,
this preference is not as strong as in the case of disabled care. Donors may deem
a large charity to be more effective than many small charities in fighting diseases
whereas they prefer smaller and possibly more locally oriented charities in the case
of disabled care. Thus, the natural size of a charity depends on the charitable cause
it engages in, which means that there would hardly be any convergence between
small and large charities.
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Appendix 5
5.A - Tables
Table 5.A1: Socio-demographic characteristics of participants
Variable State N Share (in %)
Gender Male 103 46.19
Female 119 53.36
No answer 1 0.45
Age 18 - 29 73 32.74
30 - 44 60 26.91
45 - 59 54 24.22
60 - 75 34 15.25
No answer 2 0.90
Family status Single 139 62.33
Married 45 20.18
Divorced 31 13.90
Widowed 6 2.69
No answer 2 0.90
Children Yes 34 15.25
No 189 84.75
Household size 1 102 45.74
2 82 36.77
3 21 9.42
4 or more 17 7.62
No answer 1 0.45
Education University 88 39.46
Gymnasium (12 years of education) 58 26.01
Realschule (10 years of education) 35 15.70
Hauptschule (9 years of education) 23 10.31
Other 17 7.62
No graduation 2 0.90
Nationality German 192 86.1
Turkish 2 0.90
Italian 3 1.35
Polish 2 0.90
Other 23 10.31
No answer 1 0.45
Total 223 100
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Table 5.A1 cont.: Socio-demographic characteristics of participants
Variable State N Share (in %)
Houshold ≤ 1,000e 51 22.87
net income 1,000 - 2,000e 85 38.12
2,000 - 3,000e 44 19.73
3,000 - 4,000e 13 5.83
4,000 - 5,000e 8 3.59
≥ 5,000e 8 3.59
No Answer 14 6.28
Religion Catholic 70 31.39
Evangelic 71 31.84
Muslim 5 2.24
Other 10 4.48
No religion 67 30.04
Voting Christian Democratic / Social Union 43 19.28
behavior Social Democratic Party 49 21.97
The Greens 42 18.83
Free Democratic Party 25 11.21
Left Party 17 7.62
Other 9 4.04
Nonvoter 17 7.62
No answer 21 9.42
Total 223 100
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Table 5.A2: Charitable giving habits of participants
Variable State N Share (in%)
Donated Yes 189 84.75
before No 34 15.25
Modal Child or disabled care 46 20.63
charitable Emergency aid 12 5.38
cause Medical research 13 5.83
Church and religious purposes 11 4.93
Environment or animal protection 32 14.35
Development aid 39 17.49
General (e.g. Red Cross) 20 8.97
Culture 3 1.35
Politics 2 0.9
Local welfare services, homeless persons,
poverty 8 3.59
No answer (incl. 34 subjects who did
not donate before) 37 16.59
Contribution Always 60 26.91
receipt Mostly 36 16.14
received Sometimes 42 18.83
Never 49 21.97
No answer (incl. 34 subjects who did
not donate before) 36 16.14
Donated in Yes 67 30.04
2009 No 156 69.96
Total 223 100
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Table 5.A3: Attitudes of participants towards society and government responsibil-
ities
Question / Statement Answer N Share (in %)
Compared with how others live in Very much less 20 8.97
Germany: Do you think you get Somewhat less 61 27.36
your fair share, more than your Fair share 104 46.64
fair share, somewhat less, or very More than fair share 19 8.52
much less than your fair share? Don’t know 19 8.52
All in all, I think the social Completely agree 14 6.28
differences in this country Tend to agree 65 29.15
are just. Tend to disagree 90 40.36
Completely disagree 50 22.42
Don’t know 4 1.79
It is the responsibility of the Completely agree 74 33.18
state to meet everyone’s needs, Tend to agree 104 46.64
even in case of sickness, Tend to disagree 35 15.7
poverty, unemployment Completely disagree 4 1.79
and old age. Don’t know 6 2.69
It is the responsibility of the Strongly agree 32 14.35
government to reduce the Agree 73 32.74
differences in income Neither agree nor disagree 39 17.49
between people with high Disagree 48 21.52
incomes and those with Strongly disagree 17 7.62
low incomes. Can’t choose, don’t know 14 6.28
Total 223 100
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5.B - Figures
Figure 5.B1: Proceedings of the experiment
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5.C - Experimental instructions (translated from German)
Welcome! Thank you very much for participating in our study for the analysis of
consumer behavior. Enclosed in this folder, you find information which you need
during this event. You may return pages to which you have already gone through
at any time. Please turn pages only up to the next “stop-sign”. You will be asked to
turn to the next page. Please only read the respective text and do not act until you
receive specific instructions to follow the assignment. Please follow the instructions
carefully. We also would like to ask you not to talk to other participants. We want
to emphasize that all information which we gain from today’s event will only be
used to draw a comparison between the groups of participants. No individual data
about the participants will be published or passed on. Shortly, we will come up to
your seat and you will draw a piece of paper with a number on it. This number will
serve as your personal identification number (ID) throughout the study. Please
state your ID whenever you are asked to do so during the study. The ID ensures
anonymity, as neither other participants nor we know your name or the ID that
belongs to it.
– STOP sign: Please do not turn the page until we ask you to! –
For your participation in the study, you will receive 40e. Shortly, we will hand
out the money in an envelope. Then we ask you to confirm the receipt. After-
wards, you will get the opportunity to donate any preferred amount of money to a
charitable cause. There is a charitable organization behind every charitable cause.
The money which you, if any, will donate, will be completely transferred to the
respective charity. We guarantee that this will happen lawfully and will have the
transfer supervised and verified by the director of the notary’s office, [name of the
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notary]. All selected charitable organizations hold the “donation seal” by the state-
approved German Central Institute for Social Issues (Deutsches Zentralinstitut für
soziale Fragen (DZI)). This assures that the organizations act autonomously and
charitably and that the usage of their financial means is reviewable, economical
and statutory. The names of the individual organizations will at this point - for
scientific reasons - not be mentioned. We guarantee that all information you re-
ceive from us regarding the organizations is true. At the end of the experiment, we
are happy to hand to you a list of all organizations upon request. In the following,
we present to you four different charitable causes to which you can donate in the
course of this study. The four charitable causes are:
• Medical research
• Animal protection
• Disabled care
• Development aid
[Additional part mentioned only in the Info Treatment: The organizations you
may donate to do not only differ with regard to their charitable causes, but also
their revenues, which these organizations have generated in 2006 from donations,
membership fees and government grants. For each charitable cause, we offer you a
charitable organization with relatively small revenues between 40,000 and 300,000e
and organizations with rather large revenues between 5 million and 11 millione.
Therefore, we ask you, in the case you donate, to pick one of the following
organizations:
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Medical research Revenues 2006: 40,000e - 300,000e
Medical research Revenues 2006: 5 millione - 11 millione
Animal protection Revenues 2006: 40,000e - 300,000e
Animal protection Revenues 2006: 5 millione - 11 millione
Disabled care Revenues 2006: 40,000e - 300,000e
Disabled care Revenues 2006: 5 millione - 11 millione
Development aid Revenues 2006: 40,000e - 300,000e
Development aid Revenues 2006: 5 millione - 11 millione ]
We now hand out to you an envelope with the money you receive for your
participation in our study.
– STOP sign: Please do not turn the page until we ask you to! –
In the envelope, you find:
• one white envelope
• one blue envelope
• 40e, composed of two 10e-bills, one 5e-bill, six 2e-coins and three 1e-coins
• one receipt.
We now ask you to sign the receipt you find enclosed. By doing so, you confirm
that you have received 40e from [name of the institution] for the participation in
this study. We need the receipt for administrative purposes. Without a receipt we
are not allowed to give you the money. Your data is still handled confidentially and
anonymized. We will now collect the receipts, the study will continue hereafter.
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– STOP sign: Please do not turn the page until we ask you to! –
Now you can make a donation decision. You can decide freely and anonymously
whether and how much money you want to give to one of the above-mentioned
charitable organizations. The amount of money you put into the blue envelope
will benefit a charitable cause and will be transferred completely to the respective
charity after the experiment. You will keep the amount of money you put into the
white envelope.
The study proceeds as follows: 1.) Make your donation decision. In case of
a donation, please tick the desired charitable organization on the blue envelope.
Please note that you have to choose one of the four [in the Info treatment: eight]
charities given. It is not possible to choose more than one charitable organization
for your donation. Please tick only one organization if you wish to donate. If you
tick more than one organization, unfortunately, we will not be able to transfer
the donation. If you do not wish to donate, please do not tick any organization.
2.) Write down your ID-number into the predefined box on the blue envelope,
irrespective of whether you wish to donate or not. 3.) Put the desired donation
amount into the blue envelope. 4.) Put the amount of money you wish to keep
into the white envelope. Finally, you should have distributed 40e completely to
the two envelopes. Please note that any distribution in full amounts of Euros is
possible. You may put any desired amount of money into both envelopes. It is
also possible to put 40e completely into one envelope. 5.) Seal up both envelopes.
When all participants have finished, we will come up to you and collect the
blue envelope. When we do so, please put the blue envelope into the box. Please
keep the white envelope. We guarantee that your donation will be transferred to
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the charitable organization lawfully and have the transfer supervised and verified
by the director of the notary’s office, [name of the notary]. We will explain the
most important items once again orally. Afterwards, please make your decision as
described above.79
79Next to the questionnaire, which is available from the author upon request, some of the
subjects also got instruction on playing a dictator game, see Borgloh et al. (2010b) for more
information.
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